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[T]he affective quality of the world matters more than its 
geography.
Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology  
of Aesthetic Experience, 1953
[Feeling] is nothing without form.
Gustave Flaubert, Letter to Louise Colet, 12 August 1846
I
I would like to begin, if I may, in a rather unpredictable place: provincial France in the summer of 1789. At this time, the country was undergoing 
a political and economic crisis that has been well-documented. The 
harvest had failed, food prices were rising, and unemployment was 
rife. In Paris, the Revolution was gathering momentum, and as news 
of the fall of the Bastille filtered through to the provinces, a number 
of rumours began to circulate. It was said that the aristocracy were 
planning to subdue the uprising by force, and that they had recruited 
foreign soldiers and ‘brigands’ in order to do so. It was also said that 
this army of mercenaries would be marching through the provinces to 
quell the various disturbances that had taken place there too. These 
rumours travelled with astonishing speed, and as they moved from 
village to village, they produced a particular kind of affective response 
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that has come to be known as the Great Fear of 1789. People everywhere 
experienced an overwhelming sense of panic and anxiety, but this was 
not a vague and intangible national mood; it was a circulation of feeling 
whose speed and specific coordinates, at any given point in time, can 
be traced with remarkable accuracy (see Figure 1). According to Georges 
Lefebvre, the fear travelled from Clermont-en-Beauvaisis to the Seine, 
a distance of about fifty kilometres, in twelve hours. As it moved more 
slowly at night, it covered the five hundred kilometres from Ruffec to 
Lourdes in nine days, while elsewhere it travelled ‘from Livron to Arles – 
a hundred and fifty kilometres – in forty hours, which makes [an average 
of] four kilometres an hour, night and day’ (Lefebvre, Great 155).1 In his 
classic study of the Revolution, Lefebvre was able to follow the progress 
of this emotion as it was transmitted throughout the provinces:
A ‘disturbance’ at Nantes alarmed Poitou. At Estrées-Saint-Denis, in the 
Beauvais, another spread fright in all directions. A third in southern 
Champagne sowed terror through the Gâtinais, Bourbonnais, and 
Burgundy. A fourth, originating near the Montmirail forest, close to 
La Ferté-Bernard, alerted Maine, Normandy, Anjou, and the Touraine. 
From the edge of the Chizé forest fear struck Angoulême, spread 
into Berry and the central mountains, alarmed Aquitaine as far as 
the Pyrenees. In the east, agrarian revolts in Franche-Comté and the 
Mâconnais drove fear to the shores of the Mediterranean. (French 
123–24)
By exploring this phenomenon in such detail, Lefebvre was attempting 
to rectify a tendency, among other historians of the period, to ignore 
the affective dimensions of the Revolution – or to ascribe the events of 
that year, in passing, to the irrational and pathological nature of ‘crowd 
psychology.’ For Lefebvre, by contrast, the Great Fear played a central 
role in the Revolution of 1789. It emerged as a response to quite specific 
political and economic circumstances, and it directly influenced the 
subsequent course of the Revolution – by mobilizing various rural 
militias, by bringing disparate communities together, and, above all, by 
disseminating revolutionary fervour throughout the provinces, so that 
many of those who experienced the Great Fear would later participate 
in the uprising against the ‘seigneurial regime’ (Lefebvre, Great 211).
 1 If Balzac is to be believed, however, this was a good deal slower than the 
speed at which rumour moved through the residential areas of nineteenth-




Figure 1. The Great Fear of 1789
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As we shall see, the Great Fear demonstrates many of the features that 
will be essential to my discussion of emotion in Affective Disorders. But I 
could easily have begun elsewhere too – in Tanganyika (Tanzania), say, 
in the early sixties. On 30 January 1962, three girls in a mission school 
in the village of Kashasha (see Figure 2) started to laugh uncontrollably. 
This laughter spread rapidly throughout the student body and showed 
no sign of diminishing as the weeks passed. By the time the school was 
forced to close, on 18 March, ninety-five out of 159 students had been 
infected. During this period, the ‘disease’ was also transmitted to the 
neighbouring villages of Nshamba (where 217 people were infected), 
Ramashenye (where forty-eight were infected), and Kanyangereka 
(where the rate of infection was not recorded). In every case, the 
symptoms were the same: the afflicted person would succumb to 
hysterical laughter that might last anywhere between a few minutes and 
a few hours, followed by a respite and then a recurrence. This pattern 
Figure 2. The Tanganyika Laughter Epidemic of 1962
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would be repeated for several hours or up to sixteen days, depending 
on the severity of the episode, during which time the individual would 
be unable to perform his or her normal duties and would be difficult to 
control. An epidemic of this kind was unprecedented, and so there was 
no traditional name for it in the local languages. The Bahaya people, who 
constitute the majority in north-western Tanzania, referred to it either 
as enwara yokusheka (‘the laughing disease’) or as akajanja, which simply 
means ‘madness.’ Although some people believed that the disorder was 
a consequence of poisoned maize flour, this possibility was quickly 
eliminated – as was the theory that the laughter may have had a viral 
aetiology. In a contemporary article on the subject, A.M. Rankin and 
P.J. Philip conclude that as none of the infected people demonstrated 
any physical abnormalities, and the possibility of poison had been 
eliminated, the condition was almost certainly ‘culturally determined’ – 
that is to say, it was a type of ‘mental disorder’ that had been influenced 
by the precise social and cultural circumstances in which the afflicted 
found themselves (170). ‘As the commoner epidemics are caused by 
the spread of viruses, bacteria, or parasites,’ Rankin and Philip write, 
‘there is a tendency to forget that abnormal emotional behaviour may 
spread from person to person and so take on an epidemic form’ (167). 
In this instance, the emotion that was being transmitted was not as 
congenial as it may have appeared to be at first glance. Such episodes 
were often accompanied by feelings of restlessness and anxiety, as if 
the person was ‘frightened of something’ (168) or being pursued; and in 
some cases, they would become so agitated that they would have to be 
physically restrained. As François Sirois observes, hysteria of this kind 
frequently coincides with a ‘state of ideological or cultural transition’ 
and may also occur during ‘periods of uncertainty and social stress,’ 
such as those occasioned by war, famine, or even rapid technological 
change (106). In the case I have just outlined, it may be worth noting 
that Tanganyika had gained full independence on 9 December 1961, 
less than two months before the outbreak of the ‘laughter epidemic’ – 
and some of the uncertainties generated by this moment of profound 
social and political transformation may well have contributed to the 
‘abnormal emotional behaviour’ that subsequently occurred.2
 2 Along with the political and economic difficulties it was facing during this 
period, Tanganyika had also been suffering from a famine since 1960 (the 
worst for seventy years); and as the country declared its independence, 
nearly half a million people were still receiving famine relief (Iliffe 576). 
According to Robert R. Provine, the ‘laughter epidemic’ only came to an 
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In this study, I will be exploring the process by which certain sociopo-
litical forces give rise to dominant ‘structures of feeling’ within colonial 
and postcolonial societies. I shall be arguing, furthermore, that these 
affective qualities also make their presence felt within literary discourse, 
where they penetrate even the deeper reaches of form, genre, and 
style.3 In order to make such an argument, I will be placing particular 
emphasis on three characteristic features of emotion (as demonstrated 
by the Great Fear and the ‘laughter epidemic’) – namely, (1) the fact that 
emotion is both psychogenic and sociogenic (i.e., socially transmitted); 
(2) the fact that emotion may be determined by quite specific historical 
processes; and (3) the fact that emotion is inherently mobile, a quality of 
feeling that moves easily from one body to another, from one structure 
to another, and from one place to another (see Figures 1 and 2).4 
Of course, all three of these features are interrelated and mutually 
enabling. In other words, it is precisely because it is sociogenic (and 
subject to various historical contingencies) that emotion acquires such 
mobility; and this is also why it is able to penetrate the deeper reaches 
of literary discourse, for good or for ill. Once emotion becomes detached 
from the individual consciousness, circulating freely within the larger 
community, it becomes, to quote Mikel Dufrenne, ‘a supervening or 
impersonal principle in accordance with which we [might] say that there 
is an electric atmosphere or, as Trenet sang, that there is joy in the air’ 
(168). And once an emotion becomes depersonalized in this way, once 
it merges with the general ‘atmosphere’ of a particular place or time, it 
very quickly achieves a kind of ubiquity, percolating into almost every 
end two and a half years later, in June 1964, having infected an estimated 
one thousand people (131). For more on this subject, see Hempelmann.
 3 It goes without saying that the study of emotion has a long transdis-
ciplinary genealogy – encompassing philosophy, evolutionary biology, 
anthropology, aesthetics, history, sociology, rhetoric, psychology, 
cognitive science, psychoanalysis, neurobiology, and literary and cultural 
studies. For a useful overview of these intertwined genealogies, see 
Plamper; and for an intellectual history of the ‘emotion sciences’ that 
traces their development since the 1960s, see Leys.
 4 If we turn to the Oxford English Dictionary, we find that the etymology of 
the word itself alludes to each of these characteristics. Originally derived 
from the Latin emovere (‘to remove,’ ‘to shift [or] displace’), ‘emotion’ would 
go on to accrue a social significance (‘a public commotion or uprising’ 
[1562]), an historical connotation (‘any strong mental or instinctive feeling 
[deriving] from one’s circumstances’ [1602]), and a sense of mobility (‘[a] 
movement from one place to another; a migration’ [1596]).
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area of social and cultural life.5 Indeed, I would go so far as to argue 
that emotion (thus understood) is what ultimately unites the categories 
of the literary-aesthetic and the sociopolitical – not only in a straight-
forward mimetic sense, but also at a deeper, discursive level, as the 
literary artefact itself internalizes the dominant structures of feeling 
circulating within society at large.
Rather than understanding emotion as necessarily subjective or 
individualized, then, I shall regard it here as a relational practice that 
may be socially or even politically determined. Or to put it another 
way, I will argue that literary representations of emotion need not 
be interpreted solely at the level of character, individual psychology, 
or the contingencies of plotting, but could also be related to wider 
historical processes. This shift in emphasis acknowledges the intersub-
jective quality of such emotional responses and, in so doing, challenges 
some of the boundaries that have traditionally insulated the individual 
from the collective, the psychological from the social. In The Transmission 
of Affect, Teresa Brennan makes a similar point, arguing that the feelings 
of ‘one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects 
entail, can enter into another’ (3). According to Brennan, this process 
of affective transmission ‘alters the biochemistry and neurology of the 
subject. The “atmosphere” or the environment literally gets into the 
individual. Physically and biologically, something is present that was not 
there before, but it … was not generated solely or sometimes even in 
part by the individual organism or its genes’ (1). Although such a claim 
may blur the boundaries between self and other, subject and object, 
the psychological and the social, I believe it is important to maintain 
some distinction between these ‘opposing’ categories – rather than 
seeing ourselves as mere repositories of disembodied affective energies, 
whether they be positive or negative, euphoric or dysphoric. And this is 
 5 In Melancholy and Society, for instance, Wolf Lepenies describes the 
collective sense of boredom that plagued the French aristocracy as they 
were increasingly marginalized by Louis XIII and Louis XIV. ‘This boredom,’ 
he writes, ‘which stemmed directly from the position of an aristocracy 
both disempowered and relieved of its duties,’ was ‘socially transmitted 
and a phenomenon of interpersonal action’ (40); it ‘took hold of everyone, 
the members of the salon as well as the [courtiers], the former Frondeurs 
as well as nobles loyal to the king’ (39). One may also be reminded of the 
‘objective neurosis’ that Jean-Paul Sartre, in his multivolume biography of 
Flaubert, attributes to Second Empire society following the Revolution of 
1848 – and the connection he draws between this social pathology and 
the ‘subjective neurosis’ of Flaubert himself (Family 619).
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something that Brennan herself readily concedes: ‘We may influence the 
registration of the transmitted affect in a variety of ways,’ she writes, as 
‘affects are not received or registered in a vacuum. If I feel anxiety when 
I enter [a] room, then that will influence what I perceive or receive by 
way of an “impression” (a word that means what it says)’ (6).6 So although 
I will be arguing here that emotion is at least partly sociogenic, I shall 
also be retaining some sense of individuality (or the ‘subject’) in order to 
acknowledge our capacity to resist affective interpellation – our ability 
to defy the ‘psychology’ of the crowd, or the social rules that govern our 
emotional behaviour, or the dominant structures of feeling that may be 
characteristic of the historical period in which we live.
I have employed the phrase ‘structure of feeling’ more than once 
now, and I should probably define this term more precisely before 
proceeding. It is, of course, derived from the work of Raymond 
Williams, who uses it to describe the ‘specifically affective elements 
of consciousness’ (Marxism 132) that could be said to characterize any 
given historical period. For Williams, the term ‘structure of feeling’ 
designates the affective quality of our lives at a particular point in time 
– not the dominant ideologies or doctrines of the day, but the way in 
which these more ‘concrete’ and easily delineated forces are registered 
at an intuitive, emotional level. ‘The most difficult thing to get hold of, 
in studying any past period,’ Williams writes in The Long Revolution,
is [a] felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time: a 
sense of the ways in which the particular activities combined into a 
way of thinking and living … The term I would suggest to describe it 
is structure of feeling: it is as firm and definite as ‘structure’ suggests, 
yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our 
activity. (63–64)
The structure of feeling was, for Williams, a way of collectivizing 
our affective lives. Although we may register the ‘atmosphere’ of an 
 6 Similarly, in The Promise of Happiness, Sara Ahmed argues that ‘to be 
affected by another does not mean that an affect simply passes or “leaps” 
from one body to another. The affect becomes an object only given the 
contingency of how we are affected. We might be affected differently by what 
gets passed around … If bodies do not arrive [somewhere] in neutral, if 
we are always in some way or another moody, then what we receive as an 
impression will depend on our affective situation … [H]ow we arrive, how 




historical period individually, the fact that we are all doing so at the 
same time gives these individual feelings a broader social significance:
We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, 
and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and 
relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and 
feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in 
a living and interrelating continuity. We are then defining these 
elements as a ‘structure’: as a set, with specific internal relations, 
at once interlocking and in tension. Yet we are also defining a social 
experience which is still in process, often indeed not yet recognized 
as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating, 
but which in analysis … has its emergent, connecting, and dominant 
characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies. (Marxism 132)7
Such feelings are, by definition, ephemeral and elusive. They are barely 
registered at the time, and as they lie at ‘the very edge of semantic availa-
bility’ (Williams, Marxism 134), they leave few traces in the historical 
record. According to Williams, the ‘best evidence’ of a structure of 
feeling can be found encoded within ‘the actual conventions of literary 
or dramatic writing’ (Politics 159) – in the affective and aesthetic qualities, 
the phobic and philic impulses, that achieve a certain salience within a 
work of literature. In Politics and Letters, for instance, Williams observes 
that ‘one of the determining characteristics of so much of the English 
writing of the late 1840s was an anxious oscillation between sympathy 
for the oppressed and fear of their violence’ (166). This combination 
of sympathy and fear, he argues, constituted one of the dominant 
structures of feeling in England during the 1840s, and can be identified 
in a number of literary narratives produced during this period. Williams’ 
structure of feeling is particularly useful for our purposes as it delineates 
the same affective qualities that I will be emphasizing in the following 
pages. Here, too, emotion will be seen as essentially sociogenic, as a 
response to specific historical processes, and as a quality of feeling – an 
‘atmosphere,’ if you like – that infiltrates literary discourse, with often 
profound formal and generic consequences. In other words, using the 
structure of feeling as a general theoretical principle, I shall be exploring 
 7 It is important to acknowledge the fact that a particular historical period 
may have more than one structure of feeling – so, for example, we could 
speak of an aristocratic structure of feeling (as Lepenies does, without 
explicitly saying so, in Melancholy and Society), an imperial structure of 
feeling, or even a generational or gendered structure of feeling.
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the process by which sociogenic and historically contingent feelings 
are ‘materialized’ within literary narratives, transforming the ‘affective 
elements of consciousness,’ such as ‘impulse, restraint, and tone,’ into a 
tangible structure ‘with specific internal relations, at once interlocking 
and in tension.’8
As suggested earlier, the fact that emotion becomes detached from 
the individual consciousness and assumes the quality of an objective 
‘atmosphere,’ circulating freely throughout the public and private 
spheres, makes it possible for such structures of feeling to find their way 
into literary narratives. Once they do percolate into literary discourse, 
they are most easily identified in the form of the atmospheric or tonal 
qualities that any given narrative generates.9 This is what allows us to 
describe a particular work of literature as melancholy, say, or joyful, 
although it may be difficult to ascertain precisely where this affective 
quality resides. Typically, we register it as a vague, all-encompassing 
‘climate’ or feeling-tone – the kind of feeling that Mikel Dufrenne 
calls a ‘world atmosphere’ (178). ‘When we name the world of the 
aesthetic object by its creator,’ Dufrenne writes, ‘we emphasize the 
 8 There are, of course, other ways of theorizing the sociality of emotion. We 
have, for instance, Sara Ahmed’s notion of affective economies (‘emotions 
[that] circulate or are distributed across a social as well as psychic field, 
[following] the logic of capital’ [Cultural 45]); Peter N. Stearns and Carol 
Z. Stearns’ emotionology (‘the attitudes or standards that a society, or 
a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions 
and their appropriate expression’ [813]); Barbara H. Rosenwein’s emotional 
communities (‘groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional 
expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions’ [2]); 
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s feeling rules (the social guidelines governing 
the ‘type, intensity, duration, timing, and placing of [our] feelings’ [85]); 
William M. Reddy’s emotional regimes (‘[t]he set of normative emotions and 
the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate 
them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime’ [129]); and 
Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman’s group style (‘recurrent patterns of 
interaction [and emotional behaviour] that arise from a group’s shared 
assumptions about what constitutes good or adequate participation in 
the group setting’ [737]). Although these are all productive theories, I 
have found Williams’ notion of the structure of feeling – combining as it 
does the social and the literary, the affective and the ‘structural’ – more 
suitable for my particular purposes.
 9 For a fascinating discussion of the relationship between emotion and 
literary tone, one that has influenced my own understanding of the 
subject, see Ngai, Ugly 38–88.
Introduction
11
presence of a certain style, a unique way of treating a subject’ (167). 
In the case of literature, this quality saturates the discourse, creating 
an ‘internal cohesion which is amenable only to the logic of feeling’ 
(180). For Dufrenne, the unity of such an atmosphere emerges out of 
‘the vital metaphysical element in all men, [their] way of being in the 
world which reveals itself in a personality.’ Simply put, just as someone 
who is feeling euphoric may be surrounded by a ‘nimbus of joy’ (177), 
so too an aesthetic object – whether it be a novel, a painting, or a 
piece of sculpture – will radiate a particular affective quality, a ‘world 
atmosphere,’ that gives it both substance and unity. To gain a better 
understanding of how this ‘world atmosphere’ actually operates, it 
may be useful to refer to Erich Auerbach’s masterly reading of Balzac’s 
Old Goriot (1835). In his analysis of the novel, Auerbach focuses on 
its opening pages, where we are offered a lengthy description of 
Madame Vauquer and her rather squalid boarding-house on the rue 
Neuve-Sainte-Geneviève. (‘The atmosphere has the stuffiness of rooms 
which are never ventilated, and a mouldy odour of decay. Its dampness 
chills you as you breathe it, and permeates your clothing. Smells of all 
the meals that have been eaten in the boarding-house linger in the air’ 
[31], etc.) As Auerbach notes, this opening passage produces ‘an intense 
impression of cheerless poverty, shabbiness, and dilapidation’; and 
‘with the physical description the moral atmosphere is [also] suggested’ 
(468). Like Stendhal, he goes on to argue, Balzac not only
places the human beings, whose destiny he is seriously relating, 
in their precisely defined historical and social setting, but also 
conceives this connection as a necessary one: to him every milieu 
becomes a moral and physical atmosphere which impregnates the 
landscape, the dwelling, furniture, implements, clothing, physique, 
character, surroundings, ideas, activities, and fates of men, and at 
the same time the general historical situation reappears as a total 
atmosphere which envelops all [of] its several milieux. (473)
For Auerbach, as for Dufrenne, the affective or tonal quality of a 
narrative permeates every level of the discourse, settling nowhere 
in particular yet influencing everything it touches. And this may be 
why it is so difficult to identify exactly where this feeling resides – 
because of its discursive ubiquity, because of the fact that it can be 
found in every piece of furniture and every article of clothing, but also 
because it resides within the reader, too, who is obliged to register 
the atmosphere of a work of literature, even if they find themselves 
resisting it (as may sometimes be the case).
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Although Dufrenne’s notion of the ‘world atmosphere’ is a productive 
way of theorizing this tonal quality, this governing structure of feeling, 
it may also be useful to invoke the Indian aesthetic concept of rasa 
(which literally means ‘essence,’ ‘juice,’ or ‘flavour’). In classical Indian 
aesthetics, the term rasa refers to the artistic transformation of certain 
core feelings (sthāyı̄  bhāva) into an objective, impersonal mood that is 
communicated to – and shared by – the audience or reader. According 
to Bharata’s Nāṫyashāstra (c. second or third century AD), there are eight 
core sthāyı̄  bhāvas, all of which are relatively stable emotional states. 
These feelings are as follows:
1. rati – sexual love, desire
2. hāsa – laughter, merriment
3. shoka – sorrow, grief
4. krodha – anger, rage
5. utsāha – enthusiasm, courage
6. bhaya – fear, terror
7. jugupsā – disgust, horror, hatred
8. vismaya – astonishment, wonder10
Needless to say, in a theatrical performance or a work of literature, it is 
impossible to render such states in their ontological totality, so instead 
they are subject to a process of artistic distillation (rasa) by which the 
audience or reader is offered a ‘taste’ of the sthāyı̄  bhāva that is being 
evoked. In order to create this ‘flavour,’ a performer or writer is obliged 
to transform the core feelings listed above into eight corresponding 
rasas (Dharwadker 1384–87).11 It is only at this level, once the sthāyı̄  
bhāva has been transformed into an objective or impersonal rasa, that 
an emotional state can be experienced (or ‘savoured’) collectively. 
And here, too, it becomes difficult to identify the precise location of 
such affective qualities – whether they reside in the aesthetic object 
 10 In the Nāṫyashāstra, Bharata delineates a further thirty-three transitory 
feelings (vyabhichārı̄  bhāva), each of which can be ascribed to one of these 
core emotional states (sthāyı̄  bhāva).
 11 These rasas are: (1) shṙṅgāra – eros; (2) hāsya – mirth; (3) karuṅa – compassion; 
(4) raudra – fury; (5) vı̄ra – heroism; (6) bhayānaka – terror; (7) bı̄bhatsa – 
revulsion; and (8) adbhuta – wonder (Dharwadker 1387).
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or performance itself, or whether they only ‘come to life’ through the 
hermeneutical act of reading, viewing, or listening. In fact, as Sheldon 
Pollock observes, this is ultimately a false dichotomy. With specific 
reference to literature, he argues that rasa can be ‘regarded as a property 
of a text-object, a capacity of a reader-subject, and also a transaction 
between the two. The whole process … exists as a totality even while 
its several moments can be analytically disaggregated.’ In this respect, 
rasa ‘precisely resembles the “taste” it metaphorically references, which 
may be regarded as existing at once in the food, the taster, and the 
act of tasting’ (26).12 Despite their cultural and historical differences, 
then, both Dufrenne and Bharata theorize the relationship between 
emotion and aesthetics in a remarkably similar way – emphasizing the 
‘impersonality’ of aestheticized emotion, its collective quality, and 
also its capacity to defy the boundaries that traditionally insulate the 
(perceiving) subject from the (aesthetic) object, the phenomenal world 
of the reader from the purely referential world of discourse.13
It is important to note that the structures of feeling that find their 
way into literary discourse may in some cases acquire a pathological 
dimension; and this is particularly so within colonial or postcolonial 
societies, where one frequently encounters accelerated processes of social 
transformation, sudden historical ruptures, civil instability, authoritarian 
governance, and profound socioeconomic disparities. In The Wretched of 
the Earth, Frantz Fanon describes a range of pathologies that came about 
as a direct consequence of the colonial war in Algeria (1954–62). As a 
psychiatrist, Fanon was especially attuned to these pathologies, and in a 
 12 For more on the subject of rasa, see Appadurai 92–112, Rowell 327–34, 
and Schwartz.
 13 In his article on the Nāṫyashāstra, Vinay Dharwadker expresses surprise at 
the extent to which the treatise anticipates modern theories of emotion 
such as those found in Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals (1872), William James’ The Principles of Psychology (1890), 
and even Silvan Tomkins’ Affect Imagery Consciousness (1962–92). ‘These 
intersections across time and space,’ he writes, ‘are not the result of 
accidental or idiosyncratic textual juxtaposition. For reasons that we still 
cannot formulate after nearly three centuries of intellectual excavation, 
the fabric of thought in several modern European languages, as in Latin 
and Greek previously, is thickly interwoven with the thought that started 
to emerge in Sanskrit early in the first millennium BCE. Far from being 
foreign, Bharata’s concepts and categories have been domesticated in 
European culture for a long time, in the intertextures of word and idea 
beneath the visible tissues of textuality’ (1381–82).
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chapter entitled ‘Colonial War and Mental Disorders,’ he provides us with 
a fascinating series of case studies. In Case No. 2 (Series A), for example, 
we are told of an Algerian fellah who had survived a massacre perpetrated 
by the French forces, and who subsequently developed a pathological 
‘aggressivity’ (260) that manifested itself in the form of indiscriminate 
homicidal impulses. Similarly, in Case No. 1 (Series B), Fanon discusses the 
murder by two young Algerian boys of their European schoolmate, and he 
concludes that this crime was a consequence of the ‘atmosphere of total 
war which reign[ed] in Algeria’ (270) at the time. As we read these case 
studies, it becomes clear that the colonial presence in Algeria not only 
gave rise to a number of quite specific ‘psycho-affective injuries’ (218), 
but also produced a more general ‘pathology of atmosphere’ (289) that 
influenced every aspect of Algerian society. Under such circumstances, 
as I have suggested, these pathologies also infiltrate literary narratives, 
creating significant disturbances both at the level of character psychology 
– be it individual or collective – and at the level of form and structure, 
where the narrative itself may experience a series of discursive or generic 
crises. In an essay on the Arabic novel, for instance, Edward Said explores 
some of the underlying differences between Naguib Mahfouz (whom we 
shall be discussing in Chapter 1) and writers of a later generation from 
Lebanon and Palestine. According to Said, Mahfouz’s work has always 
been able to depend on the stability, continuity, and ‘vital integrity’ of 
Egyptian civil society. ‘[T]hroughout all the turbulence of the country’s 
wars, revolutions, and social upheavals,’ he writes, ‘civil society was 
never eclipsed, its identity was never in doubt, was never completely 
absorbed into the state’ (‘After’ 319). In Lebanon and Palestine, however, 
such discursive stability is simply impossible to achieve – given the 
‘fractured, decentered, and openly insurrectionary’ (320) nature of these 
societies. Instead, we find narratives such as Ghassan Kanafani’s Men in 
the Sun (1962) or Elias Khoury’s Little Mountain (1977), whose ‘underlying 
aesthetic form,’ Said notes, is characterized by ‘rejection, drift, errance, 
[and] uncertainty’ (325).14 For these writers, who are obliged to contend 
with the ‘fragmented realities’ (323) of civil war and social disintegration, 
form is ‘an adventure, narrative both uncertain and meandering, [and] 
character less a stable collection of traits than a linguistic device, as 
self-conscious as it is provisional and ironic’ (321).
I believe that Said is quite right when he draws this connection 
between the sociopolitical circumstances in which a work of 
 14 An earlier version of Said’s essay, with only minor stylistic differences, was 
published in 1989 as a foreword to Khoury’s novel.
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literature is produced and the formal or stylistic qualities of the 
narrative in question.15 But how, precisely, does this process of 
transmission occur? What is it that ultimately unites the domains 
of the sociopolitical and the literary-aesthetic? In what follows, I 
will be suggesting that emotion, as I understand it here, serves as 
an intermediary between these two categories. Once the literary 
artefact has internalized the affective energies that are circulating 
within a particular society at a given point in time, it processes or 
‘materializes’ these energies at the subliminal level of form, structure, 
and style – before integrating them into the affective economy of 
the narrative itself in the guise of a ‘world atmosphere’ or governing 
structure of feeling. As the Brazilian critic Roberto Schwarz argues, 
the original historical circumstances in which a novel is produced 
(or situated) reappear ‘as a sociological form … on the fictional 
plane and as a literary structure.’ In this sense, he writes, ‘forms 
are the abstracts of specific social relationships, and that is how … 
the difficult process of [transforming] social questions into properly 
literary or compositional ones … is realized’ (‘Importing’ 53). Consider, 
for example, Ato Quayson’s notion of the systemic uncanny (which we 
will be exploring in more detail in Chapter 1). According to Quayson, 
when an individual is confronted by a situation of ‘acute political 
chaos or the general collapse of the social order,’ he or she will often 
convert this ‘perception of … systemic disorder into a negative 
affect’ (a feeling of guilt, say, or anxiety) that may not be traceable 
to its original source (Calibrations 80). Within literary narratives, this 
‘repressed negative energy’ generates a strong sense of the uncanny 
and ultimately gives rise to a particular kind of discursive pathology 
– one that Quayson refers to as ‘symbolization compulsion.’ He 
employs this term, more specifically, to describe a narrative’s drive 
toward an ‘insistent metaphorical register even when this register 
does not help to develop the action, define character or spectacle, or 
create atmosphere.’ In fact, Quayson says, such an excessive use of 
figurative language serves as a defence mechanism for the discourse 
itself, a way of avoiding or denying a traumatic experience that 
‘cannot be named except through symbolized digressiveness’ (82).16 
 15 Of course, the ‘sociology of form’ has a long history too. See, for instance, 
Adorno, Aesthetic 225–61, Jameson, Political 89–136, and Moretti, Signs 
1–41.
 16 For more on the systemic uncanny and symbolization compulsion, see 
Quayson, ‘Symbolization’ and Aesthetic 141–46.
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Quayson’s discussion of this subject is located within a precise set of 
sub-Saharan coordinates; yet in the following pages, I shall argue that 
the social, psychological, and literary-aesthetic dynamic he describes 
here can be identified elsewhere too – whether it be Rio de Janeiro 
during the nineteenth century, Cairo in the early forties, or Sri Lanka 
at the height of the civil war.
II
Affective Disorders is situated at the juncture of three different critical 
perspectives. In addition to its obviously postcolonial qualities, it also 
engages with the areas of affect studies and narratology. Over the last 
few decades, there has been a tendency in postcolonial literary studies 
to focus on the purely traumatic consequences of colonialism – to the 
exclusion of all the other feelings that achieve a certain prominence, 
for one reason or another, in colonial and postcolonial societies.17 In 
an essay published in 2012, the South African critic Gerald Gaylard 
discusses this omission in some detail, asking ‘why it is that [postco-
lonial] literature is still associated with social issues and politics rather 
than feeling.’ After all, he writes, ‘it is hardly the case that [such] 
literature is lacking emotion’; and yet for some reason, ‘[w]hen emotion 
in postcolonial literature has been explored, this has usually been in 
the guise of trauma studies’ (99). In Affective Disorders, then, I have 
decided to focus on a wider range of feelings than is typical for a work 
of postcolonial criticism – discussing states such as anger, jealousy, 
and boredom – while also engaging more substantially with the field 
 17 See, for example, Craps, Ifowodo, and Ward. This entirely legitimate 
emphasis on the traumatic consequences of the colonial project has also led 
to a number of studies that focus on the psychic/affective states of mourning 
and melancholia (see Gilroy, Durrant, and Khanna). More recently, however, 
some postcolonial critics have begun to explore feelings that are not 
necessarily ‘traumatic’ in origin (see Kim, Majumdar, and Bewes). In Prose of 
the World: Modernism and the Banality of Empire, for instance, Saikat Majumdar 
argues that ‘[b]anality and its often-attendant emotion boredom need to be 
understood as key motifs for colonial and postcolonial literary criticism as 
they help to aestheticize the relation between the imperial metropolis and 
the colonial periphery’ (4). According to Majumdar, the ‘material, economic, 
and infrastructural inadequacies felt across the margins of the historical 
expanse of the British Empire’ move their ‘victims not only toward the 
intense theatre of trauma but also toward the pervasiveness of banality and 
the iterative cycle of boredom’ (23).
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of affect studies (as a broadly construed, interdisciplinary enterprise). 
The third major critical perspective I employ here is that of narratology. 
Once again, there has been a tendency in postcolonial studies to 
neglect or deprioritize the formal and stylistic qualities of a narrative in 
favour of thematic readings or ideological critique. As the editors of the 
Cambridge Journal of Postcolonial Literary Inquiry put it, ‘literature and the 
aesthetic at large have suffered a regrettable abeyance as prime sites 
for generating theoretical perspectives on the conditions of the postco-
lonial’ (Quayson et al. 6). In this case, however, I will be emphasizing the 
formal and structural consequences of the aforementioned emotional 
disturbances – exploring the way in which feelings such as anger or 
boredom can often destabilize narratives, provoking crises of represen-
tation, generic ambivalence, and discursive rupture. By bringing all 
three critical perspectives together in this manner, I hope to provide 
a deeper understanding of the relationship between various sociopo-
litical forces (colonial modernity, bureaucracy, communal violence, etc.) 
and the affective and aesthetic ‘disorders’ to which they give rise.
As the reader may have noticed, I have chosen to focus on an 
historically and geographically diverse range of narratives, some of 
which originate in quite different corners of the colonial and postco-
lonial world. Proceeding chronologically, we begin with Joaquim Maria 
Machado de Assis’ Dom Casmurro (1899), which is set in Rio during the 
reign of Dom Pedro II (1831–89). Although Brazil achieved independence 
from Portugal in 1825, many colonial practices, such as slavery and 
patronage, continued well into the postcolonial period – creating, as we 
shall discover, a peculiar dissonance within nineteenth-century Brazilian 
society. Naguib Mahfouz’s Midaq Alley (1947) is set in Cairo during 
the Second World War, a time when the city was occupied by over 
140,000 Allied soldiers. Under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936, Egypt was obliged to accommodate an unlimited number of these 
foreign forces for the duration of the war, although the country itself 
would remain officially neutral until the spring of 1945. Vikram Seth’s 
A Suitable Boy (1993) surveys the early years of Indian independence, 
focusing in particular on a period spanning from 1950 to 1952, when 
the fundamental features of the postcolonial nation-state, as envisaged 
by Jawaharlal Nehru, were being established.18 In Upamanyu Chatterjee’s 
 18 The so-called Nehruvian Consensus involved the general acceptance of 
four basic principles: socialism, secularism, democracy, and a foreign 
policy of non-alignment with any major power bloc. For more on this 
‘consensus’ (and its eventual collapse), see Vanaik 301–3.
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English, August: An Indian Story (1988), we return to India several decades 
later to find that the optimism of the 1950s has long since dissipated and 
the Nehruvian nation-state, which held so much promise in those early, 
formative years, has become notorious for its bureaucratic inefficiency, 
petty corruption, and ‘rule-bound incompetence’ (Nandy, ‘Culture’ 68). 
The action in Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost (2000) takes place during 
the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983–2009), a brutal conflict that claimed an 
estimated 100,000 lives. Although the war itself lasted for twenty-six 
years, the novel focuses on a particularly violent period in the late 
eighties and early nineties that came to be known as the beeshana 
kalaya – or the ‘time of great fear.’ And finally, in Vikram Chandra’s 
Sacred Games (2006), we make our way to Mumbai at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, where we discover a city that has been deeply 
traumatized by the communal violence and terrorism that occurred in 
1992–93 (following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya), and 
whose inhabitants continue to suffer the malign influence of majori-
tarian politics, corruption, and organized crime.
Although a chronological overview is always beneficial, I have 
decided, for the purposes of analysis, to trace the various stages of the 
colonial/postcolonial life cycle as it unfolded in these different locales. 
We therefore begin our journey in colonial Cairo during the Second 
World War (Midaq Alley), before exploring India’s transition from colony 
to postcolony during the late forties and early fifties (A Suitable Boy). In 
the following chapters, we advance even further into the postcolonial 
period, albeit in different places and at different times. After visiting 
nineteenth-century Rio (Dom Casmurro), which for many years served 
as the capital of a postcolonial monarchy, we return once more to 
India, roughly four decades after independence (English, August). We 
then travel to Sri Lanka during the ‘time of great fear’ (Anil’s Ghost), 
before bringing our journey to an end in a Mumbai that is recognizably 
contemporary (Sacred Games). By structuring Affective Disorders in this 
way, I am not suggesting that every colonial or postcolonial experience 
is perfectly analogous. Quite the opposite. In the case of Dom Casmurro, 
for instance, I will be focusing on the colonial legacy of slavery and 
the fact that Brazil would remain a slave-owning economy until 1888 
(by which time it would be the only such economy in the Western 
world). When I come to discuss English, August, on the other hand, I 
will be addressing the bureaucratic legacy of the British Empire, which 
survives to this day in the form of the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS). Although both of these practices could be considered a colonial 
‘inheritance,’ they are, of course, more notable for their differences than 
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for their similarities. But this is precisely what makes it so interesting 
to consider one alongside the other – and to explore the different 
emotions that these quite distinct historical experiences generate. In 
Brazil, as I shall argue, we have a destructive and pathological jealousy 
that emerges out of the conflict between the social reality of slavery 
and the liberal ideologies to which the élite ostensibly subscribe. 
Turning to English, August, however, we find an altogether different 
type of feeling – an overwhelming sense of boredom that is a direct 
consequence of the bureaucratic procedures of the IAS. This is the kind 
of ‘minor’ emotion that is characterized, in Sianne Ngai’s words, by its 
‘flatness or ongoingness,’ by its ‘remarkable capacity for duration’ (Ugly 
7); and given the nature of Indian bureaucracy, it is entirely appropriate 
that this should be the case.
The similarities between such disparate narratives can also be 
instructive. Despite their obvious differences – despite the intensity 
of the jealousy we encounter in Dom Casmurro, for example, and the 
languid, apathetic quality of the boredom we find in English, August 
– there are a number of fundamental correspondences that all six 
narratives share. To put it briefly, these similarities can be summarized 
as follows:
1. All six narratives trace the process by which certain social, 
political, or economic forces penetrate the private sphere, where 
they induce corresponding (although frequently displaced or 
sublimated) affective states.
2. All six narratives demonstrate the way in which such affective 
states assume an intersubjective quality, becoming deperson-
alized ‘structures of feeling’ (although this collective quality may 
not always be recognized by the characters themselves, who 
in some instances continue to regard their feelings as ‘private, 
idiosyncratic, and even isolating’ [Williams, Marxism 132]).
3. All six narratives reveal the narratological consequences of these 
affective disturbances, as in each case the dominant emotion 
(whether it be anger, jealousy, or boredom) infiltrates the 
structure of the narrative itself, which thereby comes to serve as 
a discursive correlative for the social, political, or economic forces 
mentioned above, and for the various affective disorders to which 
they give rise.
In addition to these general correspondences, it may also be useful to 
provide a more detailed summary of what can be found in the following 
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pages – beginning with Chapter 1, which seeks to explain the ubiquity 
of anger in Naguib Mahfouz’s Midaq Alley. I argue here that this dominant 
emotion could be read as a collective response to the contradictory 
social forces, the radical disjunctures and discontinuities, initiated by 
colonial modernity. I then move on to discuss the role of rumour in the 
novel and the significance of its pronounced melodramatic qualities, 
both of which represent an attempt to contain or ‘quarantine’ such 
dysphoric feelings. As we shall see, though, this strategy ultimately 
fails, and the melodramatic conclusion that we are expecting never 
arrives. Instead, the novel itself suffers something of a generic crisis, 
shifting without warning from the melodramatic mode into the tragic. 
Rather than focusing on a particular emotion, Chapter 2 explores the 
way in which strong feelings of any kind are actively discouraged in 
Vikram Seth’s A Suitable Boy. In the days following the Partition of 
India in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru delivered numerous speeches in which 
he asserted that social and political unity could only be achieved by 
renouncing ‘hatred, violence, [and] anger’ (Speeches 23). This rhetoric, 
I suggest, profoundly influences the novel’s affective disposition, its 
‘world atmosphere,’ causing it to internalize the Aristotelian virtue of 
metriopatheia (or ‘equanimity’) and obliging the reader to adopt a similar 
stance if he or she is to survive 1,349 pages of carefully modulated 
prose. Chapter 3, as indicated above, focuses on the significance of 
jealousy in Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis’ Dom Casmurro. On the 
face of it, this fictional memoir relates a straightforward story of 
marital infidelity from the perspective of the ‘betrayed’ husband, Bento 
Santiago. As the narrative progresses, however, the story we are told 
becomes increasingly implausible, and we begin to suspect that Bento’s 
wife may have been unjustly maligned. Although our narrator locates 
the source of his jealousy in the private sphere, I propose that it actually 
arises out of the conflict between the archaic socioeconomic practices 
of nineteenth-century Brazil (i.e., slavery and patronage) and the liberal 
principles that were so closely affiliated with European modernity. In 
Chapter 4, I turn my attention to the subject of boredom in Upamanyu 
Chatterjee’s English, August. Here, I explore the connection between 
bureaucracy, boredom, and realist discourse. More specifically, I argue 
that the narrative internalizes many of the features that we tend to 
associate with the Indian Administrative Service and, in so doing, 
becomes ever more lethargic, repetitive, and ‘boring.’ Although these 
qualities undermine the novel’s governing aesthetic principles, the fact 
that it survives such a grave challenge suggests that realism may be a 
good deal more agile and accommodating, as a mode of representation, 
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than is often allowed. Chapter 5 discusses the climate of fear that 
dominates Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost. We can find ample evidence 
of such fear at the representational level of the narrative – where all 
the violence and torture and enforced disappearances take place – 
but it also penetrates the novel’s underlying structure, activating a 
phobic response on the part of the discourse itself. After analysing this 
response in some detail, I explore the way in which it defies the generic 
imperatives that would typically govern a narrative of this kind, making 
it impossible to achieve the linearity, the hermeneutic closure, and the 
‘localization of culpability’ that we associate with classic crime fiction. 
Finally, Chapter 6 addresses the affective (and aesthetic) consequences 
of violence and criminality in Vikram Chandra’s Sacred Games. I begin 
by discussing the minor crimes to be found within its pages (the petty 
burglaries, the routine corruption, the domestic disputes, etc.), before 
moving on to address various instances of ‘exceptional’ criminality, such 
as the communal violence that took place in Mumbai in 1992–93, killing 
an estimated 900 people, and the retaliatory bombings that occurred 
on 12 March 1993, claiming another 257 lives. The affective state that 
emerges out of this combination of the mundane and the extraordinary, 
I argue, could best be described by invoking Sianne Ngai’s notion of 
‘stuplimity’ – a somewhat contradictory aesthetic response in which 
‘the initial experience of being aesthetically overwhelmed involves 
not terror or pain … but something much closer to an ordinary fatigue’ 
(Ugly 270).
So what is to be gained, then, by approaching these works of colonial 
and postcolonial literature from the perspective of affect studies? In the 
first place, I would contend, it provides us with a deeper understanding 
of the way in which the social, political, and economic forces that 
are produced under such circumstances influence the affective lives 
of ordinary people – whether these forces are encountered in the 
form of colonial modernity (Chapter 1), communal violence (Chapter 
2), slavery and patronage (Chapter 3), bureaucracy (Chapter 4), civil 
war (Chapter 5), or crime and terrorism (Chapter 6). By analysing the 
affective consequences of these historical processes, we are able to 
gain a ‘felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time’ 
(Williams, Long 63). And as such experiences typically lie at the ‘very 
edge of semantic availability’ (Williams, Marxism 134), the evidence they 
leave behind can be identified most clearly, I would argue, at the level of 
literary form, structure, and style. Hence the emphasis on narratology 
in what follows; and hence my decision to combine narratology with 
affect studies (broadly construed). Only thus are we able to trace the 
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process by which a sociogenic feeling penetrates the private sphere, 
and then infiltrates the structure of the literary narrative itself, where 
it makes its presence felt in the form of proairetic sequences, plot 
nuclei, temporal anachronies, and so on. In the opening pages of The 
Bourgeois, Franco Moretti discusses the relationship between the study 
of literature and that of history. ‘What kind of history,’ he asks, ‘what 
kind of [historical] evidence’ do we find in literature?
Clearly, never a direct one: the mill-owner Thornton in North and 
South (1855), or the entrepreneur Wokulski in The Doll (1890), proves 
exactly nothing about the Manchester or Warsaw bourgeoisie. They 
belong to a parallel historical series … where the spasms of capitalist 
modernization are matched and reshaped by literary form-giving … 
[I]f we accept the idea of literary form as the fossil remains of what 
had once been a living and problematic present; and if we work our 
way backwards … then formal analysis may unlock … a dimension of 
the past that would otherwise remain hidden. Here lies its possible 
contribution to historical knowledge: by understanding the opacity 
of Ibsen’s hints to the past, or the oblique semantics of Victorian 
adjectives, or even … the role of the gerund in Robinson Crusoe, we 
enter a realm of shadows, where the past recovers its voice, and 
still speaks to us … But speaks to us only through the medium of 
form. (14–15)
While it may be difficult to prove, incontrovertibly, the connection 
between the diminution of the proairetic code in English, August and 
the bureaucratic procedures of the IAS, or between the abundance of 
‘catalyzers’ that can be found in A Suitable Boy and the placatory content 
of Nehru’s speeches during the late forties and early fifties, the formal 
correspondences between these narratives and their actual or imagined 
historical circumstances, the structural analogies that serve to conjoin 
the literary-aesthetic and the sociopolitical in such cases, will, I hope, 
prove to be reasonably persuasive. As Roberto Schwarz writes, an 
argument of this nature ‘requires a moment of extraliterary reflection, 
whose relevance, impossible to prove on the model of 2 + 2 = 4, can 
be substantiated in the increased understanding [of the narrative that] 
it … allows’ (Master 20). And that will certainly be my objective in 
Affective Disorders, too, where the reader will be asked to pursue these 
often elusive feelings as they take on a decentred, intersubjective 
quality, as they colonize the private sphere, and as they saturate the 
very tissue of the narratives we will be discussing. Such a process may 
not yield incontrovertible ‘proof’ in the manner of 2 + 2 = 4, but it 
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does provide enough circumstantial evidence, I believe, to make a 
plausible (even compelling) case.19
Something else the reader will be asked to do in Affective Disorders, 
as we have noted, is to follow a rather meandering historical and 
geographical itinerary, one that includes destinations as diverse as Rio 
during the reign of Dom Pedro II, wartime Cairo, and contemporary 
Mumbai. So what logic has informed the selection of these particular 
texts, and what do we learn by bringing them together in such a way? By 
choosing to focus on four different countries and two different empires, 
I am attempting to emphasize the international (or, as Robert Young 
might say, the ‘tricontinental’) nature of the processes outlined above, 
while also revealing the various correspondences and specificities that 
only become clear once we bring these narratives into direct contact 
with each other.20 Generally speaking, then, I have selected these six 
narratives precisely because of their historical and geographical range 
 19 By arguing that literary discourse internalizes the dominant structures 
of feeling within a particular society, and by identifying the traces of 
such feelings in the formal, generic, and stylistic qualities of these 
individual narratives, I have clearly consigned the figure of the author 
to the periphery of my analysis – and I have done so quite deliberately. 
As a matter of critical principle, I believe that literary narratives assume 
a certain autonomy from their author and are ultimately responsible for 
generating their own (polysemic) meaning. I also believe that literature 
is capable of internalizing various social, political, and economic forces, 
and that we may learn more about this process by analysing the formal 
qualities of a narrative than by discussing the biography of its author 
(although in some cases this may be a productive enterprise too). More 
specifically, however, given the nature of this particular project and my 
attempt to move away from individualistic or subject-centred theories of 
emotion, it seemed important that the affective qualities I explore here 
should not be seen to originate from an authorial figure (even if such 
a figure were merely serving as an ‘intermediary’), but instead should 
be allowed to circulate freely between the public and private spheres, 
between the domains of the sociopolitical and the literary-aesthetic, as a 
disembodied and depersonalized structure of feeling.
 20 In Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, Young uses the term ‘tricon-
tinental’ instead of ‘postcolonial’ or ‘Third-World’ in order to emphasize 
the international dimension of anti-colonial and postcolonial resistance. 
‘Above all,’ he writes, ‘the tricontinental marks an identification with the 
great Havana Tricontinental [Conference] of 1966, which initiated the first 
global alliance of the peoples of the three continents [i.e., Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America] against imperialism, and the founding moment of postco-
lonial theory in its journal, the Tricontinental’ (5). 
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– because of their differences, but also because each one demonstrates, 
in a nuanced and multilayered way, the process by which a collective 
structure of feeling can infiltrate literary discourse, whether the 
narrative in question is produced (or situated) in Rio in 1899 or Cairo in 
1947. Moreover, all six narratives emphasize the tendency, in colonial 
and postcolonial societies, for such feelings to acquire a pathological 
quality; and it is in this regard that the aforementioned similarities and 
differences become especially instructive.
In Chapter 1, on Midaq Alley, we are confronted by an anger that 
emerges out of the various inequalities, disparities, and instabilities 
generated by colonial modernity. Yet given the political circum-
stances in which the characters find themselves (living in a city under 
military occupation), this anger must be severely repressed; and as a 
consequence, it undergoes a process of displacement, being directed 
instead at more easily mastered substitutes such as wives, employees, 
and acquaintances. This is what makes the anger in the novel so dispro-
portionate and ‘ill-fitting’: the fact that it is a product of obstructed 
agency, the fact that it is an emotion looking for a cause, and the 
fact that it denies the characters the possibility of genuine cathartic 
release.21 Chapter 2, which offers a close reading of A Suitable Boy, is 
slightly different to the other five chapters in that it does not explore 
a particular emotional state, but focuses instead on the attenuation 
of feeling, on the discipline and self-control that Nehru promoted in 
response to the communal violence that accompanied Partition in 
1947. Even so, the fact that this reticence acquires such prestige within 
the narrative, and within the society it delineates, draws our attention 
to the volatility (the underlying ‘passion and prejudice’ [Nehru, Speeches 
33]) that made the imposition of such a rigid ‘emotional regime’ 
necessary in the first place. Moving on to Dom Casmurro, in Chapter 3, 
we also encounter a disproportionate and displaced feeling. In this 
case, however, the pathological jealousy that our narrator experiences 
emerges out of the conflict between his professed liberal values and 
the archaic system of slavery on which his socioeconomic privilege 
relies; and it could thus be seen as an affective correlative for the 
more general tendency among the Brazilian élite to misrecognize 
 21 I have borrowed the phrase ‘obstructed agency’ from Sianne Ngai, whose 
2005 book Ugly Feelings explores some of the ‘negative affects’ (envy, 
anxiety, paranoia, etc.) that such an obstruction produces, ‘regardless of 
whether [it] is actual or fantasized, or whether the agency obstructed is 
individual or collective’ (3).
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the true nature of their social reality. Such jealousy also became a 
dominant structure of feeling during this period as a consequence of 
the patronage that continued to serve as Brazil’s primary form of social 
mediation, encouraging a fierce competition for favour at every level 
of society. Chapter 4 focuses on English, August and the debilitating 
boredom that arises out of the bureaucratic procedures of the Indian 
Administrative Service (which, prior to independence, was known 
as the Indian Civil Service [ICS]). In some ways, we could relate this 
boredom to the renunciation of strong feeling advocated by Nehru in 
Chapter 2 – for boredom also de-intensifies our lives, leaving us, as 
Heidegger observes, ‘equally distant from despair and joy’ (Introduction 
2) – but again there are some fundamental differences that ought to be 
acknowledged. The ‘reticence’ in A Suitable Boy, for example, is designed 
to protect the narrative from dangerous upsurges of intradiegetic 
feeling, while the boredom in English, August brings it to the verge of 
a complete discursive collapse. And whereas the emotional regime in 
A Suitable Boy still endorses moderate affective states, in English, August 
the attenuation of feeling assumes a pathological quality that leaves 
our lethargic hero utterly drained of energy and desire. In Chapter 5, 
which explores Anil’s Ghost, we discover a feeling of fear that has also 
acquired a pathological quality. During the Sri Lankan Civil War, the use 
of violence and intimidation as a deliberate political strategy gave rise 
to a general ‘culture of terror’ within the country. By the late eighties, 
as one Amnesty International report indicates, violence had become 
‘so widespread that it [was] often difficult to establish with certainty 
who the agents of specific killings were – or even to identify the 
victims,’ whose bodies may have been ‘grossly mutilated’ or ‘burned to 
ashes’ (qtd. in Senaratne 146). Under these circumstances, as we shall 
see, the kind of fear that is created cannot be easily localized in the 
form of an unidentified corpse or a representative of the state, but 
instead moves from body to body, and from place to place, creating 
a dysphoric atmosphere that permeates every level of the discourse. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we address the significance of stuplimity – the 
conjunction of the stupefying and the sublime, the boring and the 
astonishing – in Sacred Games. As mentioned earlier, this term was first 
employed by Sianne Ngai to ‘highlight certain limitations in classic 
theories of the sublime,’ which fail to account for the boredom that 
has become ‘increasingly intertwined with contemporary experiences 
of aesthetic awe’ (Ugly 8). In Chandra’s novel, however, the feeling of 
stuplimity assumes a broader social significance. Instead of being 
inspired by an encounter with an aesthetic object, it is generated 
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by the intermingling of two different types of crime: the ‘ordinary’ 
criminality that has become a feature of everyday life in Mumbai, and 
the episodes of ‘spectacular’ criminality, such as communal violence 
and terrorism, that have also come to be associated with the city.
Before proceeding any further, I would like to clarify precisely what 
I mean when I use the word ‘emotion.’ In some recent theoretical 
writing within the field of affect studies, a crucial distinction has been 
drawn between affect and emotion – the former term being employed 
to describe pre-subjective, asignifying bodily ‘intensities,’ while the 
latter refers to feelings that have been recognized as ‘subjective’ and 
granted both social and linguistic significance. According to Brian 
Massumi, for instance, affect and emotion follow ‘different logics and 
pertain to different orders.’ Whereas affect is ‘embodied in purely 
autonomic reactions most directly manifested in the skin – at the 
surface of the body, at its interface with things’ (25), emotion involves 
the ‘sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from 
that point onward defined as personal’ (28).22 Although I have found this 
formulation useful at times, by and large I agree with Sara Ahmed that 
the distinction between affect and emotion can ‘under-describe the 
work of emotions which involve forms of intensity, bodily orientation, 
and direction that are not simply about “subjective content” or [the] 
qualification of intensity’ (Promise 230). In other words, drawing such an 
emphatic distinction between affect (as an asignifying bodily ‘intensity’) 
and emotion (as a clearly defined, subjective feeling) can conceal the 
extent to which these categories merge into one another. It is possible, 
as Ahmed notes, to ‘separate an affective response from an emotion’ at 
a theoretical level – to separate the bodily sensation of fear, say, from 
the feeling of being afraid – but this ‘does not mean that in practice, 
or in everyday life, they are separate’ (Promise 231).23 In the present 
study, therefore, I shall not be observing this particular theoretical 
distinction. For one thing, my interest lies not in dividing the bodily 
from the cognitive, but in exploring the interaction between these two 
categories. Or to put it another way, I shall be focusing on the point at 
which feelings such as anger or boredom achieve a certain discursive 
 22 For more examples of this theoretical distinction, see Grossberg, We Gotta 
79–87, Terada 4, and Jameson, Antinomies 28–44.
 23 Other critics who have chosen not to make use of such a distinction 
include Brennan 3–6, Ngai, Ugly 25–28, and Flatley 12. For an especially 




legibility, coming into view by way of the ‘impression’ they leave on the 
literary narratives they infiltrate. These are the structures of feeling we 
discussed earlier – the feelings that lie at ‘the very edge of semantic 
availability’ (Williams, Marxism 134) yet nonetheless reveal themselves 
in ‘the actual conventions of literary or dramatic writing’ (Williams, 
Politics 159). Although such structures of feeling have assumed a certain 
significatory presence, this does not mean that they have lost their 
physiological qualities. On the contrary, what literature provides is 
a site where the subjective and the objective, the semiotic and the 
asignifying, the cognitive and the somatic, can come together; and it is 
the conjunction of these different categories, as revealed, enacted, or 
produced within the domain of the literary-aesthetic, that we will be 
exploring in the following pages. As we do so, I shall be using the term 
‘emotion’ to describe a state of feeling that combines, to varying degrees, the 
categories of the physiological, the psychological, and the sociocultural. And 
I will also be emphasizing the three characteristic features of emotion 
that I mentioned at the beginning of this introduction – (1) the fact that 
it is both psychogenic and sociogenic, (2) the fact that it is historically 
constituted, and (3) the fact that it is inherently mobile, an affective 
quality that slides all over the place, defying all boundaries, even those 
that would distinguish between a feeling you register on your skin, 
as a bodily ‘intensity,’ and your cognitive understanding of what that 
sensation signifies.
As we have seen, the texts I have chosen to analyse in this study are 
notable for their diversity – encompassing four different countries, two 
different empires, and three different centuries. By discussing such a 
wide range of narratives, I am not suggesting, of course, that emotion 
can be easily universalized. Again, quite the opposite: I view emotion 
not as the product of some ahistorical psychic essence, but as a ‘felt 
response’ to specific social, political, and economic forces (hence my 
reliance on the ‘structure of feeling’ as a theoretical principle). At the 
same time, however, this does not mean that our affective lives are 
entirely determined by our circumstances, or that the anger we feel 
in Cairo in 1942 bears no resemblance at all to the anger that may 
be felt elsewhere in the colonial or postcolonial world at different 
historical junctures.24 Rather than opting for a biological or a cultural 
understanding of emotion, then, I shall be attempting to combine these 
 24 For more on the universality of certain narrative structures and affective 




two categories by situating various emotional ‘utterances’ (or parole, to 
use Saussure’s linguistic terminology) within a larger affective structure 
(or langue) that is not confined to any one culture.25 If we are to deny 
the humanistic notion that different cultures share certain underlying 
similarities, many of which may be located in the psyche or the realm 
of the affective, then we create a world of unassimilable, untranslatable 
cultural difference, which immediately forecloses the possibility of 
meaningful intercultural dialogue.26 Earlier, if you recall, we compared 
the affective and aesthetic theories of Bharata, the author of the 
Nāṫyashāstra (c. second or third century AD), and Mikel Dufrenne, the 
author of The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (1953). This would 
not have been possible if these two writers did not share at least some 
similarities (despite their various differences); and I believe it is the 
responsibility of the literary critic to identify such correspondences, 
however unlikely they may be, while also remaining alert to the cultural 
and historical specificities that situate every narrative, every theory, 
every aesthetic object or representational gesture, within a particular 
place and time. It might be best to elaborate on this point, in conclusion, 
by discussing the example of psychoanalysis.
Traditionally, the relationship between psychoanalysis and 
postcolonialism has been a rather fraught one. According to its 
critics, psychoanalysis as a discipline is grounded in, and serves to 
perpetuate, certain racist ideologies and colonial binaries, such as 
the opposition between the civilized and the savage.27 It has also 
 25 As the reader may know, Ferdinand de Saussure employed the term langue 
to refer to the underlying structure of a language (which is ‘both a social 
product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions 
that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise 
that faculty’ [9]) and the term parole to describe an individual utterance or 
act of linguistic communication.
 26 Ernesto Laclau makes this argument very persuasively in Emancipation(s) 
20–35.
 27 One need only read the opening passage of Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1913), 
subtitled Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics, to understand what motivates such a critique. ‘There are men 
still living,’ Freud writes, ‘who, as we believe, stand very near to primitive 
man, far nearer than we do, and whom we therefore regard as his direct 
heirs and representatives. Such is our view of those whom we describe as 
savages or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest 
for us if we are right in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of an early 
stage of our own development’ (1).
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been accused of universalizing a particular Western model of subjec-
tivity that is inapplicable to other cultures (where subject-formation 
occurs in contrasting ways and ‘subjectivity’ itself may be understood 
differently). Such critiques are to be taken seriously, but in some 
cases they may underestimate the cultural pliability of psychoanalysis, 
the manner in which it changes shape as it moves from one place to 
another (again depending on the precise circumstances in which it is 
employed). It is this pliability that makes it possible for Frantz Fanon, 
in Black Skin, White Masks, to use the psychoanalytical categories of 
narcissism and neurosis to explore the pathological consequences of 
the colonial presence in the French Antilles. Or, elsewhere, this is what 
allows J.M. Coetzee to analyse the psychopathology of South African 
society during the apartheid era, as demonstrated by the obsessive and 
neurotic writings of Geoffrey Cronjé (19–22). Or to offer yet another 
example, it is this pliability, this shape-shifting quality, that enables the 
anthropologist Gananath Obeyesekere to invoke the Freudian notion 
of transference when describing his relationship with an informant in 
Sri Lanka (9, 231–36). In each of these cases, we see the way in which a 
body of thought that originated in a particular place and time (Western 
Europe at the end of the nineteenth century) can be used in other 
places and at other times to understand the formation of individual 
or collective identities, the pathologies to which they may give rise, 
and the complicated psychosocial dynamic they bring into being. 
In his discussion of Moses and Monotheism (1939), Edward Said freely 
acknowledges Freud’s Eurocentric perspective, yet he also recognizes 
the wide-ranging applicability of psychoanalysis. Freud, he writes,
was an explorer of the mind, of course, but also, in the philosophical 
sense, an overturner and a re-mapper of accepted or settled 
geographies and genealogies. He thus lends himself especially to 
rereading in different contexts, since his work is all about how 
life history offers itself by recollection, research and reflection to 
endless structuring and restructuring, in both the individual and the 
collective sense. That we, different readers from different periods 
of history, with different cultural backgrounds, should continue to 
do this in our readings of Freud strikes me as nothing less than a 
vindication of his work’s power to instigate new thought, as well as 
to illuminate situations that he himself might never have dreamed 
of. (Freud 27)
In what follows, then, I shall be exploring different feelings as they 
emerge in different places and at different times. But I also believe it is 
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important to identify some of the cultural and historical correspondences 
that make such a study possible in the first place. Even if we do not 
always experience feelings in precisely the same way, it is essential, in 
my view, to acknowledge the fact that such feelings can be shared; and if 
we go so far as to acknowledge the possibility of a ‘structure of feeling’ 
that may be characteristic of a particular society or a particular culture, 
at any given point in time, then we also need to consider the possibility 
that there may be qualities of feeling, shades of emotion, that we 
share with other people, with still larger collectives, elsewhere and at 
other times. Or to end this introduction where it began, I would like to 
suggest that there may be some connection, however slight, between 
the fear experienced by a French peasant in the summer of 1789, as 
rumours of invading armies spread throughout the provinces, and the 
anxiety felt by a young Tanganyikan schoolgirl in 1962, as her country 
negotiated the various social, political, and economic challenges that 
accompanied its declaration of independence.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
Anger 
Naguib Mahfouz’s Midaq Alley
Anger
The native’s muscles are always tensed.
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1961
A moment arrives when one can no longer feel anything but 
anger, an absolute anger.
Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 1993
I
Set in Cairo during the Second World War, Naguib Mahfouz’s Midaq Alley (1947) introduces the reader to a small circle of characters 
living in one of the old city’s more dilapidated alleyways. It traces their 
interwoven lives and focuses, in particular, on the accelerated processes 
of social transformation that many of these characters are forced to 
undergo. As Magda Baraka has observed, the socioeconomic influence 
of the war made the 1940s ‘a decade of sharp contradiction’ in Egypt 
(87). For some, the presence of over 140,000 Allied soldiers in Cairo 
led to greater employment opportunities, and many local businesses 
flourished. The average earnings of the young men employed by the 
British Army at Qantara and Tel el-Kebir increased tenfold (Cooper 137), 
while for a privileged minority the war would prove even more lucrative: 
between 1940 and 1943, to cite one especially revealing statistic, the 
number of (sterling) millionaires in the country rose from fifty to 
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four hundred (Lacouture and Lacouture 99). But of course there was 
another side to this story; and in many ways, during the early forties, 
Cairo was becoming an increasingly divided city. While fortunes were 
being made in the financial district, in the poorer quarters they were 
storming the bakeries for bread (Vatikiotis 347). Between August 1939 
and September 1941, the cost of living index rose by 45 per cent, and 
during the same period the price of food showed an average increase 
of 94 per cent (Cooper 136, 161). This sudden rise in the cost of living 
was aggravated by a scarcity of basic commodities such as sugar, flour, 
fuel, and bread (Vatikiotis 347) – leading one Member of Parliament 
to accuse the Allied forces of ‘starving the people’ (Lacouture and 
Lacouture 99).
As ever, these economic disparities were also reflected in the 
topography of the city itself. While the European quarter was being 
expanded and developed, Islamic Cairo was largely abandoned: ‘its 
streets were neglected, cleaning was haphazard, [the] water supply 
was only partial, and the sewers were poor or insufficient.’ This 
deterioration was exacerbated by the ‘rapid increase in [a population] 
whose density weighed heavily on the crumbling infrastructure and 
inadequate public services’ (Raymond 334). And as the old city went 
into an irreversible decline, the upper classes relocated to the European 
quarter – where political power, economic activity, and capital were 
now concentrated – leaving Islamic Cairo to the poor and uneducated 
majority.1 Such developmental and demographic differences in turn 
served to underscore the broader social and cultural disparities that 
separated the two halves of Cairo. Whereas the European quarter 
contained all the usual signifiers of Western modernity (department 
stores, shopping arcades, movie theatres, etc.), the old city was, as 
Janet Abu-Lughod notes, ‘still essentially preindustrial in technology, 
social structure, and way of life’ (98).2
By the early 1940s, then, when the action in Midaq Alley takes 
place, Cairo had been divided into two quite distinct spheres of urban 
culture: ‘traditional versus modern, native versus foreign, Egyptian 
 1 In the 1940s, half of the city’s children were dying of diarrhoea and 
malnutrition before the age of five; and although an estimated 90 per 
cent of foreigners were literate, only one in seven Egyptians could read 
(Rodenbeck 147).
 2 For more on the topographical duality of colonial Cairo (and the liminal 




versus European, old versus new, baladi [“of the country”] versus ifrangi 
(Western style)’ (Reynolds 3). And it is the tension between these 
two spheres that generates much of the novel’s proairetic substance, 
as continuity collides with change, and the inhabitants of the alley 
struggle to maintain a fragile sense of social order and stability. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the conflict between tradition and modernity has also 
tended to dominate critical readings of Midaq Alley, with many commen-
tators approaching the novel from a broadly sociological perspective.3 
In what follows, however, I would like to trace in greater detail the 
affective, formal, and generic consequences of this encounter. I shall 
begin by discussing the significance of anger within the narrative, 
arguing that this dominant structure of feeling could be read as a 
collective response to larger historical forces.4 Or to put it another way, 
rather than understanding emotion as the ‘subjective property’ of the 
individual (Grossberg, ‘Postmodernity’ 79), I shall regard it here as a 
relational practice embedded within and determined by quite specific 
sociopolitical circumstances. Only thus can we hope to account for the 
curious ubiquity of such negative feelings in Midaq Alley, their hyperbolic 
nature, and the insufficient explanatory force of the localized causes 
we find distributed throughout the narrative. I will then proceed to 
discuss the role of rumour in the novel and the significance of its 
pronounced melodramatic qualities. In the first case, I shall argue, the 
circulation of rumour provides a way of containing or ‘quarantining’ 
the negative feelings produced by modernity, while also reinforcing the 
boundaries of a community facing the very real possibility of its own 
 3 For examples of this tendency, see El-Enany, Moosa, Deeb, Somekh, and 
Moussa-Mahmoud.
 4 I do not claim to be entirely original here, as the broader social and political 
significance of (colonial or postcolonial) anger has been acknowledged 
elsewhere too. In her analysis of Tsitsi Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions 
and The Book of Not, for instance, Sue J. Kim distinguishes between the 
‘large anger’ we find in the former (‘grand, explosive, and raging at 
structures’) and the ‘minor rages … over apparently trivial things’ that 
occur in the latter. Yet despite these differences, Kim argues that both 
varieties of anger are ultimately political in origin – the characters’ 
dysphoric feelings being produced and shaped by the various ‘ideolog-
ically conditioned’ spaces they occupy. ‘In Nervous Conditions and The Book 
of Not,’ she observes, ‘spaces such as bathrooms, kitchens and dining 
halls, and other private spaces are charged battlegrounds, particularly 
for women, sparking anger that arises from their inhabiting of clashing 
ideologies and structures’ (101–2).
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demise. In the second case, I would like to suggest that the narrative’s 
tendency to privilege the melodramatic mode creates a sense of social 
order and moral intelligibility by channelling these feelings into a 
stable and predictable generic structure. As we shall see, though, the 
latter project is ultimately frustrated when the forces of evil emerge to 
destroy the novel’s principal representative of virtue – thus ensuring 
that the trajectory of the narrative itself, the melodramatic logic of 
its unfolding, should also be severely disrupted by the intervention of 
colonial modernity.
II
If we agree with Sianne Ngai that ‘every literary work has an organizing 
quality of feeling akin to an “atmosphere”’ (Ugly 174), then the emotion 
that most clearly dominates Midaq Alley would have to be anger – the 
instinctive rage that drives the narrative forward, providing it with its 
underlying dynamic force. Simply put, everyone in the novel is angry, 
and they seem to be angry all the time. Here are just a few randomly 
selected examples of the anger to be found on almost every page:
Her temper had always, even in Midaq Alley itself, been something 
no one could ignore. (24)
She was one of those alley women renowned for their tempers … 
and she was particularly famous for the furious rows she had with 
her husband concerning his dirty habits. (72)
He was filled with scorn and his small eyes flashed in anger. (73)
Anger seethed within her and she stared hard at him, her eyes red 
from sleeplessness and rage. (75)
Kirsha was now standing behind the till, his anger having locked his 
tongue, his face pale with fury. (100)
He always seemed overcome with rage, exasperation, and a desire 
to curse. (116)
She turned her attention to the stage in angry exasperation … Her 
blood boiled. (157)
As soon as he was left alone [Salim] Alwan’s vindictive thoughts 




She opened her mouth in horrified amazement and an awful look 
darkened her eyes as her face went white with rage. (196)
The memory flowed through him like a gentle spring breeze, but, 
meeting the glare of his troubled heart, it was transformed into a 
raging sirocco. (238)
And so it goes. Over the course of the novel, this constant reiteration of 
anger comes to dominate the narrative, producing what we might call 
a surplus of dysphoric energy.5 Indeed, at times, even the characters 
themselves are surprised by the overdetermined, excessive nature of 
their anger. When, for instance, the wealthy businessman Salim Alwan 
learns that Hamida has become engaged to Abbas, he flies into an 
uncontrollable rage. Taken aback, the girl’s mother replies: ‘Don’t be 
angry with me, Mr. Alwan. You’re the kind of man who only has to issue 
a command when you want something … Please don’t be angry with 
me. Why are you so angry?’ (139). It is a question we will hear more than 
once as the novel progresses, and eventually we will be obliged to ask 
ourselves the same thing. Yes, why are they so angry? Why are these 
people always shouting at each other? Why must every encounter in 
the alley take on an adversarial quality?
The very overdetermined nature of the characters’ anger, however, 
along with its striking ubiquity within the narrative, complicates many 
of the interpretive procedures we would ordinarily bring to bear on 
such issues. In other words, a reading of this dominant structure of 
feeling based solely on character, individual psychology, or the contin-
gencies of plotting would seem to be inadequate – or at least incapable 
of accounting for the privileged position that anger occupies within 
the novel’s affective economy. The disparity between the intensity of 
the characters’ negative feelings and the incidental causes scattered 
across the surface of the narrative is simply too great to sustain such 
a reading. Instead, I would like to suggest that the anger in Midaq Alley 
emerges out of much deeper social, political, and economic processes. 
As will become clear, the intervention of colonial modernity in the novel 
radically destabilizes the old social order, yet without implementing 
a new order that can be easily comprehended by the characters or 
assimilated into their lives. And because they are unable to understand 
fully the processes of transformation they are undergoing, because 
 5 Envy also features prominently in Midaq Alley, yet this minor emotion is 
subordinated to (and ultimately serves to generate) the anger that I would 
consider to be the novel’s primary affective quality.
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these processes are located just beyond their cognitive range, many of 
the characters internalize a vague sense of social crisis that eventually 
resurfaces in the form of displaced anger. Ato Quayson, to whom this 
chapter is greatly indebted, has used the term ‘systemic uncanny’ 
to describe a similar phenomenon involving ‘the conversion of the 
perception of a systemic disorder into a negative affect’ (Calibrations 
80).6 In the face of social disruption of one kind or another, he 
writes, an ‘internalization of these perceived disorders takes place … 
The internalized translation of disorder does not, however, remain 
merely internalized, but gets cathected into inchoate senses of guilt, 
inexplicable terror, or a general sense of disquiet that may or may not 
be consciously traceable to a direct source’ (Aesthetic 142). To Quayson’s 
list of dysphoric feelings we could, of course, add anger – the blind 
rage that drives (and disfigures) almost every social encounter in Midaq 
Alley. And once we register the fact that these encounters have been 
invested with too much affective energy, once we acknowledge their 
overdetermined quality, we are compelled to look elsewhere for the 
ultimate source of such disproportionate rage. According to Freud, 
the process of displacement involves shifting the ‘psychical accent’ 
from something of key importance to the psyche to something of 
minimal significance, ‘which thenceforward plays the psychological 
part of the former [idea]’ (‘Further’ 308–9). It is the responsibility of 
the psychoanalyst, he argues, to recognize the affective disparity such 
a process creates and to identify, by following a ‘chain of associations’ 
(Interpretation 58), the original cause of the displaced feeling. ‘If [such] 
displacements can be reversed,’ Freud concludes, ‘the way is open to 
the discovery of the repressed ideas, and the relation between affect 
and idea is found to be perfectly appropriate’ (‘Claims’ 173). In Midaq 
Alley, as I say, this is precisely what the attentive reader is obliged to do 
if the novel is to achieve any kind of emotional plausibility. Rather than 
accepting the characters’ anger at face value, we must trace it back to 
its source in the public sphere, for only at this deeper, social level does 
the rage they all share begin to make sense.7
 6 It was Quayson who first drew my attention to the preponderance of 
anger in Midaq Alley and suggested that this structure of feeling could be 
related to the disruptive pressures of modernity.
 7 Aristotle’s theory of anger, as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics, may also 
be instructive here. Rather than rejecting this ‘passion’ altogether, he 
advocates a moderate form of anger that is situated, like all his virtues, 
between two negative extremes. One can be too angry or not angry 
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Although the narrator of Mahfouz’s novel describes the eponymous 
alley as an ‘ancient relic’ living in ‘isolation from all surrounding activity’ 
(1), it soon becomes obvious that this is not altogether true. In the 
opening scene, we witness a radio being installed in the local café, 
displacing the old poet who has been allowed to recite his verses there 
for as long as anyone can remember. ‘Public reciters still have an appeal 
which won’t disappear,’ the poet announces as he is leaving. ‘The radio 
will never replace us.’ To which the café owner, Kirsha, replies: ‘That 
is what you say, but it is not what my customers say and you are not 
going to ruin my business. Everything has changed!’ (6). This altercation 
is just the first of many such disturbances; and over the course of the 
novel, the characters will continue to grapple with the contradictory 
social forces, the radical disjunctures and discontinuities, initiated 
by colonial modernity.8 Indeed, in Midaq Alley, every effort is made to 
bring these contradictory tendencies to the fore, reminding us that 
modernity can be at once emancipatory and repressive, dignifying and 
degrading. When Hussain Kirsha leaves the alley to work for the British 
Army, for example, his wages increase from three piastres to thirty, and 
his lifestyle changes accordingly: ‘He bought new clothes, frequented 
enough; yet the ‘man who is angry at the right things and with the right 
people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, 
is [to be] praised’ (73). It is not easy, Aristotle concedes, to ‘define how, 
with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at what 
point right action ceases and wrong begins.’ But what is clear is that ‘the 
middle state is praiseworthy – [the state in] which we are angry with the 
right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so on’ (74). At one 
extreme, then, we have those people who suffer a deficiency of anger, and 
who therefore seem ‘not to feel things nor to be pained by them,’ while at 
the other, we have those ‘irascible’ people who ‘get angry quickly and with 
the wrong persons and at the wrong things and more than is right’ (73). As 
I have suggested, the inhabitants of Midaq Alley clearly belong to the latter 
category – their anger being disproportionate to the minor provocations 
they suffer, cathected with far greater intensity than it ought to be, 
because it has been misdirected or displaced.
 8 On the one hand, as Perry Anderson writes, this form of modernity 
‘tears down every ancestral confinement and feudal restriction, social 
immobility and claustral tradition,’ bringing about a ‘tremendous emanci-
pation of the possibility and sensibility of the individual self.’ On the 
other hand, the very same system ‘generates a brutally alienated and 
atomized society, riven by callous economic exploitation and cold social 
indifference, destructive of every cultural or political value it has itself 
brought into being’ (98).
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restaurants, and delighted in eating meat, which he considered a luxury 
reserved especially for the rich. He attended cinemas and cabarets and 
found pleasure in wine and the company of women’ (33). We are also 
told that Hamida envies ‘the freedom and obvious prosperity’ of the 
young women who work in the factories, women whose very bodies 
come to signify the invigorating pleasures of modernity:
They were girls from the Darasa district, who, taking advantage of 
wartime employment opportunities, ignored custom and tradition 
and now worked in public places just like the Jewish women. They had 
gone into factory work exhausted, emaciated, and destitute. Soon 
remarkable changes were noticeable: their once undernourished 
bodies filled out and seemed to radiate a healthy pride and vitality. 
They imitated the Jewish girls by paying attention to their appearance 
and in keeping slim. Some even used unaccustomed language and did 
not hesitate to walk arm in arm and stroll about the streets of illicit 
love. They exuded an air of boldness and secret knowledge. (40–41)
But needless to say, there are two sides to this story as well. Hussain 
will eventually lose his job and be forced to return, destitute and 
disillusioned, to Midaq Alley, while Hamida, for whom the outside 
world held so much promise, will only be able to fulfil her ‘dreams of 
clothes, jewelry, money, and men’ (255) by prostituting herself to the 
Allied forces.
It is perhaps not surprising, given these contradictory qualities, that 
modernity should generate a strong sense of ambivalence in many of 
the novel’s characters. They simply do not know what to make of it, 
and so they respond, for the most part, with profound equivocality 
– torn between feelings of repulsion and attraction, between ‘phobic 
strivings “away from” [and] philic strivings “toward”’ (Ngai, Ugly 11). 
In Hamida’s case, these feelings attach themselves most obviously to 
Faraj, the predatory pimp who offers to rescue her from the ‘graveyard 
of decaying bones’ (Mahfouz 195) in which she lives. His arrogance, 
we are told, ‘infuriated’ her, and yet his ‘respectable appearance and 
his handsome masculinity attracted her’ too. Try as she might, ‘she 
could not sort out her feelings for him’ (161). As the novel progresses, 
Hamida’s libidinal impulses toward Faraj are repeatedly disrupted by 
surges of anger, animosity, and a ‘bestial desire to fight’ (184). Consider 
the following passage, for instance:
She noticed [Faraj] had snuggled close to her, and she began to sense 
the effect of his touch creeping over her. This enraged her, and she 
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pushed him away more forcibly than she intended. He glanced at her 
to see what was the matter and then took her hand and gently placed 
it between his own. He was encouraged by her permissiveness and 
searched for her lips with his mouth. She seemed to resist and drew 
her head back slightly. However, he did not find this a sufficient 
restraint and pressed his lips to hers. (189)
It is worth noting the vacillations of meaning that occur here. Almost 
every sentence produces a collision of contraries – sliding from one 
antithetical category into another, weaving its way through a series 
of equivocations and inconsistencies, ‘ceaselessly posit[ing] meaning 
ceaselessly to evaporate it’ (Barthes, ‘Death’ 147). Force fades into 
delicacy without quite losing its coercive qualities. Resistance becomes 
‘permissiveness’ under the guise of continued defiance. Phobic strivings 
‘away from’ give rise to philic strivings ‘toward.’ And all of these minor 
slippages ultimately testify to the presence of much deeper instabilities 
and equivocalities, circulating just beneath the surface of the narrative. 
For many of the novel’s characters, as we have seen, modernity is a 
source of considerable ambivalence. They are ‘moved at once by a 
will to change – to transform both themselves and their world – and 
by a terror of disorientation and disintegration, of life falling apart’ 
(Berman 13). And it is this underlying tension, I would argue, this sense 
of cognitive dissonance, that contributes more than anything to the 
novel’s dominant structure of feeling, transforming a vague sense of 
disquiet into full-blown ‘loathing and rage’ (Mahfouz 99).
Although the characters themselves may not always know why they 
feel the way they do, it is difficult for us as readers to ignore the 
connection between modernity and its affective consequences. Let us 
focus, by way of illustration, on one case in particular. At the beginning 
of the novel, we learn that the eccentric Sheikh Darwish had once 
been ‘a teacher of the English language.’ When the religious foundation 
schools merged with the Ministry of Education, however, ‘his position 
changed, as did that of many of his associates, who, like him, lacked 
higher qualifications.’ As a consequence of this restructuring, Sheikh 
Darwish became a clerk in the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and 
‘went down from the sixth to the eighth [bureaucratic] grade’ (12), with 
a corresponding reduction in his salary. It was only natural, the narrator 
says, that ‘he was hurt by what happened to him,’ and so he began ‘a 
continuous rebellion’ against those in authority:
Occasionally he rebelled openly; at other times he felt defeated 
and concealed his rebellion. He had tried every method, issuing 
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petitions, appealing to his superiors, and complaining about his 
poverty and the size of his family. All without success. At last he 
gave way to despair, his nerves almost in shreds. His case became 
famous in his ministry and he became notorious as a rebel, always 
complaining, extremely stubborn and obstinate, and very quick 
tempered. Scarcely a day went by without his becoming involved in 
an argument or quarrel. (13)
We can see quite plainly here the way in which the forces of modernity 
enter into, and ultimately disrupt, the novel’s affective economy. Sheikh 
Darwish’s life has been transformed by processes of structural change 
that he can neither control nor fully understand. At first, he strives to 
master these processes by ‘issuing petitions, appealing to his superiors, 
and complaining about his poverty and the size of his family,’ but when 
all of this proves futile, he finally ‘[gives] way to despair.’ The profound 
sense of social instability he experiences is thus internalized, only 
to resurface almost immediately in the form of displaced anger and 
irascibility: ‘[H]e became notorious as a rebel, always complaining, 
extremely stubborn and obstinate, and very quick tempered.’ Once 
his career at the ministry comes to an end, Sheikh Darwish loses his 
mind altogether, ‘desert[ing] his family, friends, and acquaintances, 
and wander[ing] off into the world of God, as it is called’ (14). And by 
the time we are introduced to him in the novel’s opening pages, he has 
become a kind of sacrificial figure, a pharmakos, whose only purpose is 
to bear the psychological burden of these ‘innovations’ and to provide 
a choric commentary on the other characters’ lives.
One question we might ask, though, is why this anger should be 
displaced at all. If the processes of social transformation initiated by 
colonial modernity are the ultimate source of these affective distur-
bances, then why is the anger we witness here not directed at some 
of the more tangible attributes of modernity itself? For one thing, 
as I have noted, the characters in Midaq Alley are simply unable to 
identify the underlying cause of their rage (‘Don’t be angry with me, 
Mr. Alwan … Why are you so angry?’ [139]). They may register these 
social pressures at a subliminal level, but they cannot understand 
precisely why it is that they should feel this way; and so they focus their 
displeasure on anyone (and anything) within range.9 It is also significant 
 9 In this respect, the anger they demonstrate resembles Freud’s notion of 
‘expectant anxiety,’ as described in one of his introductory lectures from 
1917. If we study a condition of this kind, Freud says, ‘we find a general 
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that these characters should be living in a colonial city, a city that has 
been occupied since 1882 and currently accommodates over 140,000 
Allied soldiers. Under these circumstances, in the colonial Cairo of the 
1940s, the inhabitants of Midaq Alley have no choice but to direct their 
rage at more easily mastered substitutes (wives, employees, colleagues, 
etc.), and this is what finally denies them the possibility of genuine 
cathartic release. ‘When the native is confronted with the colonial 
order of things,’ Frantz Fanon observes, ‘he finds [that] he is in a state 
of permanent tension,’ and he ‘will first manifest [the] aggressiveness 
which has been deposited in his bones against his own people.’ This is 
a period of time ‘when the [natives] beat each other up, and the police 
and magistrates do not know which way to turn when faced with the 
astonishing waves of crime in [the colonies]’ (Wretched 52). Having been 
deprived of a legitimate political voice, Fanon concludes, the colonial 
subject is forced to find other, more oblique ways of releasing these 
dysphoric energies – ‘in tribal warfare, in feuds between [families], 
and in quarrels between individuals’ (54).10 And that is why the anger 
that dominates Midaq Alley is so clearly disproportionate: because it 
has been displaced, because it has been denied cathartic release, and 
because it has been directed at an innocuous ‘third party’ rather than 
its true source, which continues to hover just beyond the characters’ 
field of cognition.11
apprehensiveness, a kind of freely floating anxiety which is ready to attach 
itself to any idea that is in any way suitable, which influences judgement, 
selects what is to be expected, and lies in wait for any opportunity that 
will allow it to justify itself ’ (Introductory 446).
 10 According to Fanon, however, the self-destructive violence that occurs 
during this period will eventually be redirected at the colonizers 
themselves. ‘In spite of the metamorphoses which the colonial regime 
imposes upon it in the way of tribal or regional quarrels,’ he writes, ‘[this] 
violence makes its way forward,’ until the native finally ‘identifies his 
enemy and recognizes all his misfortunes, throwing all the exacerbated 
might of his hate and anger into [the] new channel [of anti-colonial 
resistance]’ (Wretched 71).
 11 As I shall argue in Chapter 3, Machado’s Dom Casmurro also explores the 
affective consequences of the encounter with European modernity – and 
it is worth considering, just briefly, some of the correspondences between 
these two narratives. In Midaq Alley, the intervention of colonial modernity 
(in the particular form that it assumed in Cairo during the Second World 
War) initiates a period of rapid social transformation that many of the 
characters find unsettling and disorientating. This in turn produces a 
collective feeling of anger, which is directed not at its true source (i.e., 
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In Aesthetic Nervousness, Ato Quayson makes another point that is 
of some relevance to our discussion here. ‘The systemic uncanny,’ he 
writes, ‘may be social as well as personal, public as well as private’ 
(142); and that would certainly seem to be the case in Midaq Alley, 
where the feelings of anger and animosity we have been exploring 
take on an intersubjective quality, transgressing the boundaries of 
individual consciousness. Roland Barthes has argued, quite persua-
sively, that literary characters are essentially composed of semes (or 
units of meaning) clustered around a single proper name. According 
to Barthes, ‘[w]hen identical semes traverse the same proper name 
several times and appear to settle upon it, a character is created … 
The proper name acts as a magnetic field for the semes; referring 
in fact to a body, it draws the semic configuration into an evolving 
(biographical) tense’ (S/Z 67–68). Despite their superficial differences, 
though, the characters in Midaq Alley all seem to share the same 
fundamental attributes, or ‘semic configurations,’ and what we 
eventually come to realize is that the ubiquity of ill feeling in the alley 
makes it difficult to distinguish between individual subjectivities. (It 
appears to be difficult for the narrator, too, whose struggle to say the 
same thing differently moves the narrative on more than one occasion 
toward blatant redundancy: e.g., ‘rage and anger, spite and malice’ 
[271].) Indeed, we could even go so far as to argue that the novel only 
has one subjectivity, one ‘character,’ for although we are presented 
with a wide range of proper names, they all occupy the same magnetic 
modernity itself ) but at a number of more easily mastered substitutes; 
and it is the displaced nature of this rage that gives it such a strong sense 
of disproportionality. In Dom Casmurro, on the other hand, the dominant 
structure of feeling emerges out of a conflict between the archaic social 
reality of nineteenth-century Brazil and the ‘modern’ European values to 
which the élite subscribed – despite the fact that they were the principal 
beneficiaries of the last slave-owning economy in the Western world. 
Although this ideological dissonance creates a feeling of jealousy, rather 
than anger, it is an emotion that has also lost all sense of proportion 
(‘I came to be jealous of everything and everyone’ [196], our narrator 
confesses). And this is where the point of connection between the two 
narratives can be located. In both Midaq Alley and Dom Casmurro, the 
encounter with European modernity (under quite specific circumstances 
in each case) generates a sense of social incongruity and dissonance, 
which in turn gives rise to a structure of feeling (anger in one novel, 
jealousy in the other) that is equally disproportionate and ‘ill-fitting’ – 
thus allowing it to serve as an affective correlative for the very social 
forces that brought it into being.
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field and produce the same configuration of affective semes – a 
configuration, incidentally, that resists being drawn into anything like 
an ‘evolving’ or biographical tense.
The narrative’s use of variable internal focalization also contributes 
a great deal to this sense of communality.12 Rather than privileging 
any one character or seeking to individuate emotion, it offers us what 
Teshome Gabriel has called a ‘hetero-biography’ of the collective 
subject. In his influential analysis of Third Cinema aesthetics, Gabriel 
distinguishes between two different types of autobiographical 
narrative: (1) ‘autobiography in its usual Western sense of a narrative 
by and about a single subject,’ and (2) ‘a multi-generational and 
trans-individual autobiography, i.e., a symbolic autobiography 
where the collective subject is the focus’ (58). Midaq Alley provides 
us with a particularly good example of this second type of ‘autobio-
graphical’ narrative – deliberately blurring the distinction between 
the individual and the collective, between the private and public 
spheres, until one category appears to collapse into the other.13 As 
a consequence of this shift in emphasis, emotion becomes detached 
from the individual consciousness, circulating freely within the larger 
community and within the structure of the novel itself. It becomes, 
to quote Mikel Dufrenne once more, ‘a supervening or impersonal 
principle in accordance with which we [might] say that there is an 
electric atmosphere or, as Trenet sang, that there is joy in the air’ 
(168).14 Yet in Midaq Alley, of course, the dominant structure of feeling 
is one of anger rather than joy; the atmosphere is not ‘electric’ but full 
of animosity and belligerence. And this affective quality, I would like 
to suggest, is what motivates many of the characters to spend their 
 12 Gérard Genette has distinguished between two different types of internal 
focalization: fixed, where the point of view is restricted to one particular 
character, and variable, ‘as in Madame Bovary, where the focal character is 
first Charles, then Emma, then again Charles’ (189).
 13 It is worth noting, however, that none of the characters are able to 
recognize the collective quality of their anger. Like the structures of 
feeling we discussed in the Introduction, the rage they feel is a ‘social 
experience’ that is ‘not yet recognized as social but taken to be private, 
idiosyncratic, and even isolating’ (Williams, Marxism 132).
 14 In The Particulars of Rapture, Charles Altieri uses the term ‘mood’ to 
describe this depersonalized, freely circulating form of emotion. ‘Moods,’ 
he writes, ‘are modes of feeling where the sense of subjectivity becomes 
diffuse and sensation merges into something close to atmosphere, 
something that seems to pervade an entire scene or situation’ (2).
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time gossiping about each other’s lives. For only by narrativizing their 
experiences in this way, only by arranging them into what Leo Bersani 
calls a ‘governing pattern of significance’ (52), can they hope to assert 
some control over the dysphoric energy that has been released into 
the novel’s atmosphere.
III
On 15 January 1934, the Indian province of Bihar was struck by a 
catastrophic earthquake measuring 8.4 on the Richter scale. Some 
thirty thousand people are believed to have died in the disaster, 
and the urban centres of Monghyr and Muzaffarpur were almost 
completely destroyed. In the days following the earthquake, according 
to the psychologist J. Prasad, various rumours began to circulate 
throughout the province. The river Ganges had disappeared, it was 
said, leaving bathers embedded in the sand. The grounds of the High 
Court in Patna had been ‘rent into wide fissures’ and ‘big holes of 
immeasurable depth’ (1) had appeared there. Thirteen thousand dead 
bodies had been discovered when clearing the debris of the main 
street in Monghyr. Local astrologers had predicted ‘evil days for the 
world from the beginning of 1934 until the end of the year’ (3). And 
that was not all. It was also foretold that there would be another 
severe earthquake on the night of the lunar eclipse (21 January), that 
Patna itself would ‘cease to exist’ (4) on 26 February, and that within 
twenty-four hours of this disaster the men and women of the province 
would change gender.
For Prasad, writing in 1935, these rumours represent ‘attempts on 
the part of the popular mind to comprehend a strange phenomenon in 
such forms of thought as are inherited by, and prevalent in, the group, 
and acceptable to all its members’ (7). He goes on to describe rumour 
more generally as a ‘response of a cognitive nature’ to an event that has 
‘set up an emotional disturbance, and contains many unknown parts’ 
(9). This ‘distracting sense of incompleteness,’ he argues, ‘arouses a 
tendency to try to understand the meaning of the changed situation by a 
process of completing the incomplete’ (7). As Prasad observes, however, 
such rumours not only constitute a collective response to a ‘widespread 
emotional disturbance’ (6), but also seem to ‘alter the character of the 
effective social bonds between the individuals belonging to the group 




The moment a rumour spreads about a matter of even private and 
personal importance … the matter is at once converted into a social 
situation which is of interest and importance to the group, and is 
no longer a merely private affair … [A] well-known reaction of the 
individual on hearing a rumour [is] his almost uncontrollable impulse 
to pass it on to another person … This impulse is of fundamental 
importance in group psychology, since the communication of a 
report to other members of the group implies an underlying bond of 
community among the members … Thus rumour, both in its rise and 
in its communication, is properly treated as a social phenomenon. 
(8–12)
In this study, Prasad raises a number of issues that also have some 
bearing on the role of rumour in Midaq Alley. As things begin to fall 
apart in Mahfouz’s novel, the characters are increasingly given to 
discussing each other’s private lives, ‘fill[ing] the air’ (9) with gossip and 
hearsay. Like anger, I would argue, these micronarratives could be read 
as a collective response to the crisis provoked by colonial modernity. 
Narratives of one kind or another have always served as a way of 
structuring, ordering, and plotting reality – allowing us to ascribe form 
and significance to the enigmatic contingencies that govern our lives. 
And this, of course, is precisely what the characters in Midaq Alley 
hope to achieve by producing their own narratives: a sense of order, 
stability, coherence, and, above all, intelligible meaning. Confronted 
by a ‘strange phenomenon’ that defies complete understanding, they 
attempt to clarify the ‘meaning of [their] changed situation’ (Prasad 
7) by translating it into narrative, by telling and retelling the various 
stories to which it gives rise. So when the characters gather to discuss 
Hamida’s sudden disappearance (‘[S]he didn’t just run away, she ran 
away with a strange man. In English they call that an “elopement”’ 
[244]) or Abbas’ death (‘[The police] carried his body off to Kasr el-Aini 
Hospital and took the whore off for first-aid treatment’ [283]), they 
are not simply indulging in idle gossip; they are, in fact, attempting to 
understand and lay claim to the larger historical forces that have had 
such a decisive influence over their lives.
Many of the rumours in the novel could also be seen as a response to 
the ‘widespread emotional disturbance’ (Prasad 6) created by colonial 
modernity – for only by narrating these stories are the characters 
able to achieve some degree of control over the negative feelings that 
have come to dominate their social reality. Take Umm Hamida, for 
instance. Her tongue, we are told, ‘was hardly ever still and she scarcely 
missed a single report or scandal concerning anyone or any house in 
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the neighborhood.’ So when she is visited by Mrs Afify in the novel’s 
opening pages, it is not surprising that she should provide the latter 
with a comprehensive ‘résumé of the news of the alley’:
Had she heard of Kirsha’s new scandal? It was just like the previous 
ones and the news got back to his wife, who had a fight with him 
and tore his cloak. Husniya, the bakeress, the day before struck her 
husband so hard that blood had flowed from his forehead. Radwan 
Hussainy, that good and pious man, had rebuked his wife most 
strongly, and why would he treat her in this way, the good man 
that he was, if she were not a vile and wicked hussy! Dr. Booshy had 
interfered with a little girl in the shelter in the last air raid and some 
upright citizen had struck him for it. The wife of Mawardy, the wood 
merchant, had run off with her servant, and her father had informed 
the police. Tabuna Kafawy was secretly selling bread made of pure 
flour – and so on. (16–17)
By integrating these disputes and episodes of violence into a clearly 
demarcated narrative structure, Umm Hamida does her best to 
quarantine the dysphoric energy she senses within the alley – energy 
that might otherwise prove severely disruptive to the community at 
large. It is her way of giving such dissonance and strife the reassuring 
shape of a story; and seen in this light, the seemingly casual ‘and so on’ 
that brings her narrative to a close assumes a far greater significance. 
According to Barthes, if the ‘classic [readerly] text has nothing more to 
say than what it says, at least it attempts to “let it be understood” that 
it does not say everything.’ This allusion to meaning, he suggests, is 
‘coded by pensiveness, which is a sign of nothing but itself: as though 
having filled the text but obsessively fearing that it is not incontestably 
filled, the discourse insist[s] on supplementing it with an et cetera of 
plenitudes’ (S/Z 216–17). In this case, similarly, the narrator’s final et 
cetera expresses a deep anxiety about all the negative energy that has 
not been contained within the structure of Umm Hamida’s narrative, 
all the anger and animosity that continues to exceed its boundaries. 
Prasad, you may recall, described rumour as a ‘process of completing 
the incomplete,’ and that is exactly what our narrator is attempting 
to achieve here. He or she is attempting to ‘fill’ the narrative, to 
compensate for the ‘parsimony of its plural’ (Barthes, S/Z 217), by 
gesturing vaguely (and desperately) toward everything it is incapable 
of accommodating.
As well as enabling the characters to assert some control over 
modernity and the negative feelings it generates, such rumours also 
Anger
47
serve to delineate and reinforce the contours of a community in peril. 
In his article on the 1934 Bihar earthquake, as we have seen, Prasad 
consistently emphasizes the social significance of rumour, arguing that 
the impulse to communicate in this way is of ‘fundamental importance 
in group psychology.’ For Prasad, rumour reinforces the ‘underlying 
bond of community’ by initiating the individual into a larger collective 
whose boundaries it also serves to define, and by instilling in them 
‘an almost uncontrollable impulse to pass [the rumour] on to another 
person.’ This transitive quality is what makes rumour a particularly 
effective unifying or interpellatory device, for the movement it traces 
is, in Peter Brooks’ words, ‘one of “contamination”: the passing-on of 
the virus of narrative, the creation of the fevered need to retell’ (Reading 
220–21). None of the characters in Midaq Alley can resist exchanging 
gossip, and every time they do so, they are unconsciously performing 
their own communality – marking the difference between self and 
other, inside and outside, those who belong here, in this ‘graveyard of 
decaying bones’ (Mahfouz 195), and those who belong somewhere else.
Near the end of the novel, moreover, we witness the process by which 
the narrative we have been reading is itself transformed into gossip. 
Hussain Kirsha has just arrived back in the alley, having failed to prevent 
Abbas’ violent death at the hands of the Allied soldiers: ‘He came slowly 
and heavily up the alley, went over to his father, and threw himself 
into a chair facing him. Without a greeting he said hoarsely, “Father, 
Abbas has been killed …”’ (283). The story that follows leaves Hussain’s 
father, Kirsha, possessed by a ‘fevered need’ to retell everything he has 
heard – thus ensuring its transition from mimetic novelistic discourse 
(280–81) into the diegetic discourse of rumour: ‘The news soon spread 
as Kirsha told his son’s tale repeatedly to people who came to ask. Their 
tongues in turn circulated the story, along with many additions and 
variations’ (284). Indeed, one could go even further and suggest that 
the narrative itself becomes an integral part of this process, dissemi-
nating Hussain’s tale far beyond the parameters of Midaq Alley.15 And 
as a consequence of this transformation, the novel’s literary discourse 
is also ‘contaminated’ by the rhetorical features of rumour, taking 
on many of the qualities that we tend to associate with the latter. In 
certain non-focalized passages, for example, the narrator’s field of 
omniscience suddenly recedes: 
 15 I am naturally reminded here of Truman Capote’s claim that ‘all literature 
is gossip, certainly all prose-narrative literature’ (337).
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[During this period] Mrs. Saniya Afify decided to clear out the flat 
which Dr. Booshy had occupied before he went to jail and Uncle 
Kamil volunteered to carry Dr. Booshy’s personal belongings … into 
his [own] flat. In explanation it was said that Uncle Kamil preferred to 
share his dwelling with Dr. Booshy rather than continue to endure 
unaccustomed loneliness. No one blamed him and indeed they may 
well have considered the act a kindness on his part [as] a term in 
prison was not the sort of thing to bring disgrace on a man in the 
alley. (285; my italics)
Like a rumour, the narrative is also generated anonymously, for 
although the narrator may in fact be located within the community, it 
is never made clear to us which character (if any) he or she might be.16 
And perhaps most significantly, the story that this anonymous figure 
relates is notable for its hyperbolic impulses, its tendency to overdo 
everything, to charge every encounter and every state of being with 
heightened emotional force. Prasad’s article identifies exaggeration as 
one of the defining characteristics of rumour, and this is something that 
the historian Gyanendra Pandey has also commented upon. ‘Rumour,’ 
Pandey writes, ‘is marked characteristically not only by indeterminacy, 
anonymity and contagion, but also by a tendency to excess’ (70). This 
hyperbolic register is of course typical of all narratives produced in the 
melodramatic mode. Yet in Midaq Alley, I shall argue, such tendencies take 
on additional significance – representing one last attempt to contain 
and control the dysphoric energy released by colonial modernity.
IV
As Peter Brooks has observed, the connotations of the term ‘melodrama’ 
are probably similar for us all. They include: ‘the indulgence of strong 
emotionalism; moral polarization and schematization; extreme states 
 16 One may recall that in the closing pages of Albert Camus’ The Plague, the 
hitherto anonymous narrator finally decides to reveal his true identity: 
‘This chronicle is drawing to an end, and this seems to be the moment 
for Dr Bernard Rieux to confess that he is the narrator.’ He does so in 
order to reassure the reader that he has given ‘a true account of all he 
saw and heard’ and ‘confined himself to describing only such things as he 
was enabled to see for himself’ (246). In Midaq Alley, by contrast, no such 
disclosure takes place and no such assurances are offered – preserving to 
the end the novel’s casual, gossipy quality.
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of being, situations, actions; overt villainy, persecution of the good, 
and final reward of virtue; inflated and extravagant expression; dark 
plottings, suspense, [and] breathtaking peripety’ (Melodramatic 11–12). 
Needless to say, we do not have to look very hard to find these qualities 
in Midaq Alley. The strong emotionalism and extreme states of being 
we have already discussed in some detail (‘She clung to him, her head 
raised toward his face, her mouth open and trembling with passion …’ 
[223]); there are examples of ‘inflated and extravagant expression’ on 
almost every page; many of the novel’s characters, both major and 
minor, undergo episodes of ‘breathtaking peripety’; and the narrative 
does everything it can to establish a sense of ethical legibility and 
predictability. One of the ways in which it strives to achieve this last 
objective is through the schematic personification of moral absolutes, 
ensuring that characters are either good (Abbas) or evil (Faraj), and 
refusing to accommodate any intermediate states of ethical being. 
These qualities are almost always externalized, too, so that the reader 
has no difficulty distinguishing between the representatives of good 
and those of evil. And finally, we are offered a plot trajectory that 
(ostensibly) promises to bring about the destruction of vice and the 
ultimate apotheosis of virtue, thereby restoring the natural order of 
things within the narrative.
In Midaq Alley, as I have suggested, these melodramatic tendencies 
could be interpreted as one more response to colonial modernity. 
Modernity obliges many of the novel’s characters to inhabit a kind of 
floating world – a world in which they are surrounded by historical 
processes they cannot quite understand and troubled by disruptive 
forces they cannot quite see, a world in which everything appears to be 
‘pregnant with its contrary’ and all that was once assumed to be solid 
‘melts into air’ (Marx 368, 248). Under such circumstances, melodrama 
serves to allay the threat of ineffability, rendering these occult forces 
legible, bringing them to the surface of the narrative where they can be 
more easily identified and apprehended. As Brooks writes,
Melodrama starts from and expresses the anxiety brought by a 
frightening new world in which the traditional patterns of moral 
order no longer provide the necessary social glue. It plays out the 
force of that anxiety with the apparent triumph of villainy, and it 
dissipates it with the eventual victory of virtue. It demonstrates over 
and over that the signs of ethical forces can be discovered and can be 
made legible … Melodrama is indeed, typically, not only a moralistic 
drama but the drama of morality: it strives to find, to articulate, to 
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demonstrate, to ‘prove’ the existence of a moral universe which, 
though put into question, masked by villainy and perversions of 
judgement, does exist and can be made to assert its presence and its 
categorical force among men. (Melodramatic 20)
The ‘melodramatic imagination’ is, then, essentially conflictual, 
motivated by a desire to reveal the agonistic forces operating beneath 
the surface of our daily lives; and this brings us back to the dominance 
of anger within the narrative, for it could be read not only as a displaced 
and pathological response to colonial modernity, but also as a strategy 
by which the novel’s characters seek to reaffirm, through ‘heightened 
dramatic utterance and gesture’ (Brooks, Melodramatic 14), a sense of 
social order and stability. In other words, one could argue that the 
characters in Midaq Alley are themselves responsible for determining 
the generic characteristics of the narrative they have been made to 
occupy – favouring, in their encounters with each other, ‘intense, 
excessive representations of life’ that ‘push through manners to deeper 
sources of [social] being’ (Brooks, Melodramatic 3–4). Here, as Brooks 
writes of Balzac, the ‘world is subsumed by an underlying manichaeism, 
and the narrative creates the excitement of its drama by putting 
us in touch with the conflict of good and evil played out under the 
surface of things.’ For the inhabitants of the alley, ‘[n]othing is spared 
because nothing is left unsaid; [they] stand on stage and utter the 
unspeakable, give voice to their deepest feelings, dramatize through 
their heightened and polarized words and gestures the whole lesson of 
their relationship’ (Melodramatic 4). And by doing so, they render legible 
(at least in symbolic form) the underlying pressures and imperatives 
of modernity – bringing these forces to the surface of the narrative 
through a ‘metaphoricity of gesture that evokes meanings beyond its 
literal configuration’ (Brooks, Melodramatic 10). All this anger, that is to 
say, all this animosity and conflict, gestures toward or makes visible 
deeper social polarities that can only be articulated indirectly, by way of 
oblique metaphorical correlatives. Bringing these polarities to light also 
serves to delineate and reinforce the very boundaries that modernity 
threatens to destroy, making clear once more the distinction between 
tradition and modernity, self and other, good and evil. According to 
Brooks, melodrama ‘can offer no terminal reconciliation, for there 
is no longer a clear transcendent value to be reconciled to. There is, 
rather, a social order to be purged, a set of ethical imperatives to be 
[revealed]’ (Melodramatic 17). But in the case of Midaq Alley, as we shall 
see, such ethical clarity and predictability is ultimately confounded 
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when the forces of evil emerge to destroy Abbas, the novel’s principal 
representative of virtue.
Of course, the predictability of melodrama is largely dependent on 
its formulaic structure, on the promise (and eventual delivery) of a 
certain narrative outcome. This structure, as Brooks observes, usually 
follows a very clear trajectory:
In the typical case … melodramatic structure moves from the 
presentation of virtue-as-innocence to the introduction of menace or 
obstacle, which places virtue in a situation of extreme peril. For the 
greater part of the play, evil appears to reign triumphant, controlling 
the structure of events, dictating the moral coordinates of reality … 
The third act … most often includes duels, chases, explosions, 
battles – a full panoply of violent action which offers a highly 
physical ‘acting out’ of virtue’s liberation from the oppressive efforts 
of evil. This violent action of the last act is possibly melodrama’s 
version of the tragic catharsis, the ritual by which virtue is freed 
from what blocked the realization of its desire, and evil is expelled 
from the universe … The play ends with public recognition of where 
virtue and evil reside, and the eradication of one as the reward of the 
other. (Melodramatic 30–32)
In Midaq Alley, though, despite the best efforts of the characters 
themselves, this standard plot trajectory is violently disrupted by the 
intervention of colonial modernity. Up until the novel’s penultimate 
chapter, everything has proceeded with reassuring predictability. In the 
opening pages, we are introduced to Hamida, the innocent young girl 
whom our hero Abbas loves. They become engaged, and Abbas leaves 
the alley in order to earn money for their future together. While he is 
away, however, Faraj, the representative of evil, makes his appearance 
– placing ‘virtue [Hamida] in a situation of extreme peril.’ Eventually, he 
manages to lure Hamida away from the alley, ensuring the temporary 
ascendance of evil within the narrative, but our hero soon returns and 
everything looks to be heading toward a satisfactory (i.e., formulaic) 
conclusion. When Abbas discovers what has become of his sweetheart, 
he promises both her and the reader ‘a highly physical “acting out” of 
virtue’s liberation from the oppressive efforts of evil’ – ‘a panoply of 
violent action’ that will restore, once and for all, the natural order of 
things. ‘I can never forget that you abandoned me and that people saw 
you with him,’ he says. ‘It’s over between us … But that monster must 
suffer. Where can I find him? … I’ll smash the filthy pimp’s head … 
I’ll break his neck; I’ll strangle him!’ (266–67). And those readers who 
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are familiar with melodramatic conventions will be expecting nothing 
less – but unfortunately things do not quite work out that way. Before 
Abbas can confront Faraj, he discovers Hamida entertaining Allied 
soldiers in a bar and flies into a terrible rage. Seeing him enter the bar, 
she too loses her temper, which only makes matters worse:
Her anger and shouting acted like gasoline on flames, and Abbas’ rage 
turned to sheer fury. His normal hesitancy and reserve disappeared 
as he felt all the sorrow, disappointment, and despair he had suffered 
in the past three days boil up within him to burst forth in a mad 
frenzy. He noticed some empty beer glasses on the bar, took one, 
and, not really aware of what he was doing, hurled it at her with all 
the force of the anger and despair within him. He acted so quickly 
that no one, neither the soldiers nor any of the tavern employees, 
could stop him, and the glass struck her in the face. Blood poured 
in a stream from her nose, mouth, and chin, mixing with the creams 
and powders on her face and running down onto her neck and dress. 
Her screams mingled with the enraged shouts of the drunks in the 
tavern, and angry men fell on Abbas from all sides like wild animals. 
(280–81)
This moment represents the fulfilment of all that has been threatened 
over the course of Midaq Alley and the refutation of all that has been 
promised. Although the Allied forces have always hovered on the 
periphery of the narrative, it is only at this late stage that they emerge 
into the light to destroy Abbas and erase the crucial distinction that 
has been established between the novel’s foreground (the alley) and 
its background (everything else). At this point, too, the anger that has 
always threatened to spill over into violence finally does so, with a 
cataclysmic ferocity that leaves Abbas ‘quite defenseless’ (281). This 
episode of violence is also particularly significant as it forces the novel 
we are reading to shift, without warning, from the melodramatic into 
the tragic mode, short-circuiting its generic wiring and subverting 
its project of ethical predictability. Instead of vice being punished 
and virtue rewarded, the reverse outcome is achieved, denying the 
characters (and the novel they occupy) their final opportunity to tame 
the disruptive forces of modernity. Rather than being safely contained 
within a melodramatic frame, the dysphoric energy produced by 
modernity leaks into the structure of the novel itself, disturbing its 
trajectory and forcing it to move abruptly from one generic mode into 




the narrative and stylistic organization of [Okri’s] material is 
informed by a problematic which assumes that the work of fiction can 
no longer complacently proffer a fictional ‘reality’ axiomatically at 
variance with the socio-historical reality of alienation, degradation, 
chaos and instability for the vast majority of its living generations. 
It is necessary to clarify that what is implied here … is not merely 
a thematic exploration of social malaise but the insinuation of this 
sense of social disjuncture into the very form and structure of these 
novels. (qtd. in Quayson, Strategic 148)
I would like to suggest, in conclusion, that exactly the same process 
takes place in Midaq Alley. As we have seen, the radical disjunctures and 
discontinuities initiated by colonial modernity give rise to a dominant 
structure of negative feeling within the novel. This feeling, I have 
argued, could be read both as a response to modernity and as an 
attempt to contain it through the enactment of various melodramatic 
tropes. But such a strategy ultimately fails, and as a consequence, the 
structure of the novel itself becomes saturated by these dysphoric 
energies, depriving the characters of any genuine sense of social order 
and stability. The discursive universe they occupy has shifted its generic 
coordinates, just as the material world they inhabit has shifted its 
sociocultural coordinates, and there is simply nothing they can do to 
stop it happening. They can only resign themselves to the inevitability of 
these historical processes, and to the inevitability of further disruptive 
change. For as Sheikh Darwish observes in the novel’s final lines, ‘[A]ll 
things have their end … Oh yes, everything comes to its nihaya. And the 
word for this in English is “end” and it is spelled e-n-d …’ (286).
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C H A P T E R  T W O
Reticence 
Vikram Seth’s A Suitable Boy
Reticence
[V]irtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, c. 340 BC
The consequences of acting in passion are always bad for an 
individual; but they are infinitely worse for a nation.
Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘Let the People Decide,’ 1952
I
According to Roland Barthes, every literary narrative is structured around a series of textual enigmas, and it is the narrative’s 
hermeneutic code that is ultimately responsible for their formulation 
and resolution. Under the category of the hermeneutic, Barthes argues, 
we may ‘list the various (formal) terms by which an enigma can be 
distinguished, suggested, formulated, held in suspense, and finally 
disclosed’ (S/Z 19). The significance of this particular code lies in its 
control over the pace and duration of the narrative – something it 
achieves by creating a number of ‘dilatory morphemes’ whose purpose 
it is to defer, for as long as necessary, the moment of full disclosure. Or 
as Barthes himself writes,
[T]he hermeneutic code has a function, the one we … attribute to the 
poetic code: just as rhyme (notably) structures the poem according 
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to the expectation and desire for recurrence, so the hermeneutic 
terms structure the enigma according to the expectation and desire 
for its solution. The dynamics of the text … is thus paradoxical: 
it is a static dynamics: the problem is to maintain the enigma in 
the initial void of its answer; whereas the sentences quicken the 
story’s ‘unfolding’ and cannot help but move the story along, the 
hermeneutic code performs an opposite action: it must set up delays 
(obstacles, stoppages, deviations) in the flow of the discourse; its 
structure is essentially reactive, since it opposes the ineluctable 
advance of language with an organized set of stoppages: between 
question and answer there is a whole dilatory area whose emblem 
might be named ‘reticence,’ the rhetorical figure which interrupts 
the sentence, suspends it, turns it aside. (S/Z 75)
In Vikram Seth’s A Suitable Boy (1993), the narrative’s central enigma is 
stated, quite clearly, in the opening sentence (if not in the title itself). 
‘You too will marry a boy I choose’ (3), Mrs Rupa Mehra says firmly 
to her younger daughter. The hermeneutic sequence initiated by this 
simple declaration will determine much of what follows – sustaining 
the narrative, driving it forward, until the identity of the ‘suitable boy’ 
in question is finally revealed on page 1335. Here, at long last, we 
learn just who Lata Mehra will marry, and it is typical of the narrative 
that this epic, seemingly unending hermeneutic sequence should be 
resolved in the most understated manner possible: ‘The civil ceremony,’ 
we are told, ‘was such a brief and dry affair that almost no one attached 
any significance to it, although from the moment it was over, Haresh 
and Lata were legally man and wife’ (1335). At this point, the reader 
could be forgiven for wondering why it was necessary to dedicate 1,332 
pages to resolving such a commonplace, even banal, enigma. Why did 
the discourse find it necessary to produce so many delays (‘obstacles, 
stoppages, [and] deviations’) before bringing things to a close? Why 
was it necessary to make so many detours, to trace so many elaborate 
arabesques, before finally arriving at a conclusion that, as we shall 
see, offers the reader very little in the way of narrative satisfaction? 
The answer to these questions can be found embedded within the 
passage from S/Z given above. ‘Between question and answer,’ Barthes 
writes, ‘there is a whole dilatory area whose emblem might be named 
“reticence”’; and it is precisely this reticence, this affective moderation, 
that A Suitable Boy seeks to emphasize by expanding its own ‘dilatory 
area’ over so many pages. Indeed, there are very few narratives in 
world literature that have been able to resist the ‘ineluctable advance 
of language,’ and the closure it promises, for as long as this one does.
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In what follows, I will be exploring the various ways in which the 
novel manages to privilege this quality of affective moderation. I 
shall begin by addressing the broader political significance of such 
reticence – relating it, more specifically, to the placatory content of 
the speeches made by Jawaharlal Nehru during the late forties and 
early fifties. I will then trace the process by which Nehru’s ‘meandering 
pleas for mutual tolerance’ (Seth, Suitable 1241) eventually find their 
way into the very structure of A Suitable Boy, directly influencing both 
its affective and aesthetic qualities. In other words, I would like to 
suggest that the narrative not only privileges this Nehruvian virtue at 
the representational level – by explicitly advocating the renunciation 
of strong feeling – but also practises it at the formal or structural level. 
And by doing so, I shall argue, it ultimately obliges the reader to adopt 
a similar affective stance. According to Barthes, another key function 
of the hermeneutic code is to instil a sense of desire in the reader, a 
desire for meaning, for the retrospective coherence that the resolution 
of any hermeneutic sequence provides; and it is only once we reach the 
end of a narrative, where the final predication of meaning traditionally 
takes place, that we can fully satisfy this craving for closure (S/Z 
75–76). In the case of A Suitable Boy, however, we are required to 
practise the same kind of reticence and self-control that the novel 
itself demonstrates – deferring the final discharge of meaning for 
over a thousand pages, and learning to appreciate, in the meantime, 
the value of everything that stands between us and the object of our 
readerly desire.1
 1 As mentioned in the Introduction, this chapter differs from the other 
five in that it does not focus on a specific emotion, but instead explores 
the repression of strong feelings such as hatred and anger. Nonetheless, 
there are some interesting correspondences between the reticence we 
find in A Suitable Boy and the structures of feeling that dominate the 
other narratives. For one thing, although reticence may not qualify as 
an emotion per se, it could be described as an affective style, a way of 
expressing (or repressing) strong feelings that is particularly susceptible 
to social or cultural conditioning. In India during the late forties and early 
fifties, emotional reticence became a highly privileged affective style, an 
example of what Arlie Russell Hochschild refers to as a feeling rule (a social 
guideline governing the ‘type, intensity, duration, timing, and placing 
of [our] feelings’ [85]) or what Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns call 
emotionology (‘the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable 
group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their 




Set during the years 1950 to 1952, A Suitable Boy covers a period that 
was crucial to the consolidation of the postcolonial Indian nation-state 
– and to the foundation of the secularism that would become one of its 
guiding principles.2 The late forties and early fifties were also a time 
of considerable social and political turbulence in India. The nation had 
only recently achieved independence, and its long-term viability was 
far from assured. In addition, the country was still recovering from 
the trauma of Partition, during which an estimated one million people 
had been killed and twelve million displaced. As part of the project 
of ethnic cleansing that accompanied Partition on both sides of the 
border, between 75,000 and 100,000 women were also abducted – to 
be raped and murdered, sold into prostitution, or forced into marriage. 
In 1947, according to one social worker, women were distributed ‘in 
the same way that baskets of oranges or grapes are sold or gifted’ 
(Kamlaben Patel qtd. in Menon and Bhasin 76). Some were sold in the 
marketplace for ten or twenty rupees apiece, while others were sent 
as gifts to friends and acquaintances (Talib 287; Basu 123). During this 
period, Jawaharlal Nehru delivered numerous speeches denouncing 
communal violence and appealing for an end to such atrocities. In 
June 1947, for instance, on the day that the plan to divide India was 
announced, he issued the following appeal by radio:
speaking, an emotion, it is a way of responding to affective impulses – 
and a way of converting these impulses into emotional behaviour that 
will be deemed normative or socially appropriate within those cultures 
where such ‘feeling rules’ are observed. Moreover, the reticence we shall 
be exploring in this chapter also follows a similar trajectory to the anger, 
jealousy, boredom, fear, and stuplimity discussed elsewhere. Like these 
other feelings, it originates in the public sphere yet gradually filters into 
the private sphere, where it gives rise to a corresponding affective state. 
Like these feelings, it assumes an intersubjective quality (i.e., more than 
one character demonstrates this particular affective style). And like these 
feelings, it eventually infiltrates the structure of the narrative itself, with 
profound discursive consequences.
 2 In a 1961 essay on the subject, Nehru provided a useful definition of the 
Indian secular state: ‘It is not very easy,’ he wrote, ‘to find a good word in 
Hindi for “secular.” Some people think that it means something opposed 
to religion. That obviously is not correct. What it means is that it is a state 
which honours all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities; that, 
as a state, it does not allow itself to be attached to one faith or religion, 
which then becomes the state religion’ (Anthology 330).
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On this historic occasion each one of us must pray that he might be 
guided aright in the service of the motherland and of humanity at 
large. We stand on a watershed dividing the past from the future. 
Let us bury that past in so far as it is dead and forget all bitterness 
and recrimination. Let there be moderation in speech and writing. 
Let there be strength and perseverance in adhering to the cause 
and the ideals we have at heart. Let us face the future not with 
easy optimism or with any complacency or weakness, but with 
confidence and a firm faith in India. There has been violence – 
shameful, degrading and revolting violence – in various parts of 
the country. This must end. We are determined to end it. We must 
make it clear that political ends are not to be achieved by methods 
of violence now or in the future. On this the eve of great changes 
in India we have to make a fresh start with clear vision and a firm 
mind, with steadfastness and tolerance … We should not wish ill to 
anyone, but think always of every Indian as our brother and comrade. 
The good of the [people] of India must be our supreme objective. 
(Anthology 73–74)
Despite such persuasive rhetoric, however, communal violence would 
continue to plague both India and Pakistan throughout the 1950s. 
Time and again, Nehru would be required to make similar speeches, 
reiterating the same theme of intercommunal tolerance. In 1950, for 
example, an outbreak of violence across the border in East Bengal led 
to reprisal attacks against the Muslim community in Calcutta; and 
in February of that year, Nehru was obliged to release the following 
statement:
I would like to make an earnest appeal to the people of Calcutta 
to help in controlling the situation and bringing it back to normal 
in every way they can … I can well understand the strong feelings 
that have been roused by the gruesome accounts brought from East 
Bengal by the refugees and others. We share those feelings. But 
action should not flow from emotion alone. In order to be effective 
and firm, it has to be calm, well thought out and based on right 
principles … On no account must we fall prey to communal passion 
and retaliation. (Speeches 135–36)
Although Nehru was responding to specific episodes of communal 
violence throughout this period, the general point he sought to 
make was always the same. India’s social and political stability, and 
the security of its minorities, could only be achieved by renouncing 
‘hatred, violence, [and] anger’ (Speeches 23). And by repeating himself 
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in this way, by tirelessly promoting the same two or three core values, 
he obviously hoped to influence the affective atmosphere within 
the country – to create a climate of tolerance and amity among the 
different religious communities. In The Navigation of Feeling, the anthro-
pologist William M. Reddy argues that any stable political system 
must establish a normative emotional order that either endorses 
or anathematizes certain affective qualities. He describes this order 
as an ‘emotional regime,’ and offers as an example ‘the impact of 
the Iranian revolution on the experience of grief in that country.’ 
Although previously a symbol of resistance, Reddy writes, ‘grief is 
now an emotion mandated by the state’ (48), and as a consequence, it 
has become one of the dominant structures of feeling within Iranian 
public life.3 Similarly, in the decade or so following Partition, Nehru 
was attempting to establish an emotional regime that would ensure 
the stability (and durability) of the postcolonial Indian nation-state. 
In order to counteract the divisive legacies of 1947, it was essential 
that he anathematize ‘strong feelings’ (Speeches 135) of any kind, and 
instead promote the virtues of tolerance and temperance.4 For Nehru, 
such virtues were to be practised not only socially or politically, but 
also linguistically – at the level of language and discourse. In the 
first passage quoted above, it is significant that he should appeal 
for moderation in speech and writing, and we find the same emphasis 
 3 For more on the development of this particular emotional regime, see 
Good and Good. By contrast, the medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman 
has described the way in which the Chinese Communist Party sought 
to anathematize affective states such as depression and anxiety after 
it came to power in 1949 – claiming that these feelings were bourgeois 
pathologies that a programme of ‘socially productive labour’ (128) would 
quickly eradicate.
 4 By doing so, Nehru was really endorsing the Aristotelian ideal of metrio-
patheia, which advocates affective moderation rather than the complete 
absence of emotion (apatheia). According to Aristotle, it is possible to feel 
emotions such as anger or fear ‘both too much and too little, and in both 
cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the 
right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the 
right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic 
of virtue.’ In other words, virtue is ‘concerned with passions and actions 
in which excess [hyperbole] is a form of failure, and so is defect [elleipsis], 
while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being 
praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore 
virtue is a kind of mean [mesotes], since, as we have seen, it aims at what 
is intermediate’ (Nicomachean 30).
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elsewhere too. Responding to the violence in Calcutta in 1950, he 
declared that people should ‘remain calm and determined and not 
indulge in loose language … which is improper and harmful’ (Speeches 
146). And then a short time later, during a debate in parliament, he 
made it clear that this injunction applied to everyone, even the prime 
minister himself. ‘I happen to hold a responsible position,’ he said,
and my decisions are not merely expressions of opinion but may 
have to be translated into action. Therefore, I must be careful that 
at this moment I am not led away by emotion, excitement or indignation. 
Normally, I speak without having to keep a tight hold of myself. In this 
instance, however, I dare not allow myself to go because the respon-
sibility and the consequences are too grave. That does not mean that 
I am unaware of what has happened; it is because of the very nature 
of the crisis, the depth of it and its far-reaching consequences, that 
I hesitate to speak in unrestrained language. (Speeches 147; my italics)5
In A Suitable Boy, we find several direct references to the placatory 
speeches – the ‘meandering pleas for mutual tolerance’ (1241) – that 
Nehru made during this period. After Partition, we are told, he had 
‘preached against communal enmity in every speech he had given’ 
(955), and by doing so, he had managed to ‘keep a volatile country … 
safe [from] religious fanaticism,’ not ‘merely in those early and most 
dangerous years but throughout his own lifetime’ (1241).6 As we shall see 
in the following pages, however, the affective moderation advocated by 
Nehru operates at every level of the novel – giving rise to an ‘emotional 
 5 Here, Nehru is clearly acknowledging the performative nature, the perlocu-
tionary force, of such utterances – however remote they may appear to be 
from the lived reality of communal violence.
 6 Neelam Srivastava has pointed out that A Suitable Boy’s endorsement of 
Nehruvian secularism carried a broader social and political significance at 
the time of its publication in the early nineties, ‘when Nehru’s idea of the 
Indian secular state was subject to severe erosion in the political sphere, 
with the rise of the pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP].’ As Srivastava 
observes, ‘The cultural and social mores of 1950s India [were] still easily 
recognizable in the India of the 1990s. But the political present of 1993 
had witnessed a radical shift in the hegemonic ideology of the Indian 
public sphere: Nehruvian secularism was out, Hindutva ideology was in … 
The novel can [thus] be read as a way of addressing the “present needs” of 
the Indian polity by proposing a return to Nehruvianism, by recreating a 
national narrative set in the heart of the Nehru era, the heyday of secular 
nationalism in the aftermath of Partition’ (11).
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regime’ within the narrative itself, one that makes a virtue of restraint 
and reticence while categorically rejecting any feelings (dysphoric or 
otherwise) that might compromise the stability of the discourse.
Before proceeding, it may also be worth acknowledging, just briefly, 
the tension between Nehru’s rhetorical moderation and the underlying 
radicalism of his political programme following independence. 
In A Suitable Boy, the revolutionary potential of Nehru’s post-1947 
social policies is most obvious in those passages that deal with the 
introduction of the Zamindari Abolition Act (which did in fact take place 
during the early 1950s). This legislation was designed, in principle, to 
abolish feudal estates and institute a more equitable distribution of 
land. In the novel, it is Mahesh Kapoor, the revenue minister for the 
(fictional) state of Purva Pradesh, who introduces the act into the 
Legislative Assembly; and the debates we witness there (see chapters 
5.15–16) demonstrate just how divisive this issue would prove to be.7 By 
advocating moderation during these transitional years, then, Nehru was 
attempting not only to quell specific episodes of communal violence, 
but also, one could argue, to contain and control the revolutionary 
political energies that he himself was responsible for creating. And 
to some degree, the same thing could be said of A Suitable Boy – for it 
is one of the novel’s central ironies that it should demonstrate such a 
strong aversion, at the discursive level, to the volatile and melodramatic 
substance of its own story. On the one hand, like Nehru, it does 
everything it can to discourage upsurges of strong feeling, yet on the 
other hand, it actively contributes to this affective disorder by creating 
a narrative of profound social and political change. Indeed, this tension 
may also partly explain the rather anticlimactic nature of the novel’s 
conclusion, in which the values of bourgeois (Hindu) respectability are 
finally allowed to reassert themselves – thus containing, or at least 
dissipating, some of the ‘revolutionary’ energy that the narrative itself 
has brought into being.
 7 There was, however, a significant disparity between the act’s proclaimed 
objectives and its practical implementation. In Bihar, for instance, ‘[t]he 
state government did not have the administrative competence to 
implement it fully. Former zamindars [landlords] were well advised and 
knew in advance the provisions of the forthcoming abolition legislation, 
and they were in many cases able to circumvent the intentions of the 




A Suitable Boy is structured around the interconnected lives of four 
different families: the Khans, the Mehras, the Chatterjis, and the Kapoors 
(the first of these being an aristocratic Muslim family, while the other 
three, related by marriage, belong to the Hindu élite). Over the course 
of several years, each family generates multiple plotlines that are also, 
inevitably, woven together. There are, among other things, love affairs, 
infidelities, court cases, political alliances and rivalries, communal 
disturbances, medical crises, suicides, academic intrigues, and, in the 
words of one character, ‘God knows what else’ (261). But despite these 
diverse plotlines, A Suitable Boy is, in essence, a classic narrative of 
courtship and marriage. In the very first sentence, as we have noted, 
Mrs Rupa Mehra delivers the ‘maternal imperative’ (3) that initiates 
much of what follows. And it is in this narrative strand that the virtues 
of reticence and rationality are most clearly thematized.8 As Lata’s 
quest to find a ‘suitable boy’ progresses, she is presented with three 
very different suitors: Kabir, the romantic young undergraduate with 
whom she falls in love; Amit, the ‘[f]amous poet’ (385) and composer 
of whimsical acrostics; and Haresh, the manufacturer of shoes, who 
is really only notable for his practicality and mercantile ‘good sense.’ 
Of the three, Kabir is certainly the most appealing, and so it comes 
as something of a disappointment when we learn, in Chapter 18.21, 
that Lata has decided to reject him in favour of Haresh. Her reasons 
for doing so are simple. For one thing, the fact that Kabir is Muslim 
makes him, from Lata’s perspective, ‘the most unsuitable boy of them 
all’ (1138); and she is also deeply disturbed by the emotions that he 
inspires in her – the ‘erratic swings of mood’ (14), the feelings of love 
and desire. So in the end she decides to marry Haresh, whose stability 
and pragmatism she finds reassuring. (He is, she tells herself, ‘as solid 
as a pair of Goodyear Welted shoes’ [1291].)9 Appalled by this decision, 
 8 Needless to say, I am not alone in having noticed this thematic emphasis 
in A Suitable Boy. In her review of the novel, for example, Anita Desai 
argues that it implicitly endorses ‘Aristotle’s golden mean – the avoidance 
of excess, the advisability of moderation, the wisdom of restraint, 
temperance, and control’ (24); and David Myers makes a similar claim 
in an article entitled ‘Vikram Seth’s Epic Renunciation of the Passions: 
Deconstructing Moral Codes in A Suitable Boy.’ Where my analysis differs, 
however, is in its focus on the formal and structural consequences of these 
Aristotelian (and Nehruvian) virtues.
 9 Interestingly, we find the same renunciation of strong feeling in The 
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Lata’s friend Malati asks her to explain herself, and the following 
dialogue takes place:
‘Malati, I can’t describe it – my feelings with [Kabir] are so confused. 
I’m not myself when I’m with him. I ask myself who is this – this 
jealous, obsessed woman who can’t get a man out of her head – why 
should I make myself suffer like this? I know that it’ll always be like 
this if I’m with him.’
‘Oh, Lata – don’t be blind –’ exclaimed Malati. ‘It shows how 
passionately you love him –’
‘I don’t want to,’ cried Lata, ‘I don’t want to. If that’s what passion 
means, I don’t want it. Look at what passion has done to the family. 
Maan’s broken, his mother’s dead, his father’s in despair. When 
I thought that Kabir was seeing someone else, what I remember 
feeling was enough to make me hate passion. Passionately and 
forever.’ (1296)10
Seeing that Malati is still unconvinced, Lata invokes the poet Arthur 
Hugh Clough, whose Amours de Voyage (1849) offers a similar critique 
of strong romantic feeling. ‘I can’t remember [the passage] exactly,’ she 
says, ‘but he talks about a calmer, less frantic love, which helps you 
to grow where you were already growing, “to live where as yet I had 
languished”’ (1299).11 And this is precisely the kind of love she believes 
she will come to feel for Haresh – not the kind that ‘merely excites, 
Golden Gate, Seth’s 1986 novel in verse. ‘Passion’s a prelude to disaster,’ 
one character declares while proposing to our heroine, Liz. ‘It’s something 
else that makes us sure / Our bond can last five decades more.’ In the end, 
Liz acquiesces to this logic, deciding that instead of marrying a man she 
loves passionately, ‘she’d far rather / Marry a man who’s a good father’ 
(244–45).
 10 In this passage, Lata is referring to one of the novel’s other major 
plotlines, which involves the volatile relationship between Maan Kapoor, 
her brother-in-law, and Saeeda Bai, a Muslim courtesan.
 11 In its entirety, the stanza Lata is quoting reads as follows: ‘There are 
two different kinds, I believe, of human attraction: / One which simply 
disturbs, unsettles, and makes you uneasy, / And another that poises, 
retains, and fixes and holds you. / I have no doubt, for myself, in giving my 
voice for the latter. / I do not wish to be moved, but growing where I was 
growing, / There more truly to grow, to live where as yet I had languished. 
/ I do not like being moved: for the will is excited; and action / Is a most 
dangerous thing; I tremble for something factitious, / Some malpractice of 
heart and illegitimate process; / We are so prone to these things, with our 
terrible notions of duty’ (Clough).
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unsettles, and makes you uneasy’ (1299), but the kind that will develop 
over time into something solid and reliable and enduring (like a pair of 
Goodyear Welted shoes).12
As suggested above, there is a clear correspondence between Lata’s 
rather muted matrimonial desire, the ‘desire’ of the narrative itself, 
and our readerly desire for the full and final predication of meaning 
that traditionally accompanies narrative closure. Allow me to clarify 
what I mean by this, and to do so by citing Peter Brooks. For Brooks, 
all narratives possess an internal energy that drives them forward, 
‘connecting beginning and end across the middle and making of that 
middle – what we read through – a field of force’ (Reading 47). This 
energy, he argues, is ultimately produced by the ‘dynamic of desire’ (38) 
within the narrative: ‘the desire to wrest beginnings and ends from the 
uninterrupted flow of middles, from temporality itself; the search for 
that significant closure that would illuminate the sense of an existence, 
the meaning of life’ (140). Indeed, Brooks writes, one could ‘analyze 
the opening paragraph of most novels and emerge in each case with 
the image of a desire taking on shape, beginning to seek its objects, 
beginning to develop a textual energetics’ (38). This is certainly true 
of A Suitable Boy, whose inaugural image of desire could not be clearer. 
‘You too will marry a boy I choose,’ Mrs Rupa Mehra tells her daughter in 
the opening sentence, thus activating the ‘textual energetics’ that will 
sustain the novel for a thousand-odd pages. So the narrative is obviously 
not without desire – if it were, it would be unable to sustain itself in this 
way – but it is a particularly diluted species of desire, one that allows 
for delayed gratification, for the endless ‘obstacles, stoppages, [and] 
deviations’ that impede the onward ‘flow of the discourse’ (Barthes, S/Z 
75). And as I have observed, this also influences the way in which we 
read the novel. According to Brooks, citing Barthes, what animates us 
as readers of narrative is ‘la passion du sens, which [he would] translate 
as both the passion for meaning and the passion of meaning: the 
active quest of the reader for those shaping ends that, terminating the 
dynamic process of reading, promise to bestow meaning and signif-
icance on the beginning and the middle’ (Reading 19). In other words, 
the desire for meaning is, above all, a desire for the end, for the sense 
of unity and plenitude that the termination of (readerly) discourse 
provides. Yet here, too, A Suitable Boy demonstrates its aversion to any 
kind of emotional intensity. By creating so many detours and delays, by 




elongating the discourse to such a large degree, the novel forces us to 
renounce (or at least moderate) our own readerly desire for meaning 
and closure. Of course, we do not entirely lose our desire for the end 
– if we did, we would simply stop reading – but we do learn to control 
this desire, to subordinate it to the ‘reality principle’ that the discourse 
so actively promotes. In this way, then, Lata’s sublimated matrimonial 
desire could be said to serve as an intradiegetic correlative for the 
narrative’s own sublimated desires, and for those of the reader, who is 
obliged to tolerate (and even enjoy) over a thousand pages of ‘imposed 
delay’ (Brooks, Reading 107).
If you remember, in his description of the hermeneutic code, Barthes 
identifies two contrasting forces: one that moves the story forward, 
propelling it ever closer to its conclusion, and another that uses various 
dilatory strategies to oppose ‘the ineluctable advance of language’ (S/Z 
75). As we have just noted, A Suitable Boy places a particular emphasis 
on the second of these two forces – the one that moderates both the 
narrative’s desire for closure and the reader’s ‘passion for meaning.’ 
In order to understand this dynamic, and its broader affective signif-
icance, it may be useful to approach the subject from a neurological 
perspective. Like a narrative, the body’s autonomic nervous system is 
divided in two. There is the sympathetic nervous system (SNS), which 
is responsible for the physiological arousal that we associate with 
emotions such as anger or fear (an increase in heart rate and blood 
pressure, enhanced muscle tone, accelerated breathing, etc.). And then 
there is the parasympathetic nervous system (PNS), which, as Bessel 
van der Kolk writes, ‘triggers the release of acetylcholine to put a brake 
on arousal, slowing the heart down, relaxing muscles, and returning 
breathing to normal.’ Together, these two systems play a vital role in 
‘managing the body’s energy flow, one preparing for its expenditure, 
the other for its conservation’ (77). Turning once more to the literary 
narrative, we find a similar tension between two opposing ‘systems.’ 
On the one hand, we have an SNS that generates the necessary energy 
to keep the narrative moving forward, while on the other, we have a 
PNS that regulates or conserves this energy so that it can be sustained 
for an appropriate length of time. Although their relative prepon-
derance may fluctuate depending on the circumstances, both of these 
regulatory systems are essential to the survival of any narrative. If there 
is too much emphasis on the SNS, the narrative faces the danger of a 
premature discharge of energy. But conversely, if there is too much 
emphasis on the PNS, it could easily lapse into a state of terminal 
quiescence, having lost the energy to attach one signifier to another. 
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As is the case with any successful narrative, A Suitable Boy manages to 
sustain an acceptable, homeostatic balance between the SNS and the 
PNS until the very end; but the fact that the narrative is required to 
cover so many pages along the way, and to quell so many internal crises 
as it progresses, inevitably brings its parasympathetic tendencies to the 
fore. At the narratological level, of course, this is exactly what Barthes 
is talking about when he discusses the various ‘obstacles, stoppages, 
[and] deviations’ that constitute the hermeneutic code; and at the 
broader sociopolitical level, this is also what Nehru is talking about 
when he describes the renunciation of strong feeling, the rejection of 
‘hatred [and] anger,’ as his ‘supreme objective.’
So what happens, then, when we do finally reach the novel’s 
long-awaited conclusion? After persisting for more than a thousand 
pages, the reader is entitled to expect a particularly gratifying discharge 
of meaning (and emotion) when the narrative draws to a close. But the 
conclusion that we are eventually offered on page 1335 is anything but 
gratifying. Instead of choosing to marry the romantic Kabir, or even the 
charming Amit, Lata decides to spend the rest of her life with Haresh, the 
least engaging of her three suitors. The motivation behind this decision 
is never made entirely clear to the reader. On page 1295, out of the blue, 
as it were, she simply writes to Haresh, ‘accepting with gratitude … his 
often repeated offer of marriage.’ More significantly, however, it soon 
becomes apparent that even Lata herself does not fully understand why 
she has made this decision – why she has perversely abandoned the 
man she loves in favour of a man with whom she has ‘nothing at all in 
common’ (1295). When she is interrogated on the subject by her friend 
Malati, in Chapter 18.21, she is unable to explain the logic of what she 
has done (‘I’m not at ease,’ she confesses, ‘I hardly know who I am or 
what I’m doing’ [1299]); and this is the case, I would argue, because it 
was a decision that she did not ultimately make. Rather, it was made for 
her by the discourse itself, which chose to intervene at this late stage in 
order to prevent the efflorescence of feeling – strong feeling, dangerous 
feeling – that a more gratifying conclusion would have provided. In 
the end, that is to say, Lata loses her ‘autonomy’ as a character and is 
obliged to marry the ‘suitable boy’ who has been chosen for her by the 
discourse she occupies.13 And that is why both Malati and Lata herself 
 13 In his analysis of Balzac’s ‘Sarrasine,’ Barthes describes a similar moment 
of discursive intrusion. One evening as he is leaving the Teatro Argentina, 
the eponymous hero of the story is cautioned against pursuing his 
infatuation with the singer La Zambinella. ‘Be on your guard, Frenchman,’ 
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are so mystified by the decision she finally makes – because at this 
stage she is no longer obeying the internal logic of the story (the contin-
gencies of plotting or the psychology of her ‘character’) but the external 
logic of the discourse itself. According to Jonathan Culler, all narratives 
obey a ‘double logic’: the logic of story and the logic of discourse. It is 
only natural, Culler writes, to assume that story precedes (and in many 
ways determines) discourse, yet this premise is ‘frequently questioned 
in narratives themselves, at moments when the hierarchy of narrative is 
inverted’ (Pursuit 191).14 At the end of A Suitable Boy, when Lata decides 
to take Haresh as her husband, we witness precisely this kind of 
inversion, as the novel’s discourse suddenly takes precedence over the 
story it has been charged with telling. And it does so, I believe, for a 
very simple reason. Only by intervening in this way is it able to prevent 
a final discharge of meaning and significance that would otherwise 
prove far too gratifying, far too pleasurable, for the reader – and thus 
undermine the climate of affective moderation that it has gone to so 
much trouble to create.
In order to make itself last as long as it does, the discourse is obliged 
to insert a great deal of unnecessary ‘filler’ between the initiation of 
the novel’s central hermeneutic sequence on page 3 and its ultimate 
resolution on page 1335. Not everything that separates these two 
critical episodes can carry significance; in fact, the more dilatory space 
a narrative creates, the more insignificant material it requires to fill that 
space. By making this point, I am really distinguishing between two 
different types of narrative function. On the one hand, we have what 
Barthes calls nuclei (those occurrences that ‘constitute [the] real hinge 
points of [a] narrative’), while on the other, we have what he refers 
to as catalyzers (those occurrences that ‘merely “fill in” the narrative 
a stranger whispers in his ear. ‘This is a matter of life and death …’ (Balzac 
qtd. in Barthes, S/Z 241). At this point, Sarrasine would seem to have a 
choice: he could either heed the stranger’s warning or ignore it. But this 
‘choice’ (and the agency it implies) is ultimately illusory, for if he were to 
heed the warning and ‘refrain from pursuing his adventure, there would 
be no story.’ In other words, as Barthes observes, ‘Sarrasine is forced by 
the discourse to keep his rendezvous with La Zambinella’ – the character’s 
‘freedom’ being dominated, at this particular juncture, by the discourse’s 
‘instinct for preservation’ (S/Z 135).
 14 The point Culler is making here emerges out of the classic narratological 
distinction between story (what is told) and discourse (the way it is told). 
For more on this double logic, see Culler, Pursuit 188–208.
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space separating the [nuclei]’) (‘Introduction’ 265).15 Needless to say, a 
narrative the size of A Suitable Boy requires a large number of inessential 
catalyzers, or ‘subsidiary notations’ (Barthes, ‘Introduction’ 265), whose 
primary function is to fill empty space – and, in so doing, to delay the 
predication of the narrative sentence for as long as possible. In this 
particular case, though, the novel’s catalyzers also serve a secondary 
purpose, having been put there to ensure the ongoing stability of the 
discourse (through the careful regulation of its affective economy). On 
page 45, we find a paradigmatic example of this secondary function. 
While browsing in a local bookstore, Lata picks up a book at random 
and reads a rather cryptic paragraph:
It follows from De Moivre’s formula that zn = rn (cos n + i sin n). 
Thus, if we allow complex number z to describe a circle of radius r 
about the origin, zn will describe n complete times a circle of radius 
rn as z describes its circle once. We also recall that r, the modulus of 
z, written |z|, gives the distance of z from O, and that if z’ = x’ + 
iy’, then |z – z’| is the distance between z and z’. With these prelimi-
naries we may proceed to the proof of the theorem.
Although this passage carries no real significance for Lata, she finds 
it soothing to read: ‘What exactly pleased her in these sentences she 
did not know, but they conveyed weight, comfort, inevitability … The 
words were assured, and therefore reassuring: things were what they 
were even in this uncertain world, and she could proceed from there’ 
(45–46). This is also the function that such inessential passages serve in 
the novel as a whole. They are there not only to fill the pages, but also 
to create a general atmosphere of stability and composure – reassuring 
us that things are what they are, and that they will always be that way. 
From time to time, the placid surface of the narrative is still disturbed 
by a sudden irruption of strong feeling; and such feelings, when they 
do appear, are often associated with the emergence of a vital nucleus 
 15 For a function to qualify as a nucleus, Barthes argues, ‘it is enough that the 
action to which it refers open (or continue, or close) an alternative that is of 
direct consequence for the subsequent development of the story, in short 
that it inaugurate or conclude an uncertainty … Between two [nuclei] 
however, it is always possible to set out subsidiary notations which cluster 
around one or other nucleus without modifying its alternative nature … 
These catalyzers are still functional, insofar as they enter into correlation 




(the acceptance of a marriage proposal, for instance, or the death of a 
beloved spouse). But it never takes long for the excitement generated 
by these isolated nuclei to subside, once more, into the reassuring 
banality of the superfluous, that ‘very necessary thing.’16
A less obvious example of the dual function served by such catalyzers 
can be found in Chapter 9.5, which describes in some detail a long train 
journey that Lata makes from Calcutta to Kanpur. On page 558, we 
learn that ‘[t]he train departed on time’; and on page 560, it duly arrives 
at its destination. In the intervening pages, however, nothing of any 
real significance takes place. ‘A sickly smell of molasses [rises] from a 
sugar-cane factory.’ A woman in a burqa ‘roll[s] out a small prayer-rug 
and beg[ins] to pray.’ An egret flies over an adjacent field. At one point, 
‘for no particular reason,’ the train stops at a small, unidentified station 
where some beggars ply their usual trade. After a few minutes, the 
train begins moving again, and eventually it crosses the Ganges. Lata 
reads for a while; then she buys some samosas and a cup of tea, before 
drowsing off for an hour or so. When she wakes, she finds that her 
neighbour, an old woman in a white sari, has been keeping the flies 
off her face. And so it goes – one insignificant thing after another, for 
over three pages. At a basic structural level, the primary function of 
these catalyzers is to transform the train journey into a narrative, to 
separate the moment of departure from that of arrival. If there was no 
filler here at all, there would be no story. The beginning of the journey 
would simply collapse into the end, leaving no room whatsoever for any 
intervening narrative ‘substance.’ But at a secondary level, once again, 
these details could also be said to represent the general principle of 
normality. Everything is fine, they seem to be insisting; everything is 
as it should be. There is no anger here, no hatred, no violence – just a 
long, boring train journey full of ‘[d]ust and flies’ (559).17
 16 I am quoting from the first of the novel’s two epigraphs here, which itself 
is taken from line 22 of Voltaire’s Le Mondain (1736): ‘Le superflu, chose 
très-nécessaire’ (296).
 17 Of course, at some level, it is possible to recuperate any narrative detail, 
to ascribe functionality, however limited, to even the most inconse-
quential of utterances. One could argue, for instance, that at the level 
of connotative meaning this passage demonstrates the sociocultural 
diversity of postcolonial India, as Lata travels from the cosmopolitan 
urban centre of Calcutta, through ‘the green and moist countryside of 
Bengal,’ the ‘dusty fields and poor villages’ (558) of Uttar Pradesh, and 
the sacred cities of Banaras and Allahabad, to the Raj-era settlement of 
Kanpur. Or from another perspective, one could claim that her journey 
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At times, moreover, the characters themselves contribute to this 
atmosphere by exchanging the verbal equivalent of superfluous catalyzers. 
In a number of key scenes, they are allowed to saturate the discourse 
with a ‘sociable noise’ (Seth, Suitable 432) whose ultimate purpose is not 
to convey a specific message or to move the plot forward, but to sustain 
the semantic tension of the narrative while also reinforcing its dominant 
tone of civility and benevolence. The function I am describing here, to 
use a term first employed by the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, 
is one of ‘phatic communion’ (from the Greek phatos, or ‘spoken’). In a 
1923 essay entitled ‘The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,’ 
Malinowski discusses at some length the bonding function of ‘free, 
aimless social intercourse’ (313). Such utterances, he observes, whether 
they occur ‘among savage tribes [or] in a European drawing room’ (313), 
typically involve ‘purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, 
accounts of irrelevant happenings, [or] comments on what is perfectly 
obvious’ (314). In other words, the literal meaning of a phatic utterance 
carries no inherent value; what matters is the ‘atmosphere of sociability’ 
(315), the communal bond, that it generates. And this is precisely the 
function that such empty phrases serve in A Suitable Boy, where they do 
little more than fill the air – and the page – with inane pleasantries. In 
Chapter 7.11, for instance, we accompany Lata as she circulates among 
the guests at a party held by the Chatterjis. It is a splendid occasion, and 
she is ‘quite amazed by the glitter and glory of it all.’ Everyone is talking 
as loudly as possible, and as she moves from place to place, Lata feels as 
if she is ‘swimming in a sea of language’ (399), surrounded on all sides by 
innocuous banalities such as the following one:
‘Ever since the year 1933 I have been drinking the juice of bitter 
gourds. You know bitter gourd? It is our famous Indian vegetable, 
takes on a broader symbolic significance – emphasizing the difficulties 
that Nehru will face unifying a country of this magnitude and diversity, 
while at the same time providing a metaphor for such unity in the form of 
the journey itself, which arguably serves as a ‘picaresque tour d’horizon,’ 
bringing these various locales together within a ‘clearly bounded’ national 
space (B. Anderson 30). But the real significance of the passage, I believe, 
lies elsewhere. Although these catalyzers are still capable of producing a 
(rather attenuated) degree of meaning at the connotative and symbolic 
levels, their primary function within the novel remains the same. They 
are there to substantiate Lata’s journey, to separate A from B, and, in so 
doing, to infuse the narrative with a reassuring sense of the prosaic, the 
ordinary, and the banal.
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called karela. It looks like this’ – [the guest] gesticulated elongatedly 
– ‘and it is green, and ribbed … Every week my servant takes a seer 
of bitter gourd, and from the skin only, mark you, he will make juice. 
Each seer will yield one jamjar of juice … Then every morning for my 
breakfast he will give me one sherry glass or liqueur glass – so much 
– of this juice. Every day since 1933. And I have no sugar problems. 
I can eat sweetmeats without anxiety. My dermatology is also very 
good, and all [my] bowel movements are very satisfactory.’ (401)
And then thirty pages later, in a similar fashion, we attend a cocktail 
party at the Finlays’, one that also gives rise to a ‘hubbub of chatter’ and 
a ‘general mash of sociable noise’ (431–32):
Everyone stood around talking about the ‘monsoonish’ weather, 
which had struck earlier than usual this year. Opinion was divided 
as to whether today’s tremendous rains were monsoonal or 
pre-monsoonal. Golf had been quite impossible this afternoon, and 
though the races at Tollygunge were very rarely cancelled owing 
to the weather … if the rains were as heavy tomorrow as they had 
been today, the ground might be complete slush and the going too 
difficult for the horses. English county cricket too played a large 
part in the conversation, and Lata heard more than she might have 
wished to about Denis Compton’s brilliant batting and his left arm 
spinners … (431)
Here, as elsewhere, the characters do everything they can to fill the 
intervening space between page 3 and page 1335 with an ‘atmosphere of 
polite, social intercourse’ (Malinowski 316). By trading these banalities, 
they ensure both the continuity of the narrative, when nothing much 
else is happening, and its affective stability – allowing it to steer a 
middle course between the palpable animosity of the verbal dispute 
and the ‘strange and unpleasant tension’ that people feel ‘when facing 
each other in silence’ (Malinowski 314).
In a recent study, Franco Moretti has argued that narrative ‘filling’ 
of this kind came to serve a similar purpose during the late nineteenth 
century. It was, he says, ‘a mechanism designed to keep the “narrativity” 
of life under control; to give it a regularity, a “style”’ (Bourgeois 72). In 
1800, such catalyzers were still a rarity, but ‘a hundred years later they 
[were] everywhere’ (79); and for Moretti, it is particularly significant that 
their growing ubiquity as a narrative device should have coincided with 




Because they offer the kind of narrative pleasure compatible with the new 
regularity of bourgeois life. They are to story-telling what comforts are 
to physical pleasure: enjoyment pared down, adapted to the daily 
activity of reading a novel … [S]mall things become significant, 
without ceasing to be ‘small’; they become narrative, without ceasing 
to be everyday … [F]illers rationalize the novelistic universe, turning it 
into a world of few surprises, fewer adventures, and no miracles at 
all. They are a great bourgeois invention, not because they bring 
into the novel trade, or industry, or other bourgeois ‘realities’ (which 
they don’t), but because through them the logic of rationalization 
pervades the very rhythm of the novel. (81–82)
As we have seen, the fillers in Seth’s novel serve an identical purpose. 
Simply put, they are there to emphasize the systematic regularity of 
the characters’ lives and to minimize the disruption caused by those 
critical episodes in the narrative that Barthes would describe as nuclei. 
Things certainly happen in A Suitable Boy – there are a few surprises and 
adventures that are caused by, or give rise to, strong feelings of one kind 
or another – but the catalyzers surrounding these episodes of affective 
intensity are always quick to reassert themselves, to submerge such 
disruptive emotional energy beneath the unstimulating quiescence of 
the everyday.
The length of the novel testifies to the general efficacy of this 
strategy; however, there are some places where the simple accumu-
lation of catalyzers is not enough to quell the upsurge of disruptive 
feeling. At such times, when the stability of the narrative is particularly 
endangered, the discourse is obliged to deploy other, more radical 
protective measures. A notable example of this can be found in Chapter 
5.3, where we witness the following episode of communal violence 
(provoked by the construction of a Hindu temple alongside a mosque):
No one knew how the men who were gathering in the narrow alleys 
of the Muslim neighbourhood … became a mob. One moment they 
were walking individually or in small groups through the alleys 
towards the mosque for evening prayer, then they had coalesced 
into larger clusters, excitedly discussing the ominous signals they 
had heard. After the midday sermon most were in no mood to listen 
to any voice of moderation. A couple of the more eager members of 
the Alamgiri Masjid Hifaazat Committee made a few crowd-rousing 
remarks, a few local hotheads and toughs stirred themselves and 
those around them into a state of rage, the crowd increased in size 
as the alleys joined into larger alleys, its density and speed and 
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sense of indistinct determination increased, and it was no longer a 
collection but a thing – wounded and enraged, and wanting nothing 
less than to wound and enrage. There were cries of ‘Allah-u-Akbar’ 
which could be heard all the way to the police station. A few of 
those who joined the crowd had sticks in their hands. One or two 
even had knives. Now it was not the mosque that they were headed 
for but the partly constructed temple just next to it. It was from 
here that the blasphemy had originated, it was this that must be 
destroyed. (235) 
I would contend that it is not only the temple that is being threatened 
with destruction in this passage, but the discourse itself – or at least 
the climate of affective moderation it has so carefully created. As 
indicated above, the judicious insertion of a few catalyzers here (a 
flying egret, say, or a woman in a white sari) would not be enough to 
protect the narrative from the crowd’s overflowing rage, and so the 
discourse is obliged to take more radical measures. Earlier, I suggested 
that Lata’s decision to marry Haresh was ultimately determined by 
certain discursive imperatives; and here, too, the discourse suddenly 
intervenes, taking precedence over the story it has been charged 
with telling, in order to protect itself from these dangerous dysphoric 
energies. In this case, however, it chooses another accomplice, the 
young district magistrate, Krishan Dayal, whose only real function 
in the novel is to restore order as quickly as possible. As the crowd 
approaches the temple, he positions his men on either side of a large 
alleyway, and waits:
The mob was less than a minute away. He could hear it screaming 
and yelling; he could feel the vibration of the ground as hundreds of 
feet rushed forward.
At the last moment he gave the signal. [His] men roared and 
charged and fired.
The wild and dangerous mob, hundreds strong, faced with this 
sudden terror, halted, staggered, turned and fled. It was uncanny. 
Within thirty seconds it had melted away. Two bodies were left in 
the street: one young man had been shot through the neck and was 
dying or dead; the other, an old man with a white beard, had fallen 
and been crushed by the retreating mob. He was badly, perhaps 
fatally, injured …
The DM looked around at his men. A couple of them were 
trembling, most of them were jubilant. None of them was injured. 
He caught the head constable’s eye. Both of them started laughing 
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with relief, then stopped. A couple of women were wailing in nearby 
houses. Otherwise, everything was peaceful or, rather, still. (237–38)
In S/Z, Barthes claims that all literary characters could be regarded as 
willing accomplices of the discourse by which they have been constituted 
– and it is certainly difficult to argue otherwise.18 But this complicity 
is usually concealed by the characters’ ostensible autonomy and by the 
agency they appear to demonstrate. Only at certain critical junctures, 
when the very survival of the discourse is threatened, does their 
complicity become more pronounced. In this episode, for instance, the 
district magistrate is quite clearly intervening on behalf of the discourse 
when he delivers the order to fire, protecting it from the untrammelled 
rage of the crowd and from the dysphoric energy that such anger 
inevitably generates.
Much later in the novel, we are given some intimation of what might 
have happened to the discourse had he not intervened in this way. In 
Chapter 18.33, a character by the name of Rasheed suffers an emotional 
crisis and, in doing so, brings the narrative itself to the verge of a 
complete discursive collapse:
Rasheed walked along the parapet of the Barsaat Mahal, his thoughts 
blurred with hunger and confusion.
Darkness, and the river, and the cool marble wall.
Somewhere where there is nowhere.
It gnaws. They are all around me, the leaders of Sagal.
No father, no mother, no child, no wife.
Like a jewel above the water. The parapet, the garden under 
which a river flows.
No Satan, no God, no Iblis, no Gabriel.
Endless, endless, endless, endless, the waters of the Ganga.
 18 ‘From a critical point of view,’ Barthes writes, ‘it is as wrong to suppress 
the character as it is to take him off the page in order to turn him into 
a psychological character (endowed with possible motives): the character 
and the discourse are each other’s accomplices: the discourse creates in the 
character its own accomplice: a form of theurgical detachment by which, 
mythically, God has given himself a subject, man a helpmate, etc., whose 
relative independence, once they have been created, allows for playing. 
Such is discourse: if it creates characters, it is not to make them play 
among themselves before us but to play with them, to obtain from them 
a complicity which assures the uninterrupted exchange of the codes: 
the characters are types of discourse and, conversely, the discourse is a 
character like the others’ (S/Z 178–79).
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The stars above, below …
Peace. No prayers. No more prayers.
To sleep is better than to pray.
O my creature, you gave your life too soon. I have made your entry 
into Paradise unlawful.
A spring in Paradise.
O God, O God. (1315–16)
It is difficult to understand exactly what is happening here; only later 
do we learn that Rasheed has actually committed suicide at the end 
of this chapter (which concludes with the final line given above). But 
before he does so, the emotional turmoil he creates very nearly brings 
about the demise of the narrative itself – certainly the demise of the 
readerly values it has privileged over the preceding thousand-odd 
pages: clarity, order, logic, rationality, and so on. Here, suddenly, the 
disruptive forces the narrative has worked so hard to control appear 
to be gaining the upper hand. And it is only by bringing the chapter 
to a premature close before Rasheed’s suicide takes place, only by 
actively repressing this particular nucleus, that the discourse is able to 
save itself. Or to put it another way, there is a very good reason why 
Chapter 18.33 should be the shortest chapter in the entire novel. If 
the narrative were to represent Rasheed’s suicide directly, in the form 
of a mimetic ‘scene,’ the negative energy released by this event could 
easily bring about its discursive collapse. So instead it is necessary 
to approach the subject obliquely, retrospectively, in the form of 
diegetic ‘reportage.’19 Only thus can the discourse hope to reassert 
the supremacy of its own emotional regime – one that both adheres to 
and actively promotes the guiding principles of the Nehruvian secular 
state.20
 19 Twenty-four pages later, during Lata’s wedding, we learn in passing of 
‘that fellow Rasheed’s suicide’ (1340).
 20 It is, however, worth acknowledging the fact that the novel’s secular 
principles – like those of Nehru himself – are largely confined to the 
public sphere. As Nehru wrote in 1961, secularism does not mean the 
‘absence of religion, but putting religion on a different plane from that of 
normal political and social life’ (Anthology 331). And this is a distinction 
that is also emphasized in A Suitable Boy, where the anti-sectarianism 





In this chapter, I have discussed some of the ways in which A Suitable Boy 
internalizes the affective moderation advocated by Jawaharlal Nehru 
during the late forties and early fifties. It does so, I have argued, by 
delaying the resolution of its central hermeneutic sequence for as long 
as possible (thus diminishing our readerly desire for the full and final 
predication of meaning), by saturating the intervening thousand-odd 
pages with an abundance of ‘parasympathetic’ filler, and by allowing 
the discourse itself to intervene directly whenever the stability of 
the narrative is threatened by a dangerous upsurge of feeling. These 
measures all serve to reinforce the narrative’s governing emotional 
regime, so that any dysphoric energy released by the characters 
within the story is safely contained, at the extradiegetic level, by the 
discourse they have been made to occupy. Of course, there are places 
where this discursive control reveals its vulnerability – during episodes 
of communal violence, for instance, or in the scene where Rasheed 
prepares to end his life. And at such junctures the connection between 
the affective stability of the narrative and its generic stability becomes 
particularly pronounced. Confronted by these challenges to its core 
aesthetic values (clarity, order, rationality, etc.), the narrative is forced 
to contemplate a radical shift in generic allegiance – and even the 
possibility of discursive collapse. But in every case, as I have suggested, 
the aesthetic values of literary realism and the political values of 
Nehruvian secularism are able to reassert themselves, ensuring that 
when we finally bid farewell to our heroine and her ‘suitable boy’ on 
page 1349 of the novel, we are able to do so in a state of relatively 
untroubled equanimity.
It is the morning after their wedding, and Lata and Haresh have 
just boarded a train bound for Calcutta. After an hour or so, the train 
comes to a halt at a provincial railway station, where Lata notices a 
small group of monkeys searching for food. She takes out a musammi, 
‘peel[s] the thick green skin with care, and beg[ins] to distribute the 
segments’ among the monkeys. Only later, as the train is leaving the 
station, does she notice an old monkey sitting by himself at the end of 
the platform. She quickly reaches into her bag for another musammi 
and throws it in his direction. In the last sentence of the novel, we are 
told that the old monkey ‘moved towards [the piece of fruit], but the 
others, seeing it roll along, began running towards it too; and before 
[Lata] could see what had become of it, the train had steamed out of 
the station’ (1349). It is a curious, rather enigmatic way to conclude the 
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novel, but also entirely appropriate – for what we are being offered 
here is simply the last in a long line of inessential catalyzers. Lata 
could have noticed anything at this particular station (another flying 
egret, say, or a woman in a white sari) as such ‘subsidiary notations’ 
are ultimately interchangeable. Alter or delete a nucleus and you have 
a different story; alter or delete a catalyzer, on the other hand, and you 
have the same story told in a different way.21 By definition, then, such 
catalyzers have no influence whatsoever over the underlying structure 
of the narrative. Their principal function is to fill empty space, and to 
convey, at a secondary level of meaning, not only the reality of what 
we are reading, but also its profound ordinariness, its compatibility with 
the mundane substance of our own daily lives. And that, I would argue, 
is precisely what the monkeys are doing on page 1349 of A Suitable 
Boy. They are not there to ‘symbolize’ anything, to alter anything, or 
to destroy anything; they are simply there to replicate the reassuring 
banality of the everyday and to protect the narrative – even at this late 
stage – from the sudden irruption of strong feeling.
 21 I am paraphrasing Barthes here: ‘A nucleus cannot be deleted without 
altering the story,’ he writes, ‘but neither can a [catalyzer] without altering 
the discourse’ (‘Introduction’ 267).
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
Jealousy 
Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis’ 
Dom Casmurro
Jealousy
A jealousy of a particular date in which a subject historicizes 
himself in relation to a certain woman signifies, for the one 
who knows how to interpret it, the total relation to the world 
by which the subject constitutes himself as a self.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1943 
[I]t was all real, at least in appearance.
Roberto Bolaño, 2666, 2004 
I
In the early nineteenth-century Bildungsroman, as Franco Moretti observes, the narrative typically establishes a clear distinction between 
‘illusion’ and ‘reality,’ with the former occupying the level of story and 
the latter occupying the level of discourse.1 We see this quite plainly 
in Stendhal, where the protagonist’s ignorance and immaturity are the 
subject of frequent narratorial asides; but the distinction is even more 
 1 The term ‘discourse,’ in this instance, refers to ‘the narrative statement, 
the oral or written [utterance] that undertakes to tell of an event or a 
series of events,’ while the term ‘story’ is being used to describe ‘the 




pronounced in Balzac, where the aphoristic quality of the discourse 
serves to distance it from the very substance of the story it is telling.2 
In Balzac, as Moretti argues, the maturity that constitutes the ultimate 
generic objective of the Bildungsroman, the enlightened realism that 
we expect our hero to achieve, has shifted from the world of the story 
to that of the discourse. Maturity, he writes, ‘refuses to mingle with life 
and direct it: those maxims that in Wilhelm Meister [1795–96] imparted 
wisdom to the dialogue among characters, in Balzac are found only 
in the disembodied world of the narrator’s discourse.’ No longer the 
‘crowning of growth, nor “wisdom” generated directly from the story, 
Balzacian maturity is founded on a rupture: on its estrangement from the 
narrative universe’ (Way 140–41). In the novel I shall be discussing in 
this chapter, Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis’ Dom Casmurro (1899), it is 
possible to identify a similar conflict between illusion and reality, only 
in this case the dynamic is inverted – the underlying story or ‘narrative 
universe’ being associated with reality, while the discourse, so astute 
and judicious in Balzac, here assumes a delusional or illusory quality. 
What we are offered, in other words, is a reverse Bildungsroman, 
in which the discourse consistently misrecognizes the reality of the 
story it is narrating and, in so doing, serves as a linguistic correlative 
for broader social disjunctures and ideological incongruities. If Balzac 
chose to subject his youthful heroes to the moderating influence of a 
mature and knowledgeable narratorial voice, Machado moves in the 
opposite direction, obliging his characters to occupy a narrative in 
which the story is disfigured by the discourse – and as I shall argue here, 
it is entirely appropriate that this should be the case.
Set in Rio de Janeiro during the reign of Dom Pedro II (1831–89), Dom 
Casmurro follows a fairly straightforward narrative trajectory. Writing 
at the turn of the century, our narrator, Bento Santiago, describes his 
childhood romance with his neighbour, Capitu, their ensuing marriage, 
and the eventual dissolution of that marriage in circumstances that 
have been the subject of some critical debate. According to Bento 
himself, he had discovered irrefutable evidence of an affair between 
 2 Consider, for example, the following adages from Old Goriot: ‘Though the 
human heart may have to pause for rest when climbing the heights of 
affection it rarely stops on the slippery slope of hatred’ (48); ‘The desire 
to conquer is as quickly aroused by the easiness of a triumph as by its 
difficulty’ (159); and ‘Women are always true even when their actions 




Capitu and his good friend Escobar (who is unable to defend himself, 
having recently drowned in Guanabara Bay). For many years, this 
assessment was accepted at face value by the critics, and it is only 
since the publication of Helen Caldwell’s The Brazilian Othello of Machado 
de Assis in 1960 that the dominant reading of the novel has shifted in 
Capitu’s favour – suggesting that she may be the victim of a husband 
whose pathological jealousy leads him to interpret perfectly innocent 
gestures as evidence of deception and infidelity. In what follows, I shall 
be exploring the sociogenic nature of this jealousy while also discussing 
some of its more significant discursive consequences.3 Although Brazil’s 
independence was formally recognized in 1825, it continued to be 
ruled by members of the Portuguese royal family, and many of the 
socioeconomic structures that were established during the colonial 
period (1500–1822) remained unchanged and unchallenged. Slavery 
would not be abolished until 1888; and even after the proclamation of 
the republic the following year, which spelled the end of Dom Pedro 
II’s fifty-eight-year rule (known as the Segundo Reinado), Brazil would 
continue to function as an agrarian oligarchy whose primary form 
of social mediation was patronage and favour. As the Brazilian critic 
Roberto Schwarz has noted, these structural continuities came into 
direct conflict with the imported ideologies of European liberalism, 
to which the majority of the élite subscribed, and this in turn created 
a peculiar dissonance within nineteenth-century Brazilian society.4 On 
 3 It may be useful, at this stage, to distinguish between the related (and 
often intertwined) feelings of jealousy and envy. In her discussion of the 
subject, Melanie Klein is particularly careful to do so, defining envy as a 
dyadic and covetous emotion and jealousy as a triadic and possessive one. 
Whereas envy is an ‘angry feeling’ directed at someone who ‘possesses 
and enjoys something desirable,’ she argues, jealousy ‘involves a relation 
to at least two [other] people [and] is mainly concerned with love that the 
subject feels is his due and has been taken away, or is in danger of being 
taken away, from him by his rival’ (181). In this chapter, too, jealousy will 
be understood as a triadic (and thus inherently social) emotion, which 
arises out of the fear that what one ‘possesses’ may be appropriated by a 
rival, whether imaginary or real. More precisely, the word ‘jealousy’ will 
be used here to designate the belief or suspicion that a particular person 
‘has formed or may form a relationship with a rival, and the belief or 
suspicion that this relationship (or this possible relationship) threatens, is 
in competition with, or may lead to the loss of [our] existing relationship 
[with that person]’ (Goldie 225).
 4 This chapter is deeply indebted both to Schwarz’s analyses of imperial 
Brazil (particularly the 1977 essay ‘Misplaced Ideas: Literature and Society 
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the one hand, the élite ‘wanted to be part of the progressive and 
cultured West, at that time already openly bourgeois’ (Schwarz, Master 
24); yet on the other hand, and in reality, they were the privileged 
beneficiaries of an archaic slave-owning economy. In this chapter, I shall 
be discussing both slavery and patronage, arguing that the jealousy 
that dominates Dom Casmurro emerges out of these two local realities, 
and out of the ideological incongruities to which they give rise. I will 
also explore the various ways in which this jealousy influences the 
narrative’s production of meaning. Simply put, I would like to suggest 
that the contradiction between such anachronistic social practices 
and the guiding principles of European liberalism (free labour, the 
autonomy of the individual, equality before the law, etc.) creates a 
corresponding disjuncture between story and discourse – one that 
replicates the more general ideological dissonance that characterized 
Brazilian society during the Segundo Reinado. In Machado’s novel, 
the falsity, the artificiality, the very discursivity of the discourse is 
consistently emphasized, forcing the reader to acknowledge, on almost 
every page, the profound disparity between the (literary) signifier 
and the (social) signified, between Bento’s narration and the ‘implied’ 
story it generates. As Schwarz writes, ‘slavery and favour twisted the 
ideas of the times,’ producing a sense of radical incongruity that can 
still be felt today: ‘the impression that Brazil gives of ill-assortedness 
– unmanageable contrasts, disproportions, nonsense, anachronisms, 
outrageous compromises …’ (‘Misplaced’ 25). And this, I would argue, 
is precisely what we find in Dom Casmurro, where the protagonist’s 
jealousy (an emotion that is itself typically disproportionate) can be 
seen as one of the primary affective consequences of living in a society 
that is always dimly aware of its own impropriety, its fundamental 
betrayal of the liberal values to which it ostensibly adheres.5
in Late Nineteenth-Century Brazil,’ which first drew my attention to the 
significance of slavery and patronage during the Segundo Reinado) and to 
his seminal work on Machado. In the latter case, I will be quoting more 
than once from A Master on the Periphery of Capitalism, which establishes 
a causal connection between the scandal of slavery and the stylistic 
volubility and irreverence of The Posthumous Memoirs of Brás Cubas (1880).
 5 Over the course of his career, Machado would return to the subject of 
jealousy on more than one occasion. In his first novel, for instance, 
entitled Resurrection (1872), the protagonist becomes convinced that 
he is being betrayed by his fiancée, and this all-consuming paranoia in 
many ways anticipates the pathological jealousy that Bento experiences 




Although Brazil banned the importation of slaves in 1850, a thriving 
interprovincial slave trade continued until 1888, when the Lei Áurea (or 
Golden Law) was passed, definitively abolishing slavery throughout the 
country. For much of the nineteenth century, however, slavery remained 
integral to the Brazilian economy. In 1872, for instance, a population 
of 341,576 slaves was living in the province of Rio de Janeiro, with 
48,939 located in the capital itself (G. Daniel 26). And in 1887, only 
a year before Abolition, the province of Rio de Janeiro contained an 
estimated 162,000 slaves, the second highest number in the country 
after the neighbouring province of Minas Gerais (Fausto 116). During 
this period, as I have suggested, it was virtually impossible for the 
élite to reconcile the sordid reality of slavery, on which their economic 
prosperity depended, with the liberal principles that were so closely 
associated with European modernity. From the practical perspective, 
to quote Schwarz, ‘slavery was a contemporary necessity; from the 
emotional perspective, a traditional presence; and from the ideological 
perspective, an archaic disgrace – all of them contradictory attributes, 
but real in the light of the historical experience of the [Brazilian] ruling 
class’ (Master 21). In an effort to resolve these incongruities, the élite 
were obliged to misrecognize or simply disregard the true source of 
their own socioeconomic privilege, choosing to see liberty, equality, 
and fraternity where there was none. And in a city such as Rio de 
Janeiro, where by 1872 roughly 37 per cent of the population were 
slaves, this was not always easy to do.
In Culture and Imperialism, Edward Said offers what he describes as a 
‘contrapuntal reading’ of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park (1814).6 According 
earlier novel, ‘ridden with doubt and suspicion … A smile, a look, a 
gesture, anything was enough to stir his soul. The young woman’s 
very thoughts were subject to his suspicions. If at any moment he 
discovered thoughtful languor in her gaze, he would begin to speculate 
[about] her reasons, recalling a gesture from the previous day, a 
poorly explained look, an obscure, ambiguous sentence … and from 
all of this was born,  authentically and luminously, the young woman’s 
treachery’ (75).
 6 As the reader may know, Said uses this term to describe a practice 
of reading that acknowledges the presence, within such narratives, of 
‘intertwined and overlapping histories’ (Culture 18) – even if one of these 




to Said, this critical strategy enables one to trace the connection 
between a colonial sugar plantation on the Caribbean island of Antigua, 
referred to only half a dozen times over the course of the novel, and the 
affluence and privilege of the English country estate that serves as its 
primary setting. Antigua, Said writes,
is both incidental, referred to only in passing, and absolutely crucial 
to the action. How are we to assess Austen’s few references to 
Antigua, and what are we to make of them interpretatively? My 
contention is that by that very odd combination of casualness and 
stress, Austen reveals herself to be assuming … the importance of an 
empire to the situation at home. Let us now calibrate the signifying 
power of the references to Antigua in Mansfield Park; how do they 
occupy the place they do, what are they doing there? According 
to Austen we are to conclude that no matter how isolated and 
insulated the English place (e.g., Mansfield Park), it requires overseas 
sustenance. Sir Thomas’s property in the Caribbean would have had 
to be a sugar plantation maintained by slave labor (not abolished 
until the 1830s): these are not dead historical facts but, as Austen 
certainly knew, evident historical realities. (89)
Mansfield Park, Said argues, is a novel ‘based in an England relying for 
the maintenance of its style on a Caribbean island.’ And it is precisely 
because ‘Austen is so summary in one context [yet] so provocatively 
rich in the other,’ precisely because of this ‘imbalance,’ that the critic 
is able to ‘move in on the novel, [to] reveal and accentuate the interde-
pendence scarcely mentioned on its brilliant pages’ (96).7 Turning to 
Dom Casmurro, we see the same imbalance or disparity, whereby the 
reality of slavery, which was simply unavoidable in nineteenth-century 
Rio, is relegated to the background of the novel, while the prosperity 
and ‘culture’ it enabled occupies almost the entire field of represen-
tation. Any references to slaves that we do encounter are notable for 
their brevity, as demonstrated by the following examples:
One of my oldest memories is of seeing [Uncle Cosme] every morning 
mounting the [mule] given him by my mother … The slave who had 
 7 In Atlas of the European Novel, it is worth noting, Franco Moretti chooses to 
emphasize both the narratological and symbolic function served by the 
colonies in Mansfield Park. Sir Thomas goes to Antigua because his absence 
makes the narrative itself possible – and he goes to the Caribbean specif-
ically so that the ‘link between the wealth of the élite and the “multitude 
of labouring poor” of contemporary England can be easily severed’ (27).
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gone to get it from the stable held the reins while he lifted his foot 
and placed it in the stirrup. (13–14)
[Capitu] was speaking low; she took my hand and put a finger to 
my lips. A slave woman, who came from inside the house to light 
the lamp in the corridor, seeing us like that, almost in the dark, 
laughed sympathetically and murmured, loud enough for us to hear 
it, something that I did and didn’t understand. (78)
It was the morning of a beautiful day. The slave-children were 
whispering to each other; the women came to take their blessing. (99)
Like the island of Antigua in Mansfield Park, however, these slaves are 
‘both incidental, referred to only in passing, and absolutely crucial to 
the action,’ for the socioeconomic privilege of the Santiago family, their 
elevated position within Rio society, and the ‘style’ in which they are 
accustomed to living are all dependent on the wealth generated by the 
slave trade. Until the age of two, Bento had lived on a sugar plantation 
in Itaguaí (a small town roughly sixty-five kilometres west of Rio). 
Then, when his father died, Bento’s mother ‘sold the old plantation 
and the slaves, bought some more that she sent out to work or hired 
out, bought a dozen buildings and a quantity of government bonds, 
and settled down in [Rio]’ (15). The slave economy is what enables 
the family to live in the way that it does; but it is also what makes 
the novel itself possible, for without this economic substructure our 
narrator would not have had the leisure to produce the ‘memoir’ we 
are reading (to ‘put down on paper the reminiscences that [came] 
into [his] head’ [7]). And just as the family relies on slavery for the 
maintenance of its privileged lifestyle, so the narrative relies on this 
system for the maintenance of its discursive style, whose prodigious 
erudition offers thinly encoded evidence of the very same privilege. 
Over the course of the novel, to provide just a few examples, there 
are references to Goethe’s Faust (6), Tacitus (78), the Iliad (114), Lucian’s 
True History (121), Montaigne’s Essays (128), José de Alencar (136), Othello 
(226–27), Wagner (178), Camões’ Lusiads (183), Victor Hugo’s ‘Tristesse 
d’Olympio’ (199), João de Barros (203), Dante’s Purgatorio (219), Plato’s 
Phaedo (228), and so on. To recall Said, then, the imbalance between 
Machado’s passing references to slavery and his careful delineation of 
the economic (and cultural) privilege it enables, this ‘odd combination 
of casualness and stress,’ serves to ‘reveal and accentuate the interde-
pendence’ between the two – but only to the attentive reader, not to 
Bento himself, who does everything he can to ignore the anachronistic 
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social realities underlying his liberal values, his socioeconomic status, 
and his profound immersion in European culture.
Instead, he chooses to focus on Capitu, and on the growing sense 
of jealousy that she provokes. It all begins when the family agregado 
(or ‘retainer’), José Dias, describes Capitu’s eyes as being ‘a bit like 
a gypsy’s, oblique and sly’ (48). And then not long afterward, while 
visiting Bento in the seminary, he reports that she has been ‘as happy as 
ever [during his absence]; she’s a giddy little thing. Just waiting to find 
some local beau to marry her …’ This comment inspires in Bento, for 
the first time, ‘a cruel, unknown feeling, pure jealousy’ (117) – a feeling 
that will become increasingly pathological as the novel progresses. 
Even after he leaves the seminary and they are married, Bento grows 
intensely jealous if a man so much as glances in Capitu’s direction (136), 
or if she wears short sleeves in public (183), or if her mind wanders 
while her husband is delivering a lecture on astronomy (184–87). In 
short, as he himself concedes, he becomes completely consumed by 
this irrational feeling:
[I]t’s natural for you to ask me if, having been so jealous of her [when 
I was younger], I didn’t go on being so in spite of my son and the 
passing years. Yes, sir, I did. I went on being so, to such a point that 
the least gesture alarmed me, the tiniest word, any kind of insistence 
on a point; often mere indifference was enough. I came to be jealous of 
everything and everyone. A neighbor, a waltz partner, any man, young 
or old, filled me with terror or mistrust. (196; my italics)
Finally, when his friend Escobar dies, Bento decides that he and Capitu 
had been conducting an illicit affair, and that his son, Ezequiel, was 
in fact a product of this liaison. Refusing to listen to reason, and 
absolutely certain of the boy’s filial resemblance to his dead friend, 
Bento takes both mother and child to Europe, where he establishes 
them in Switzerland before returning, alone, to Brazil. Some time later, 
we learn parenthetically of Capitu’s death in exile (‘I don’t think I’ve 
said that she was dead and buried’ [239]), and after a brief visit to Rio 
as a young man, Ezequiel also dies, having contracted typhoid during 
an archaeological dig in Palestine. To the very end, however, Bento is 
unswayed and unforgiving – utterly convinced that his ‘first love and 
[his] best friend, both so affectionate and so beloved … ended up 
joining together and deceiving [him]’ (244).
As with the anger that dominated Midaq Alley, the curiously overde-
termined and undermotivated nature of Bento’s jealousy encourages us 
to look elsewhere for its ultimate source – and to consider the possibility 
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that the ostensible causes we find on the surface of the narrative may in 
fact be concealing something far deeper and far more troubling. Or to 
put it another way, when we encounter a disproportionate emotion of 
this kind (‘I came to be jealous of everything and everyone’), we may be 
inclined to search for a more plausible motivation, one that would restore 
a measure of proportionality to the feeling in question and allow us to 
make sense of the narrative’s governing affective logic. In this particular 
instance, as suggested above, I would identify the practice of slavery as 
one of the underlying social causes of Bento’s pathological jealousy. If 
you remember, the conflict between the liberal principles of the élite and 
their status as the direct beneficiaries of the last slave-owning economy 
in the Western world compelled them to misrecognize or ignore the 
true nature of their own social reality. We see this quite clearly in Dom 
Casmurro, where the slaves, who are essential both to the survival of 
the family and to the very existence of the novel itself, are relegated 
to the periphery of the narrative, subjected to a deliberate process of 
erasure so that the ideological contradiction they represent will also be 
eliminated. At one level, then, we could regard Bento’s jealousy as an 
emotional analogue for the collective distortion of reality that occurred 
during the Segundo Reinado – this inability (or refusal) to acknowledge 
the mutually incompatible nature of slavery and modernity. At another 
level, however, one could argue that Bento is subliminally aware of this 
contradiction, this collective misrecognition of reality, and that this 
too contributes to the displaced feeling of jealousy he experiences. 
In other words, Bento may very well suspect that there is something 
happening in front of him – or just around the corner – that he simply 
cannot see, a fundamental betrayal of everything he values. But because 
this ‘something’ remains opaque to him, the anxieties provoked by this 
vague intimation of betrayal, of concealment, of duplicity, migrate from 
the public sphere to the private, where they resurface in the form of the 
pathological jealousy that we have been discussing.8
Along with slavery, another one of the colonial continuities that 
 8 Such duplicity would eventually become proverbial. In 1831, the 
Brazilian government, under international pressure to respect an 
earlier Anglo-Brazilian treaty (1826), introduced a law that banned the 
importation of slaves and declared free any slave entering the country 
after that date (Bethell and Carvalho 62). Within Brazil, however, it was 
generally understood that this law would not be enforced; and it has since 
given rise to the common Brazilian expression, para inglês ver (‘for the 
English to see’), which is used to describe something that has been done 
for the sake of appearances but in reality changes nothing (Holloway 6).
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survived well into the Segundo Reinado was that of patronage, which 
ensured the ongoing dependence of the subordinate classes on the 
‘benevolence’ of the élite.9 As a consequence, during this period, the 
principle of favour infiltrated even the deepest recesses of society. 
‘Under a thousand forms and names,’ Roberto Schwarz writes,
[it] formed and flavoured the whole of the national life, excepting 
always the basic productive relationship [of slavery] which was 
secured by force. Favour was present everywhere, combining 
itself with more or less ease to administration, politics, industry, 
commerce, the life of the city, the court, and so on. Even professions, 
such as medicine, or forms of skilled labor, such as printing, which in 
Europe were on the whole free of favour, were among us governed by 
it. As the professional depended on favour to exercise his profession, 
so the small proprietor depended on it for the security of his 
property, and the public servant for his position. (‘Misplaced’ 22)
Like slavery, such patronage was fundamentally incompatible with the 
principles of European liberalism. Yet in this case, through a kind of 
ideological sleight of hand, the élite were able to reconcile the two, 
using the latter to justify or ‘endorse’ the former. As Schwarz notes, this 
strategy would also bring about a collective distortion of reality, one 
that in many ways replicated the delusional qualities of pathological 
jealousy:
Once the European [ideologies] took hold, they could serve, and 
very often did, as a justification, nominally ‘objective,’ for what 
was unavoidably arbitrary in the practice of favour. Real as it was, 
the antagonism vanished into thin air … Liberalism, which had 
been an ideology well grounded in appearances, came to stand for 
the conscious desire to participate in a reality that appearances did not 
sustain … In this way … the test of reality and coherence did not 
seem to be decisive … [O]ne could methodically call dependence 
independence, capriciousness utility, exceptions universality, kinship 
merit, privilege equality, and so on. By linking itself to the practice 
of what, in principle, it should criticize, liberalism caused thought to 
lose its footing. (‘Misplaced’ 23–24; my italics)
In Dom Casmurro, evidence of such favour, whether requested or granted, 
can be found everywhere (‘These are the favors of worthy people’ [50]; ‘I 
 9 For a detailed analysis of the connection between patronage and politics 
in nineteenth-century Brazil, see R. Graham.
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still had another promise owing and a favor pending’ [68]; ‘It was a great 
favor, and not the only one’ [178], etc.). But the character who serves as 
the most obvious representative of favour in the novel – indeed, as the 
very personification of this anachronistic social principle – is José Dias, 
the Santiago family’s agregado.10 The figure of the agregado occupied 
a curiously ambivalent position within nineteenth-century Brazilian 
society. They were not slaves, not quite, but they were not entirely free 
either. They would often spend their lives working for the same family, 
yet they received no formal wages for their labour – depending, instead, 
on the more arbitrary and unreliable patronage of their employers.11 
Many agregados would develop close ties with these families, becoming 
‘honorary’ members of the household; and yet, even so, they could be 
dismissed at any time and were obliged to show complete deference to 
those they served.12 We see this in the case of José Dias too. ‘He had 
lived with us as a dependent for many years,’ Bento says, ‘accept[ing] 
food and lodging with no … stipend, other than what [we] might be 
pleased to give him on festival days … He had the gift of making himself 
amenable and indispensable; when he wasn’t there, it was almost as if 
a member of the family was missing.’ And as the years passed, we are 
told, ‘he acquired a certain authority in the family: or at least, people 
would listen to what he had to say; he didn’t overdo it, and knew how 
to give his opinion submissively’ (11–12).
As we have established, then, favour achieved a certain ubiquity 
during the Segundo Reinado, making its presence felt at almost every 
level of Brazilian society; and as a consequence, I would like to suggest, 
jealousy became one of the dominant structures of feeling within the 
 10 The term agregado (often translated as ‘retainer’) is actually an abbreviation 
of the formal phrase, used by the patron, agregado à minha família (‘attached 
to my family’) (R. Graham 20).
 11 In 1870, for instance, one such employer said that her agregada, a young 
widow with a seven-month-old baby, ‘live[s] by [my] favor because I took 
pity when I saw her poverty, but … only as long as she behaves well and 
works at something that makes it worth giving her some salary besides 
[her] food’ (qtd. in S. Graham 92).
 12 Machado’s father, Francisco José de Assis, was himself an agregado and 
the son of freed slaves. He and his wife, a woman of Portuguese origin 
who worked as a washerwoman, served a wealthy family in the Morro do 
Livramento district of Rio. In due course, the female head of the family, 
Dona Maria José de Mendonça Barroso Pereira, would become Machado’s 
godmother – ‘underscoring,’ as Lília Moritz Schwarcz writes, ‘how bonds 
of dependency were formed and favors were exchanged’ (14).
Affective Disorders
90
empire (‘caus[ing] thought to lose its footing’).13 In any society based 
on a system of patronage, competition among those vying for favour is 
inevitable, and even once such favour has been granted, there is always 
a fear that it may be withheld or offered to some other party instead. 
Needless to say, this competitive quality is also a defining feature of 
jealousy. As the philosopher Aaron Ben-Ze’ev observes, jealousy involves 
‘specific, not general, competition with a third party.’ It ‘stems from the 
desire to be “favored” in some respect and [from] the suspicion that it 
is not merely the case that one is not favored, but that another person 
is being favored more.’ In short, when we feel jealous, ‘we are afraid of 
losing our present favorable position to someone else and of ending 
up in an inferior position’ (41). A number of characters in Dom Casmurro 
demonstrate such competitive tendencies, but none more so than José 
Dias. Whenever possible, he denigrates the family’s neighbour, Capitu’s 
father, Pádua, who has also been obliged to compete for the Santiagos’ 
favour; and this animosity becomes particularly pronounced on the day 
of the Eucharistic procession (described in Chapter XXX). Both José Dias 
and a young Bento have decided to accompany the procession, and so 
they make their way to the Church of Santo Antônio dos Pobres:
[Pádua] saw us [in the church] and came over to greet us. José Dias 
gave an irritated gesture, and barely replied with one brief word: 
he was looking at the priest, who was washing his hands. Then, as 
Pádua was talking to the sacristan in a low voice, he went nearer; I 
did the same thing. Pádua was asking the sacristan if he could carry 
one of the poles of the canopy. José Dias asked for one for himself:
‘There’s only one available,’ said the sacristan.
‘That one then,’ said José Dias.
‘But I’d asked first,’ ventured Pádua.
‘You asked first, but you came in late,’ retorted José Dias. ‘I was 
already here. You carry a candle.’
Pádua, for all he was afraid of José Dias, insisted that he wanted 
the pole, all this in a low, muted voice. The sacristan found a way of 
contenting both rivals, taking it on himself to ask one of the other 
carriers of the poles to give up his to Pádua … He did so, but José 
Dias upset this arrangement too. No, since there was another pole 
 13 Not that this feeling was necessarily unique to the Segundo Reinado. After 
visiting Rio in 1819, for example, one traveller wrote, rather disapprovingly, 
that jealousy ‘obtain[ed] unbounded influence over the minds of many … 
Brazilians, and operate[d] in some instances to such a degree that its 
victims [were] degraded much below the savage’ (Henderson 77).
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available, he asked for it to be given to me, a ‘young seminarist,’ who 
had a better right to this honor. Pádua went as pale as the candles …
‘Very well, I give way to our Bentinho,’ [he] sighed. (56)
What really motivates José Dias in this scene is the overriding principle 
of favour and the competitive impulse – the jealousy – that it generates. 
The ‘special distinction’ that attaches to the canopy ‘[comes] from the 
fact that it cover[s] the priest and the Sacrament,’ whereas ‘anyone 
could carry a candle’ (56). So by securing the canopy poles for himself 
and Bento, José Dias has demonstrated his superior position within 
the hierarchy of patronage, leaving poor old Pádua to ‘gnaw his candle 
with bitterness’ – ‘[a] metaphor, no doubt,’ Bento concedes, ‘but [he] 
can think of no better way of conveying [his] neighbor’s pain and 
humiliation’ (57).
If you recall, I suggested several pages ago that Bento’s sense of 
betrayal migrates from the public sphere (where it arises out of certain 
ideological incongruities) to the private sphere (where it becomes 
personalized, attached to neighbours or waltz partners or ‘any man, 
young or old’ [196]). In the case of patronage and favour, we are able 
to trace an identical trajectory, one that also defies the boundary 
separating the public sphere from the private. If we turn to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, we find jealousy described as ‘a state of mind arising 
from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry,’ and this 
definition is divided into two additional subcategories. We have the 
kind of jealousy that relates to ‘success or advantage’: the fear of 
‘losing some good through the rivalry of another; [or] resentment 
or ill-will towards another on account of advantage or superiority, 
possible or actual, on his [or her] part.’ And then we have jealousy ‘in 
love’: the fear of ‘being supplanted in the affection … of a beloved 
person, esp[ecially] a wife, husband, or lover.’ The former definition 
would seem to relate to the public sphere (where one is more likely 
to encounter such competition and rivalry), while the latter obviously 
relates to the private sphere (the realm of love, romance, and sexuality). 
In Dom Casmurro, however, we witness a slippage between these two 
categories, a rupture of the traditional boundary separating casa e rua.14 
 14 As Sandra Lauderdale Graham has pointed out, the distinction between 
the private space of the ‘house’ (casa) and the public space of the ‘street’ 
(rua) carried particular significance during this period. ‘Threaded through 
all the concerns of domestic living [in nineteenth-century Rio],’ she writes, 
‘were the contrasting images of casa e rua, or house and street, by which 
contemporaries located and, by locating, interpreted everyday actions 
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As a consequence of Brazil’s archaic social configuration during the 
Segundo Reinado, jealousy became a dominant structure of feeling within 
society at large, one that emerged out of the widespread competition 
for patronage. We see this most clearly in the case of José Dias, who 
jealously competes for the favour of his superiors (indeed, one could 
argue that it is an essential part of the ‘emotional labour’ that he is 
obliged to perform as an agregado).15 So it is not particularly surprising, 
given the ubiquity of this feeling in the public sphere, that Bento should 
also experience jealous impulses. But as he has no need for patronage 
or favour, as he already occupies a privileged position within Brazilian 
society (albeit one that must be ‘jealously’ guarded), these impulses are 
displaced into the private sphere, where they eventually resurface in 
the form of romantic jealousy – the unsubstantiated conviction that he 
has been betrayed by his first love and his best friend.
III
We have thus far been discussing the contradiction between the 
anachronistic social realities of nineteenth-century Brazil (namely, 
slavery and patronage) and the liberal principles associated with 
European modernity. I have suggested that this dissonance, along with 
the competitive nature of patronage, gives rise to the pathological 
jealousy that Bento, the narrator of Dom Casmurro, experiences. But 
how does this jealousy in turn influence the narrative’s production 
of meaning? What are the primary discursive consequences of this 
particular ‘affective disorder’? Under certain circumstances, feelings of 
jealousy may well be justified; more often, though, it is an emotional 
state that very quickly becomes disproportionate and may also 
involve a distortion of reality. In a 1922 essay on the subject, Freud 
divided jealousy into three different categories: normal, projected, 
and delusional. ‘Although we may call it normal,’ he wrote of the first 
category, ‘this jealousy is by no means completely rational, that is, 
and encounters. House signified a secure and stable domain. To house 
belonged the enduring relationships of family or blood kin. To street 
belonged uncertain or temporary alliances in which identity could not be 
assumed but had to be established. Street was suspect, unpredictable, 
a dirty or dangerous place’ (4). For more on the fundamental distinction 
between casa e rua, see Freyre 35–37.




derived from the actual situation, proportionate to the real circum-
stances and under the complete control of the conscious ego,’ for it is 
‘rooted deep in the unconscious’ and arises out of the ‘earliest stirrings 
of the child’s affective life’ (‘Some’ 223).16 In the case of Dom Casmurro, 
I have located the source of Bento’s jealousy elsewhere, yet it certainly 
demonstrates the irrational and disproportionate qualities that Freud 
describes here (and, remember, this is his definition of normal jealousy). 
As the novel progresses, moreover, the pathological jealousy that 
emerges out of the aforementioned contradiction between slavery and 
liberalism creates a corresponding disjuncture between the story (i.e., 
the signified) and the discourse (the signifier) – one that ultimately 
serves as a discursive correlative for the ideological dissonance that 
plagued Brazilian society during the Segundo Reinado. In the nineteenth-
century Bildungsroman, as we saw earlier, a strong sense of illusion 
often characterizes the level of story (where our heroes struggle to 
identify the basic principles governing the society in which they hope 
to find a place for themselves), while an air of confidence, maturity, 
and realism dominates the discourse. In Dom Casmurro, by contrast, 
the reader gradually comes to realize that this dynamic has been 
inverted. Here, the underlying story is associated with reality (‘what 
really happened’), while the discourse (what Bento believes to be true) 
assumes an increasingly delusional and distorted quality.
Before going any further, I should probably clarify my understanding 
of the relationship between story and discourse. It is a matter of some 
critical convenience, and essential to our readerly pleasure, that story 
should be seen to precede (and therefore determine) discourse. But 
 16 According to Freud, jealousy is ‘one of those affective states, like grief, 
that may be described as normal. If anyone appears to be without it, 
the inference is justified that it has undergone severe repression and 
consequently plays all the greater part in his unconscious mental life’ 
(‘Some’ 223). Projected jealousy, on the other hand, is to be considered 
neurotic, for it is ‘derived in both men and women either from their 
own actual unfaithfulness in real life or from impulses towards it which 
have succumbed to repression’ and subsequently been projected onto 
their partner. Delusional jealousy also ‘has its origin in repressed impulses 
towards unfaithfulness; but the object in these cases is of the same sex 
as the subject.’ In other words, Freud argues, this form of jealousy is 
‘what is left of a homosexuality that has run its course, and it rightly 
takes its position among the classical forms of paranoia. As an attempt at 
defence against an unduly strong homosexual impulse it may, in a man, be 
described in the formula: “I do not love him, she loves him!”’ (224–25).
Affective Disorders
94
as we noted in Chapter 2, this is not always so. Every narrative is in 
fact a product of a ‘double logic’ – the logic of story and the logic of 
discourse – with neither category being consistently privileged over the 
other. At certain times, the course of a narrative may be determined 
by the logic of the story; yet at other times, this priority is challenged 
when the imperatives of the discourse itself come to the fore, defini-
tively influencing the narrative’s trajectory. As Jonathan Culler observes, 
it is impossible to synthesize these two competing forces as they 
stand in ‘irreconcilable opposition’ (Pursuit 208) to one another, ‘each 
work[ing] by the exclusion of the other’ and ‘each depend[ing] on a 
hierarchical relation between story and discourse which the other 
inverts’ (195). In the opening pages of Dom Casmurro, a straightforward 
mimetic relationship between story and discourse is established; but 
over time, this superficial alliance comes under increasing pressure, 
and we begin to suspect that the ‘natural’ correspondence between 
the two categories may be deceptive. So when Bento finally accuses his 
wife of infidelity on page 230, for example, or describes her eyes as ‘sly 
[and] oblique’ for the third time on page 244, we are no longer inclined 
to believe what we are being told.
Given the fact that Bento is the narrative’s sole focalizing figure, 
though, one might wonder how it is possible to distinguish between 
story and discourse in this way – particularly if we are associating the 
former with reality and the latter with illusion. In order to address 
this issue, I would like to refer, just briefly, to the linguist Paul Grice’s 
cooperative principle. Writing in 1967, Grice argued that every conver-
sational exchange is governed by four separate categories of rules and 
subrules (regarding Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner). Under 
the category of Quality, for instance, he included the rules ‘Do not 
say what you believe to be false’ and ‘Do not say that for which you 
lack adequate evidence’ (27). Yet even if a speaker appears to be 
violating one of the rules that fall within these four categories, it is 
still possible to make sense of his or her utterance – and to assume 
that he or she is not violating the cooperative principle itself – if we 
recognize the ‘implicature’ that such a statement generates. (Irony, of 
course, is one rhetorical device that operates in this way, creating a 
recognizable discrepancy between the literal and intended meanings 
of an utterance.) As Mary Louise Pratt has suggested, it is also possible 
to apply this principle to literary discourse, in which case it becomes 
‘hyperprotected’ – thus guaranteeing that even if the narrator violates 
one of these rules and thereby jeopardizes the cooperative principle, 
‘the jeopardy is almost certainly only mimetic’ as the narrative’s 
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‘cooperation’ can ultimately ‘be restored by [discursive] implicature’ 
(215). More specifically:
[W]hen a fictional speaker [violates the cooperative principle], it 
will usually be the case that the [discourse] is implicating things in 
addition to what the fictional speaker is saying or implicating … In 
[such instances], it is not only the experiences reported which are 
unusual and problematic, but the report itself. The verbal version 
the speaker offers fails to elicit our understanding of events or our 
agreement with the speaker’s interpretation of events. The fictional 
speaker thus produces a lack of consensus, and the [discourse] 
implicates that this lack of consensus is part of what [it] is displaying, part 
of what [it] wants us to experience, evaluate, and interpret. (Pratt 
199; my italics)
This, I would argue, is precisely what occurs in Dom Casmurro. In those 
places where Bento could be said to violate the cooperative principle, 
by misinterpreting or distorting the substance of the story he is telling, 
the primacy of the principle is restored by the discourse itself, so that 
the disparity – the ‘lack of consensus’ – between story and discourse 
becomes the very message we are expected to receive. Although the 
story we are told emerges out of the discourse (as every story does), 
in this case it ultimately serves to undermine, by way of implicature, the 
credibility of its own discursive framing. In other words, to paraphrase 
Grice, what is said in Dom Casmurro may be false; but what is implicated 
is almost certainly true (39). And this, finally, is what enables us to 
distinguish between story (what is implicated) and discourse (what is 
actually said), with the former falling under the category of the real 
and the latter being associated with illusion, with our narrator’s tragic 
misrecognition of his actual diegetic circumstances.17
By now the connection between these narratological issues and the 
ideological dissonance that characterized nineteenth-century Brazilian 
society ought to be clear. During the Segundo Reinado, we also find a 
convergence of opposing ‘logics’ – one archaic, the other contemporary 
– which could not be adequately synthesized as ‘each work[ed] by the 
exclusion of the other’ and ‘each depend[ed] on a hierarchical relation … 
which the other invert[ed]’ (Culler, Pursuit 195). During these years, we 
 17 I should note here that Pratt herself offers Dom Casmurro as an example 
of a narrative that violates the cooperative principle (194–98). And for a 
reading of Machado’s Posthumous Memoirs that also discusses this principle, 
see Scott, On Lightness 39–63.
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can also identify a ‘lack of consensus’ between the true nature of the 
country’s economic substructure and the way in which it was perceived 
by its primary beneficiaries. And during these years, we also encounter 
a reality that served to undermine the credibility of its own (ideological) 
framing. Allow me to clarify, if I may, this last correspondence. In 
nineteenth-century Brazil, the principles of European liberalism 
obviously served to delegitimize the practices of slavery and patronage 
(for those who were willing to recognize such an incongruity). But as 
Roberto Schwarz quite rightly indicates, the reverse was also true. ‘Since 
they are necessary to the organization and identity of the new state and 
of the élite,’ he writes, the principles of liberalism
represent progress. [Yet] they express nothing of the reality of actual 
labor relationships, which these liberal ideas either reject or fail to 
recognize in principle, not that this prevents the élite from living with 
them quite congenially. From this stems a special kind of modus 
operandi that has no obligations to the cognitive and critical duties 
of liberalism, all of which undermines the latter’s credibility and 
gives it, along with its enlightened side, an aura of the gratuitous, the 
incongruous, and the iniquitous. (Master 21–22)
In short, during this period of Brazilian history, there was a clear 
contradiction between the archaic modes of production on which the 
economy was based and the ‘modern’ values to which the élite ostensibly 
subscribed. And the fact that these imported ideologies could be made 
to accommodate the practice of slavery, the fact that they could happily 
coexist with such a moral scandal, rendered them at once gratuitous, 
incongruous, and iniquitous. If we return to Dom Casmurro, we will 
be able to identify a similar dynamic – for not only does the growing 
disparity between story and discourse serve to invalidate the latter, 
revealing the unreliability of our delusional narrator, but the discourse 
itself also assumes a heightened degree of discursivity and, in so doing, forces 
us to question the veracity (and legitimacy) of the very narrative we are 
reading.18
One could accumulate numerous examples of the way in which the 
novel, at the representational level, consistently emphasizes its own 
 18 When I use the term ‘discursivity,’ I am referring to two basic characteristics 
of narrative discourse: (1) the various qualities that distinguish discourse 
from story (semiotic codes, linguistic structures, rhetorical strategies, 
etc.), and (2) the degree to which any given narrative emphasizes or 
acknowledges these discursive qualities.
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discursivity. In Chapter CXXIX, for instance, Bento directly addresses 
Escobar’s widow, assuming that she is still alive at the time of writing. 
‘Dona Sanchez,’ he says,
I ask you not to read this book; or if you’ve read it thus far, drop the 
rest. All you need to do is shut it; better still, burn it, to avoid the 
temptation of opening it again. If, in spite of the warning, you go to 
the end, it’s your fault; I can’t answer for the harm that may be done. 
(218–19)
But I am more interested in the formal or structural consequences 
of the ideological dissonance we have been discussing, and of the 
pathological jealousy to which it gives rise. Before concluding, then, I 
would like to offer two examples of the way in which ‘what is told’ in 
Dom Casmurro comes to be distorted or disfigured by ‘the way it is told’; 
and in order to do so, I shall be employing some of the narratological 
categories that have been delineated, with such precision and subtlety, 
by Gérard Genette.
A story, as we have defined it, always follows a chronological 
trajectory, yet it is often the case that discourse, in the ‘retelling,’ 
will rearrange this chronology – thus creating a distinction between 
‘story time’ and ‘discourse time.’ As Genette notes, such a distinction 
implicitly assumes ‘the existence of a kind of zero degree that would 
be a condition of perfect temporal correspondence between [discourse] 
and story’; however, this ‘point of reference is more hypothetical than 
real’ (36). In fact, almost every narrative employs what Genette calls 
anachronies: ‘various types of discordance between the two orderings of 
story and [discourse]’ (36). So rather than being a question of whether or 
not a narrative makes use of such anachronies, it is really a question of 
degree – a question of frequency and salience. Although Dom Casmurro 
follows a largely linear trajectory, whenever the discourse does produce 
an anachronic sequence, it proves particularly disruptive and only 
serves to reinforce a lingering sense of narratorial unreliability. At the 
end of Chapter CXXX, for example, we are offered a rather strange 
apology:
I beg your pardon, but this chapter should have been preceded 
by another, recounting an incident that happened a few weeks 
earlier … I’ll write it now; I could insert it before this one, before 
I send the book to the press, but it’s a great nuisance to alter the 
page numbers; [so] I’ll leave [it] as it is, and then the narration will go 
straight on to the end. (220)
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This passage is followed by a brief, analeptic chapter (entitled ‘Before 
the Previous One’), which takes us back to the beginning of 1872. And 
on pages 144–46, we find a corresponding episode of internal prolepsis 
that is also explicitly acknowledged.19 ‘Here,’ Bento says,
I come to a point that I hoped would come later, so much so that I 
was already considering at what point I should dedicate a chapter to 
it. Really, I should not have said now what I only … discovered later; 
but since I have touched on the matter, it’s better to be finished with 
it. (144)
In Dom Casmurro, then, the number of anachronies may fall within the 
average range, but when they do appear, they are foregrounded to such 
a degree that we are left to ponder the more general credibility of our 
poor, confused narrator – and of the narrative he produces, which never 
quite manages to ‘naturalize’ its own chronology.
Another disparity that typically distinguishes story time from 
discourse time is that of duration or tempo. Once more, we have a 
‘hypothetical reference zero,’ whereby a narrative would maintain an 
unchanging tempo that corresponds perfectly with that of the story. Yet 
as Genette observes, it is rather hard to imagine such a narrative, one 
that would ‘admit of no variation in speed’ (88). Instead, we inevitably 
encounter anisochronies: variations in tempo, ranging from descriptive 
pauses to ellipses (in which a period of story time is completely elided), 
with two contrasting intermediaries – scenes (or mimetic sequences) 
and summaries (diegetic sequences). In the latter case, it should be 
noted, the narrative tempo can vary widely; and in Dom Casmurro, this 
is precisely what it does. Although Bento’s narration maintains a fairly 
steady pace for much of the novel, oscillating between mimetic scenes 
and diegetic summaries, on page 172 he suddenly discovers that he has 
made a grave miscalculation:
This should have been the middle of the book, but my inexperience 
has let my pen run away with me, and I have come almost to the end 
of the paper, with the best of the story still to tell. There’s no way for 
it now but to take it in great strides, chapter after chapter, with few 
corrections, not much reflection, everything in resumé. This chapter 
 19 In Narrative Discourse, Genette divides analepses (retrospective sequences) 
and prolepses (anticipatory sequences) into ‘two classes, external and 
internal, depending on whether the point to which they reach is located 
outside or inside the temporal field of the [primary] narrative’ (61).
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already covers months, others will cover years, and so we will get to 
the end.
Bento, we soon realize, is as good as his word. The following chapter 
covers five years in total, summarizing his life from the age of eighteen 
to twenty-two in just a few sentences. At the beginning of Chapter 
CVIII, Ezequiel has not yet been conceived, but by the time it concludes 
he is already ‘Christian and Catholic’ (190). And the subsequent chapter, 
entitled ‘An Only Son,’ takes no more than half a page to ‘bring him up 
to the age of five’ (190). This sudden acceleration of narrative tempo not 
only serves to emphasize the disparity between story and discourse, 
but also encourages us to question the judgement of our narrator, his 
ability to distinguish between what carries genuine significance and 
value within the narrative and what should be considered mere filler.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Roland Barthes uses the term ‘nuclei’ to 
describe those episodes that ‘constitute [the] real hinge points of [a] 
narrative,’ and the term ‘catalyzer’ to label those occurrences that 
‘merely “fill in” the narrative space separating the [nuclei]’ (‘Introduction’ 
265). In literary narratives, a correspondence is typically established 
between the importance of the episode and the quantity (or tempo) 
of the discourse. When the narrative encounters an episode of some 
significance, in other words, it will decelerate, ensuring that this critical 
nucleus receives a share of the discourse that is directly proportionate 
to its ‘hinge’ value within the story as a whole. Consequently, the pacing 
of any given narrative, the story-discourse ratio, will usually provide the 
reader with a reasonably accurate sense of what carries significance 
within the narrative and what can be safely regarded as catalytic filler. In 
novelistic discourse, as Genette argues, the contrast of tempo ‘between 
detailed scene and summary almost always reflect[s] a contrast of 
content between dramatic and nondramatic, the strong periods of the 
action coinciding with the most intense moments of the narrative while 
the weak periods [are] summed up with large strokes and as if from a 
great distance.’ The typical literary narrative thus alternates between 
‘nondramatic summaries, functioning as waiting room and liaison, [and] 
dramatic scenes whose role in the action is decisive’ (109–10).
Once the discourse accelerates on page 172 of Dom Casmurro, 
however, it becomes apparent to the reader that Bento is no longer 
capable of distinguishing between those episodes that serve a decisive 
function within the narrative (nuclei) and those that carry only limited 
value (catalyzers). Simply put, as a consequence of his pathological 
jealousy, the narrative’s story-discourse ratio loses its proportionality, 
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and it too becomes increasingly unbalanced. Many years before, when 
he and Capitu were still young, a sweet-seller would pass through 
Matacavalos, singing a mournful refrain:
Cry, little girl, cry,
Got no money to buy … (37)
In the latter stages of the novel, Bento becomes obsessed by this 
memory, and by the fact that Capitu can no longer remember the song. 
He acknowledges that it is a ‘trivial subject, and … not worth the 
trouble of one chapter, let alone two’ (198); but that is exactly what 
he dedicates to this inconsequential matter.20 Elsewhere, similarly, 
he describes in (relative) detail an occasion on which he did not end 
up poisoning some stray dogs (194). Yet when Capitu eventually dies, 
this tragic event, which should really dominate the conclusion, is only 
afforded a parenthetical sentence or two. And the description we are 
given of Ezequiel’s death, a couple of pages later, is equally concise: 
‘[He] died of a typhoid fever,’ we learn, ‘and was buried in the vicinity of 
Jerusalem’ (242). These misjudged anisochronies – whereby an episode 
of minimal significance, or none whatsoever, is afforded a dispro-
portionate share of the discourse, while a crucial occurrence (such 
as Capitu’s premature demise) is passed over as quickly as possible 
– provide compelling evidence of Bento’s deteriorating psycho-
logical state. Like the aforementioned anachronies, they also serve to 
emphasize the discursivity of the narrative, and the extent to which 
that discourse has misrecognized, and ultimately distorted, the reality 
of the story it is telling. But these anisochronies do something else as 
well. They demonstrate quite clearly the way in which the discourse 
has internalized many of the qualities that Roberto Schwarz associates 
with the liberal values that were so thoroughly discredited during the 
Segundo Reinado. If you remember, as a consequence of their incompat-
ibility with the social reality of the period, these ideologies assumed, 
in Schwarz’s words, ‘an aura of the gratuitous, the incongruous, and the 
iniquitous’ (Master 22). And precisely the same thing could be said of 
 20 It is particularly ironic that Bento should belabour this issue given his 
own tendency, as narrator, to defy the convention of the ‘perfect memory’ 
(Romberg 98) – thus undermining still further his narratorial credibility. 
‘[T]here is only one way of putting one’s essence onto paper,’ he says in 
Chapter LXVIII, ‘and that is by telling it all, the good and the bad … For 
example, now that I have recounted a sin, I would happily tell the story of 
some good deed done at that time, if I could remember one, but I can’t; 
[so] it can wait for a better opportunity’ (128–29).
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the discourse in Dom Casmurro. When it describes the non-poisoning 
of a stray dog, it becomes gratuitous. When it dedicates two whole 
chapters to a song that has not been heard for forty years, it becomes 
incongruous. And when it reduces the death of this unjustly maligned 
woman to a single declarative utterance (‘she was dead and buried’), it 
becomes deeply iniquitous.
IV
At the beginning of this chapter, I described some of the characteristic 
features of the early nineteenth-century Bildungsroman. According to 
Franco Moretti, many such narratives establish a tangible distinction 
between illusion and reality, with the former occupying the level of 
story and the latter occupying the level of discourse. In the pages that 
followed, I suggested that Dom Casmurro reverses this dynamic – reality 
being associated with the world of the story, while the discourse (i.e., 
Bento’s narration) assumes an increasingly delusional quality. Having 
reached the end of the chapter, I would like to return, for a moment, 
to the subject of the Bildungsroman. As the classic Bildungsroman 
concludes, the hero typically manages to reconcile the competing 
imperatives of self and society, autonomy and interdependence, the 
private and the public – and it is this moment of reconciliation, or 
synthesis, that completes his or her transition from youth to maturity. 
In early examples of the genre, Moretti argues, a state of maturity 
could be achieved within the world of the story; but by the time we 
reach Balzac, in the 1830s, this traditional generic objective is no longer 
available to the characters themselves, having migrated instead to the 
‘disembodied world of the narrator’s discourse’ (Way 140). And what of 
Machado’s Dom Casmurro? In this case, unfortunately, we can find no 
‘maturity’ at all, either in the world of the story or that of the discourse; 
for if such maturity is to be associated with the repudiation of illusion 
and the reconciliation of opposites, if it involves a ‘formative encounter 
with reality’ (Moretti, Way 93), then it is clearly something that Bento 
has failed to achieve.21
 21 We could usefully compare Bento, in this regard, to one of Stendhal’s 
heroes. During the Bourbon Restoration (1814–30), France, like imperial 
Brazil, was a place of contradiction and incongruity. Everything, Moretti 
writes, was ‘divide[d] in two, each value [was] opposed by one of equal 
importance.’ And as a consequence of these sociocultural circumstances, 
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The evidence of this failure can be easily summarized. For a start, 
at the very foundation of the social structure, we have the conflict 
between the deplorable reality of slavery and the liberal ideologies 
to which the élite ‘officially’ subscribe. In order to live with this 
fundamental contradiction, they are obliged to render the true source 
of their privilege invisible – and this distortion of reality in the public 
sphere, I have argued, eventually penetrates the private sphere, where 
in Dom Casmurro it takes the form of a pathological ‘romantic’ jealousy. 
Here, too, we encounter acute discrepancies between reality and 
representation, ontology and epistemology; and these discrepancies, 
these irreconcilable opposites, ultimately infiltrate the structure of the 
narrative itself, creating a corresponding disjuncture between story and 
discourse. The two narratological examples I gave of this disjuncture – 
the strategies of anachrony and anisochrony – allow our argument to 
trace a full circle, for in this regard the discourse comes to resemble 
the ‘illegitimate’ liberal principles we discussed at the very beginning. 
On the one hand, that is to say, we have the social reality of the story 
itself, while on the other, we have a discursive structure that rapidly 
assumes ‘an aura of the gratuitous, the incongruous, and the iniquitous’ 
(Schwarz, Master 22).
In the classic Bildungsroman, as mentioned above, the hero is 
eventually able to reconcile these various incongruities and, in so doing, 
achieve a state of maturity – but not our Bento. Here, the maturity that 
serves as the primary generic objective of the Bildungsroman does not 
simply migrate from the world of the story to that of the discourse, 
as it does in Balzac (and arguably in Stendhal); it abandons the narrative 
altogether. And so we are left at the end of the novel with a proliferation 
of unresolved opposites: social reality versus liberal ideology, domestic 
fidelity versus pathological jealousy, and the logic of story versus the 
logic of discourse. Furthermore, the fact that none of these disparities 
have been resolved (or even recognized) by Bento constitutes another 
departure from the trajectory of the classic Bildungsroman, which 
typically follows the hero as he or she moves from a state of individual 
ignorance to one of social knowledge. In the final pages of Dom Casmurro, 
however, it becomes clear that our protagonist is just as deluded as he 
ever was (if not more so), and rather than finding his place in society, 
Stendhal abandoned ‘any idea of [dialectical] synthesis.’ Instead of ‘toning 
down the discordances and resolving the dilemmas’ of Restoration society, 
he chose (like Machado) to ‘accentuate the contradictions and even … the 
absurdity of [his] subject matter’ (Way 76).
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like the hero of a traditional Bildungsroman, he has retreated into a 
state of almost complete isolation. ‘I live alone,’ he says, and ‘go out 
little’; and on those rare occasions when he does leave the house, he 
‘seldom converse[s]’ (4–6) with anyone. In short, we are told, Bento now 
‘live[s] at a distance’ from the world and has ‘tried to make people forget 
[him]’ (238). But why should he have chosen to live like this? Why has he 
suddenly developed these agoraphobic tendencies? It is, I would argue, 
yet another way of avoiding or disregarding reality – a strategy that 
allows him to nullify the various discrepancies that we have addressed 
in this chapter. By retreating into silence and solitude, by rejecting the 
company of others, Bento is able to ignore the true nature of his social, 
domestic, and diegetic circumstances. He is able to turn away from the 
fundamental incongruities of his age, from the pathological jealousy 
that has destroyed his own life, and from the profound disparities that 
have disfigured the very narrative he has just finished writing.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
Boredom 
Upamanyu Chatterjee’s  
English, August: An Indian Story 
Boredom
The only obligation to which in advance we may hold a 
novel … is that it be interesting.
Henry James, ‘The Art of Fiction,’ 1884
What seems beautiful to me, what I should like to write, is a 
book about nothing.
Gustave Flaubert, Letter to Louise Colet, 16 January 1852
I
In the first chapter of Flaubert’s Sentimental Education (1869), the novel’s protagonist, Frédéric Moreau, takes a leisurely boat trip up the Seine. 
‘At every bend of the river,’ we are told, ‘the same curtain of pale poplars 
came into view. The countryside was deserted. Some little white clouds 
hung motionless in the sky, and a vague sense of boredom seemed to 
make the boat move more slowly and the passengers look even more 
insignificant than before’ (17). As Peter Brooks has observed, this is 
hardly the most auspicious of opening sequences, for ‘we as readers 
expect that voyages will lead somewhere, and that the voyagers who 
fare forth on them will make not only their goal but their experience 
along the way the source of significance.’ Indeed, ‘[t]o be told that we 
are scarcely advancing, in the company of the insignificant, makes us 
wonder why we are to bother at all with a five-hundred-page novel’ 
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(Reading 178). At certain junctures, readers of Upamanyu Chatterjee’s 
English, August: An Indian Story (1988) may be inclined to ask themselves 
the same thing. Insofar as it could be said to ‘do’ anything at all, the 
novel chronicles the experiences of a young civil servant, Agastya Sen, 
who has been posted to the provincial town of Madna for a year’s 
administrative training. But if the reader is expecting anything to 
happen during this purgatorial year in the provinces, if they are antici-
pating the usual pleasures of an unfolding narrative, they are likely to 
be sorely disappointed. Right from the outset, we are informed that 
‘[t]he district life that [Agastya] lived and saw was the official life, 
deadly dull’ (28). In the words of another civil service employee, ‘It’s 
sick [here], there’s no one to talk to, no place to go, nothing to do, just 
come back to your room after office, get drunk, feel lonely, and jerk off’ 
(88–89). And this is precisely what our hero does for one calendar year 
and 322 pages: masturbate, smoke marijuana, read Marcus Aurelius, 
and lie in bed ‘staring blankly up at the ceiling’ (77). Granted, he 
completes his training too, but these bureaucratic duties also turn 
out to be ‘ineffably dull’ (63) and inconsequential – stifling whatever 
proairetic possibilities the narrative may inadvertently generate as it 
inches toward its conclusion.
So where does all this leave us as readers? What are we supposed 
to make of a novel with such pronounced ‘anti-proairetic’ tendencies, 
one that gives absolute precedence to the boredom and banality of the 
non-occurrence? Where do these tendencies originate, and what impact 
do they ultimately have on the narrative’s production of meaning? These 
are some of the questions that I shall seek to address in the present 
chapter. I will begin by arguing that the bureaucratic procedures of 
the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) are primarily responsible for 
generating the novel’s entropic tendencies. This entropy, I would like 
to suggest, eventually leaks into the structure of the narrative itself, 
provoking a crisis of meaning and disruption of desire that very nearly 
brings it to the point of total collapse. Typically, as Leo Bersani writes, 
realism is supposed to do everything it can to achieve a ‘commanding 
structure of significance’ (53) and a full and final predication of meaning; 
but the leakage of negative affect in this case threatens to undermine 
both of these traditional generic imperatives. As the energy that drives 
the narrative forward dissipates, Agastya enters into a ‘purely iterative 
existence … where the direction and movement of plot appear to be 
finished’ (Brooks, Reading 122). Under these circumstances, to narrate 
one day is to narrate every day, and to narrate every day is to narrate 
the same day innumerable times – thus giving rise to the threat of 
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interminability and the infinite deferral of meaning. In other words, I 
shall argue, by replicating the dilatory drag of bureaucratic procedure, 
the narrative itself internalizes many of the qualities that we tend to 
associate with the IAS: inefficiency, repetition, redundancy, intermi-
nability, and, above all, a uniquely bureaucratic combination of the 
‘bewildering and [the] boring’ (Chatterjee 35).
II
At the time of independence in 1947, there was considerable debate in 
India as to whether the colonial bureaucratic apparatus, known as the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS), should be replaced by a central or provincial 
civil service. Many political representatives from the provinces favoured 
a decentralized bureaucracy that would allow for greater regional 
autonomy.1 However, Vallabhbhai Patel, the country’s first deputy prime 
minister, was convinced that a uniform administrative structure would 
discourage ‘provincial susceptibilities’ and provide a necessary counter-
balance to the centrifugal forces that were believed to be threatening 
national unity. He therefore proposed that an ‘all-India administrative 
service’ should be established, one that would be ‘efficient, impartial, 
and free from local or communal bias, party allegiance or political 
influence’ (qtd. in Tummala 36). And so, in November 1949, having been 
ratified in Article 312 of the Indian Constitution, the IAS officially came 
into being.
Despite Patel’s promises, however, the IAS would soon become 
notorious for its petty corruption, inefficiency, and ‘rule-bound 
incompetence’ (Nandy, ‘Culture’ 68) – a reputation it carries, with some 
justice, to this day. As one Indian government report issued in 2008 
observes,
For the common man [in India], bureaucracy denotes routine and 
repetitive procedures, paper work and delays. This, despite the 
fact that the Government and bureaucracy exist to facilitate the 
citizens in the rightful pursuit of their legal activities. Rigidities of 
the system, over-centralization of powers, highly hierarchical … 
functioning with a large number of intermediary levels delaying [the] 
 1 In 1946, for instance, Sir Khizar Hayat Khan, the premier of Punjab, 
declared that ‘Punjab is one of those provinces which would prefer to 
have a superior service of their own instead of an all-India administrative 
service’ (qtd. in Maheshwari 298).
Affective Disorders
108
finalization of any decision, divorce of authority from accountability 
and the tendency towards micromanagement have led to a structure 
in which form is more important than substance and procedures are 
valued over end results and outcomes. (Government of India 365)
The key sentence here, for our purposes, is the first one, which could 
also serve as a useful summary of Chatterjee’s novel. Routine, repetitive 
procedures, and delays – these are the bureaucratic features around 
which English, August is structured and out of which the narrative’s 
organizing quality of feeling emerges. For a start, everybody in the 
novel seems to be waiting for something. Whenever Agastya enters a 
government building, his eyes are drawn to the lines of people waiting 
patiently outside: ‘On the left, [he could see] the old and shabby office 
buildings that had ignored all the decades of an undramatic history. The 
flags, patient in the heat … The people who waited for Government to 
be kind to them, in white dhoti, kurta and napkin’ (54). Then there are 
the government employees themselves, many of whom, ‘if posted away 
from home,’ are simply biding their time until they are ‘transferred to a 
[more] congenial place’ (28). And of course, like everybody else, Agastya 
is also waiting: sitting through interminable meetings, staring blankly 
up at the ceiling, reading his Marcus Aurelius, and killing time until his 
year of training is complete.
The German term for boredom, Langeweile (literally, ‘long while’), 
nicely encapsulates the sense of temporal ‘elongation’ that is typical 
of this particular affective state. ‘In boredom,’ Heidegger writes, ‘the 
while [Weile] becomes long [lang] … The lengthening of the while is the 
expansion of the temporal horizon, whose expansion does not bring Dasein 
liberation or unburden it, but precisely the converse in oppressing it 
with its expanse’ (Fundamental 152–53). Although we may feel this 
‘lengthening of the while’ under a range of circumstances (such as 
attending a faculty meeting or listening to John Cage’s 4’33”), it is most 
commonly associated with the experience of waiting. In his 1929–30 
lecture series at the University of Freiburg, entitled ‘The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics,’ Heidegger structured his discussion of 
boredom around the following scenario:
We are sitting … in the tasteless station of some lonely minor railway. 
It is four hours until the next train arrives. The district is uninspiring. 
We do have a book in our rucksack, though – shall we read? No. Or 
think through a problem, some question? We are unable to. We read 
the timetables or study the table giving the various distances from 
this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with 
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at all. We look at the clock – only a quarter of an hour has gone by. 
Then we go out onto the local road. We walk up and down, just to 
have something to do. But it is no use. Then we count the trees along 
the road, look at our watch again – exactly five minutes since we last 
looked at it. Fed up with walking back and forth, we sit down on a 
stone, draw all kinds of figures in the sand, and in so doing catch 
ourselves looking at our watch yet again – half an hour – and so on. 
(Fundamental 93)
This example of boredom could well have been taken from the pages of 
English, August, for the novel itself is really just one long description of 
waiting, of the oppressive ‘expansion’ of time and its various affective 
consequences.2 As the days drift by, Agastya gradually lapses into 
a state of debilitating apathy and indifference: ‘When he woke up 
he hardly heard the sounds of the morning. On some afternoons he 
couldn’t leave the bed even to roll a smoke … He wanted nothing, 
it seemed – only a peace, but that was too pompous a word’ (152). 
Although he occasionally contemplates suicide, even ‘looking for that 
kind of a cessation’ (153) requires more energy and motivation than he 
currently possesses. For Agastya, in this lethargic state, nothing seems 
capable of carrying meaning or value, and as a consequence, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for him to take an interest in anything at all. The 
world, as Reinhard Kuhn writes in his classic study of ennui in Western 
literature, has been ‘emptied of its significance. Everything is seen as if 
filtered through a screen; [and] what is filtered out and lost is precisely 
the element that gives meaning to existence’ (12).3 In a word, Agastya 
is bored, terribly bored, and this affective quality will have a profound 
influence over the narrative in which he figures – draining it too of its 
meaning, its energy, and its desire.
 2 For more on the connection between waiting, ‘prolonged time,’ and 
boredom, see Majumdar 121–23; and for an insightful ethnographic 
analysis of waiting as a social, cultural, and political practice among the 
middle classes in Uttar Pradesh, see Jeffrey.
 3 Kuhn is not alone in emphasizing the deprivation of meaning that we 
experience when we are bored. In her cultural history of the relationship 
between boredom and European modernity, for example, Elizabeth 
S. Goodstein describes boredom as ‘an experience without qualities, [a] 
quotidian crisis of meaning’ (1); and in his philosophical analysis of the 
subject, Lars Svendsen argues that boredom can be understood as ‘a 




If you remember, we have discussed the subject of narrative desire 
before, in Chapter 2, where I argued that A Suitable Boy forces the reader 
to renounce (or at least moderate) his or her desire for meaning and 
closure. In order to make this argument, I cited Peter Brooks, whose 
Reading for the Plot explores the way in which narratives both ‘arouse 
and make use of desire as [a] dynamic of signification’ (37). According 
to Brooks, every narrative possesses an internal energy that drives it 
forward, ‘connecting beginning and end across the middle and making 
of that middle – what we read through – a field of force’ (47). This 
energy, he suggests, is ultimately generated by a ‘dynamic of desire’ 
(38): ‘the desire to wrest beginnings and ends from the uninterrupted 
flow of middles, from temporality itself; the search for that significant 
closure that would illuminate the sense of an existence, the meaning 
of life’ (140). In English, August, however, as Brooks notes of Sentimental 
Education, ‘there seems to be a problem of will,’ an inability on the 
part of ‘the hero to invest the world and his career with coherent and 
sustained desire’ (175). Indeed, to an even greater degree than Frédéric 
Moreau, Agastya has lost the capacity to feel desire for anything, so 
deeply boring does he find his life in the provinces. It is not unusual 
that this should be the case, either, for as Patricia Meyer Spacks 
observes, boredom is a feeling that by its very nature ‘opposes’ desire:
More precisely than repulsion, the negative form of desire, 
[boredom] constitutes desire’s antithesis, assuring its victim of the 
utter impossibility of wishing for anything at all. The sufferer from 
boredom finds it impossible to invest fully in any action, to believe 
any action worth the effort of involvement … Why bother? The 
hope of something new may dimly remain … But a sense of futility 
precedes and forestalls endeavor. (259)4
As Chatterjee’s novel progresses, this absence of desire gradually enters 
the narrative itself, inhibiting its progress, making of its middle not 
a field of force but a field of entropy and indolence. Or to put it 
another way, if we agree that boredom is the absence of desire (as 
Schopenhauer, for one, does), then English, August could be described 
not as a boring novel so much as a bored one – lacking the desire to 
 4 Similarly, in a 1934 essay, the psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel defined 
boredom as ‘an unpleasurable experience of a lack of impulse’ (292); and 
in a lecture delivered at the Collège de France in February 1980, Roland 




move toward its own conclusion, to engineer its own closure, and thus 
achieve a final discharge of meaning.5 In fact, at various junctures, the 
narrative almost comes to a total standstill. Take the following passage, 
for example, in which Agastya arrives back in Madna after a brief trip 
to Delhi:
[H]e unpacked slowly. He put back on the shelf the Gita, Marcus 
Aurelius, and his diary. He had hardly remembered them on his 
holiday … He trimmed his beard slowly, with care. The lizards 
seemed to have multiplied greatly in his absence. The late-afternoon 
sun touched the cassettes on the table. He browsed through his 
diary. Now he had nothing to record. He picked up the Madna District 
Gazetteer from beside his canvas shoes on the bottom shelf. He read 
a paragraph or two, but the words didn’t register. He then lay down 
to watch the ceiling. (200)
Agastya has nothing to record here; and nor, it would seem, does the 
novel’s narrator. At this point, the narrative has almost completely 
stalled, lapsing into a series of insignificant micro-occurrences (‘He 
trimmed his beard … He browsed through his diary … He picked 
up the Madna District Gazetteer,’ etc.). Although each of these actions 
keeps the narrative alive, as it were, by sustaining its semantic tension, 
they do very little to carry it forward – never quite generating enough 
energy to move beyond the self-enclosed, self-foreclosing parameters 
of the paratactic utterance.6
In S/Z, Roland Barthes uses the term ‘proairetic’ to describe the logical 
sequences of action and behaviour that structure literary narratives 
(18–20). According to Barthes, the proairetic code is responsible (along 
with the hermeneutic code) for maintaining our interest in a story, for 
creating a kind of epistemophilia, a desire to know what the outcome 
of any narrative sequence will be. If a character does something (writes 
a love letter, say, or goes on a journey), the proairetic code determines 
that this action will have consequences of some kind, and one of the 
 5 ‘[L]ife,’ Schopenhauer writes, ‘swings like a pendulum to and fro between 
[desire] and boredom’ (312).
 6 One may be reminded here of Jean-Paul Sartre’s stylistic analysis of Albert 
Camus’ The Stranger, in which he argues that ‘[e]ach sentence refuses to 
exploit the momentum accumulated by preceding ones. Each is a new 
beginning. Each is like a snapshot of a gesture or object’ (‘Camus’ 35). In 
other words, Sartre writes, ‘the sentence has frozen … Instead of acting 




reasons we continue reading is to find out what these consequences 
might be, to find out just how the narrative sequence initiated by this 
action will ultimately be resolved. Needless to say, things do happen 
in English, August, narrative sequences are initiated, but these actions 
and the consequences they produce very rarely coalesce into anything 
resembling a ‘plot’ – and thus, like the remote locality to which Agastya 
has been posted, the narrative itself eventually assumes the ‘enduring 
contours of underdevelopment’ (278). In the passage cited above, for 
instance, Agastya initiates a proairetic sequence that we might label 
‘unpacking,’ and in due course this sequence reaches its conclusion, 
but it does so almost imperceptibly, generating very little interest or 
narrative ‘desire’ in the reader, and discharging a minimal degree of 
meaning or significance within the narrative. We simply do not care 
about the outcome of such sequences, and in this respect, one could 
argue, the proairetic code has failed in its plot-making duties – or more 
precisely, perhaps, it has been subject to a process of attenuation that 
severely impedes the novel’s teleological trajectory, its linear progress 
toward a ‘desirable’ and revelatory ending.
Over the course of the novel, Agastya’s life becomes increasingly 
dominated by routine, further disrupting the narrative’s trajectory. 
Everything he does, he does repeatedly, ritually, day in and day out, 
until it is not just the energy of the narrative that comes under threat 
but its very narratability – for as Barthes observes, ‘to repeat excessively 
is to enter into loss, into the zero of the signified’ (Pleasure 41).7 Early in 
the novel, we are offered an entirely iterative account of Agastya’s daily 
routine, as if the narrator were compressing a year of diary entries into 
a single chapter of twelve pages (75–86). Here are just a few examples:
On most days, the [official] jeep would come for him between 
eleven and twelve … The driver of the jeep … was usually unable to 
 7 With reference to Madame Bovary, Mikhail Bakhtin describes a similar kind 
of provincial ‘chronotope’ associated with ‘cyclical everyday time.’ In the 
provincial town or village, he writes, ‘there are no events, only “doings” 
that constantly repeat themselves. Time here has no advancing historical 
movement; it moves rather in narrow circles: the circle of the day, of the 
week, of the month, of a person’s entire life. A day is just a day, a year is 
just a year – a life is just a life. Day in, day out the same round of activities 
are repeated, the same topics of conversation, the same words and so 
forth … Time here is without event and therefore almost seems to stand 
still. Here there are no “meetings,” no “partings.” It is a viscous and sticky 
time that drags itself slowly through space’ (247–48).
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differentiate one district office from another. So, for almost an hour 
on some of the (good) days, he would drive Agastya around the town, 
just trying to locate an office. (82)
[During the afternoon] he could doze a little … daydream, fantasize, 
think of his past, reorganize it, try to force out of it a pattern, 
masturbate without joy, sometimes smoke some marijuana, read 
a little Marcus Aurelius, or just lie down and think of the sun 
shrivelling up the world outside. (84–85)
On most nights that he didn’t eat with the Collector, dinner was 
early, at about eight, because Vasant liked to sleep early. (85)
In Madna [Agastya] could never take sleep for granted. He would 
repeat the activities of the afternoon, thinking that for more than 
twenty years he had always slept well, except for one or two nights 
when excitement had kept him awake … But in Madna he seemed 
to have appalled sleep. When he finally dropped off, it was out of a 
weariness even with despair. (86) 
‘Thus,’ the chapter concludes, ‘he played out, in one day, one kind 
of life of the lonely’ (86). At this point, the narrative has lapsed, 
like Agastya himself, into a purely iterative state.8 Every act that is 
narrated carries an implied et cetera, indicating its status as plural, 
gesturing toward the infinite series of (largely identical) occurrences 
that lies behind it. Under these circumstances, as I suggested earlier, 
to narrate one day is to narrate every day, and to narrate every day 
is to narrate the same day innumerable times – for there is no way 
of distinguishing between these quotidian episodes, no flashes of 
significance or uniqueness that will allow us to identify one day as 
being antecedent or subsequent to any other day. Ordinarily, as Gérard 
Genette points out, ‘iterative sections are almost always functionally 
subordinate to singulative scenes, for which the iterative sections 
provide a sort of informative frame or background … Like description, 
 8 The distinction I am making here, following Gérard Genette, is between 
singulative narration (‘where the singularness of the narrative statement 
corresponds to the singularness of the narrated event’ [114]) and iterative 
narration (‘where a single narrative utterance takes upon itself several 
occurrences together of the same event’ [116]). Genette offers the 
statement ‘Yesterday, I went to bed early’ (114) as an example of the 
former; and to demonstrate the latter, he invokes the famous opening line 




in the traditional novel the iterative narrative is at the service of the 
narrative “as such,” which is the singulative narrative’ (116–17). In 
English, August, by contrast, the iterative dimension of the narrative is 
consistently foregrounded – and in places even actively privileged over 
the singulative. Furthermore, although iterative passages are usually 
to be found embedded within larger singulative narratives, in this case 
the reverse is true. Here, as Genette writes of Proust, ‘the singulative 
itself is to some extent integrated into the iterative, compelled to serve 
and illustrate it, positively or negatively, either by respecting its code 
or by transgressing it, which is another way of manifesting it’ (140). In 
this early chapter of Chatterjee’s novel, then, we find the singulative 
embedded anecdotally within the iterative – liberating the latter from 
its functional dependence on the former, reducing the capacity of the 
narrative to move beyond the ‘always,’ the ‘every day,’ the ‘usually,’ and 
thus replicating, once more, the dilatory and entropic qualities of the 
bureaucratic apparatus.
I have been arguing so far that the incorporation of these bureaucratic 
features into the structure of English, August leads to the diminution of 
the narrative’s proairetic code and the privileging, in places, of the 
iterative over the singulative. Like Agastya, that is to say, Chatterjee’s 
novel appears to have run out of energy – not the energy to continue 
but the energy to conclude, to achieve ‘full predication of the narrative 
sentence [and] final plenitude of meaning’ (Brooks, Reading 314). And 
it is this entropic quality, I would like to suggest, this failure to move 
forward, that ultimately creates the threat of interminability in the 
novel, giving rise to the very real possibility that it may never achieve 
the retrospective significance that traditionally accompanies narrative 
closure.9
For Barthes, every narrative produces a ‘dilatory area’ (S/Z 75), 
a zone filled with delays and stoppages, through which we must 
proceed in order to reach the end; but in English, August, this area 
seems to be extended indefinitely, perpetually deferring the final 
discharge of meaning. Indeed, the novel itself demonstrates no real 
desire to achieve closure, as ‘looking for that kind of a cessation’ also 
involves ‘too much effort’ (153). Hence the threat of interminability, 
 9 As Wolf Lepenies observes, such interminability is also a typical attribute 
of the boring. ‘When we are bored,’ he writes, ‘time grows long – it cannot 
be filled or used up; and finally, time is “killed” when we notice that it 
seems endless. Consequently, boredom appears to be eternal monotony, 
always the same, a gaping void’ (87).
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the threat that the narrative we are reading may be incapable of 
summoning the energy required to terminate itself and will instead 
drift on endlessly, oblivious to our need for resolution, like the bureau-
cratic procedures it replicates. At various junctures throughout the 
novel, Agastya appears to sense this threat of interminability. More 
than once, for instance, he cites the following line from the Bhagavad 
Gita: ‘[M]any-branched and endless are the thoughts of the man who 
lacks determination’ (153).10 And in one of the novel’s more mystical 
passages, he describes his life as being characterized by ‘[m]ovement 
without purpose, an endless ebb and flow, from one world to another.’ 
Although he struggles to impose order and patterns of meaning 
onto this existence, Agastya finally recognizes the futility of longing 
‘for repose through the mastering of chaos’ (311) – understanding, 
perhaps, that the narrative he occupies is simply not equipped to 
provide this kind of quiescence.
As readers, of course, we are always aware that the threat of linear 
interminability will never be realized, for the novel is quite clearly 
finite: we can see the end approaching as we turn the pages. But the 
possibility of circular interminability does surface in two specific places 
within the narrative, creating a genuine threat of discursive rupture. 
The novel’s opening lines read as follows: ‘Through the windshield they 
watched the wide silent road, so well-lit and dead. New Delhi, one in 
the morning, a stray dog flashed across the road, sensing prey’ (5). Some 
time later – 164 pages, to be precise – Agastya hears one of Tagore’s 
songs playing on the stereo, and he is reminded of that long-ago night 
in Delhi: ‘[T]hey had sat in the car outside Dhrubo’s flat, watching 
the wide silent road through the windshield at one in the morning; a 
stray dog had at one moment flashed across the road, sensing prey’ 
(169). This recollection is significant, for by beginning to narrate once 
more the novel we are reading, by repeating its opening lines, Agastya 
inadvertently raises the spectre of interminability – the possibility that 
he may simply continue narrating, rehearsing the story we have already 
read, until he reaches the point of recollection a second time and is 
forced to start over again from the beginning. The danger represented 
by this narrative circularity is perhaps best articulated by Borges in his 
justly celebrated analysis of The Arabian Nights:
 10 The line Agastya is quoting here comes from shloka (verse) 41 of Chapter 2, 
which reads in its entirety: ‘The follower of this path has one thought, and 
this is the End of his determination. But many-branched and endless are 
the thoughts of the man who lacks determination’ (13).
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The necessity of completing a thousand and one sections obliged 
the copyists of the work to make all manner of interpolations. None 
is more perturbing than that of the six hundred and second night, 
magical among all nights. On that night, the king hears from the 
queen his own story. He hears the beginning of the story, which 
comprises all the others and also – monstrously – itself. Does the 
reader clearly grasp the vast possibility of this interpolation, the 
curious danger? That the queen may persist and the motionless king 
hear forever the truncated story of the Thousand and One Nights, now 
infinite and circular. (195)
To identify such a danger in English, August would leave one vulnerable to 
the charge of over-reading were it not for the fact that Agastya himself 
raises this very possibility just prior to the recollection described 
above. In the novel’s opening pages, on the train to Madna, he had been 
rudely interrogated by another passenger: ‘Agastya? What kind of name 
is Agastya? … You are IAS? You don’t look like an IAS officer … You 
don’t even look Bengali’ (9). And during a brief visit to Delhi some time 
later, he is tormented by the possibility that his return to Madna will 
replicate every last detail of this inaugural journey: ‘[I]n nine days he 
would be packing again and saying bye to his uncle,’ and then ‘someone 
on the train would again ask him to categorize himself, would not 
believe that he was what he was, and would never have heard of the 
name Agastya’ (160). What we have here is not a simple case of déjà vu, 
but something far more disconcerting: the possibility of déjà vécu – an 
encounter with the ‘already lived.’ In other words, the threat of intermi-
nability has shifted from the level of the discourse (the telling of the 
story) to the intradiegetic world created by the discourse (the ‘living’ 
of the story); and that is what makes it possible for a character located 
within this universe to have some intimation, however vague, of the 
ontological danger he faces.
Over the years, as the government itself concedes, such intermi-
nability has come to be regarded as another typical feature of Indian 
bureaucracy. Near the end of the novel, Agastya is sent for further 
training to a remote ‘tribal’ locality, where he quickly recognizes the 
strategic value of procrastination and delay. As Block Development 
Officer for the district, he is required to accept or reject all manner of 
‘[p]etitions, applications, [and] requests’ (279); and those he is unable 
to resolve one way or the other are simply directed elsewhere by 
his subordinates: ‘Agastya could see these rejected petitions moving 
from one ignorant official to another unhelpful one, the black creases 
on each petition marking its tortuous journey’ (277). Although this 
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all seems mystifying at first, over time he comes to understand the 
bureaucratic logic, the ‘psychology of evasion’ (Dwivedi and Jain 209), 
informing such procedures.11 ‘Eventually,’ we are told,
he learnt to see the pattern, how an incomprehensibility in the post 
became, in a few weeks (things moved even more slowly in Jompanna 
than in Madna), an incomprehensibility in a file – the passage of a 
petition, or a request for redress, from desk to desk, gathering around 
it, like flesh around a kernel, comment and counter-comment, and 
irrelevant comment, till it was fat enough to be offal for the rats in 
the office cupboards. (281)12
This last passage provides a good example, in miniature, of the way 
in which the dilatory tendencies of the bureaucratic process gradually 
enter into the very tissue of the narrative. In this particular case, the 
representation of interminability is re-enacted formally through the 
steady accretion of subordinate clauses, so that the sentence itself, 
like the petition it describes, takes on additional layers of unnecessary 
commentary as it progresses. And by the time it finally achieves full 
predication and closure, we as readers have been made to endure a 
similarly ‘tortuous’ journey along the corridors of the Collectorate, 
gaining experience of these superfluities, hindrances, and delays 
through their various syntactical correlatives. In an especially incisive 
 11 In the article from which this phrase is derived, O.P. Dwivedi and R.B. Jain 
offer a fierce critique of ‘bureaucratic morality’ in India, arguing that the 
IAS is characterized by ‘excessive self-importance, indifference towards 
the feelings or the convenience of individuals and by an obsession with the 
binding and inflexible authority of departmental decisions, precedents, 
arrangements or forms, regardless of how badly or with what injustice 
they work in individual cases’ (208).
 12 According to Matthew S. Hull, writing on Pakistani bureaucracy, the 
circulation of files is a strategy by which the individual functionary is 
able to avoid taking responsibility for any given case. ‘The circulation of 
the file,’ he writes, ‘precipitates a multiparty interaction through which 
authorship and therefore agency … is distributed over a larger and larger 
network of functionaries. The achievement of movement up and down 
the chain of command and laterally to other departments produces on 
the note sheet a representation of collective agency’ (138). By adopting 
these circulatory practices, Hull concludes, ‘functionaries try to maximize 
the mediations of their actions and writings, transforming the procedures 
designed to specify responsibility into the means to disperse it’ (150). For 
a discussion of the role of the form, the file, and the register in Indian 
bureaucratic life, see Gupta 144–49.
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reading of Bleak House (1852–53), D.A. Miller has suggested that Dickens’ 
representation of the Court of Chancery reproduces, in its length 
and complexity, some of the salient characteristics of the emerging 
Victorian state bureaucracy. The novel’s ‘suspension of teleology,’ he 
argues, is exemplary of an entire ‘social sphere that seems to run on 
the principle of a purposiveness without purpose’ (Novel 86).13 Indeed, 
for Miller, the Victorian novel as a whole typically ‘establishes a little 
bureaucracy of its own, generating an immense amount of paperwork 
and both physically and mentally sending its readers here, there, 
backward and forward, like the circumlocutory agencies that Dickens 
satirizes’ (88–89). To some degree, I believe, the same thing could be 
said of English, August, which also makes of itself a ‘little bureaucracy’ 
and operates on a principle of ‘purposiveness without purpose.’ 
(Remember that phrase: ‘[m]ovement without purpose’ [Chatterjee 
311].) Moreover, as Miller suggests, in the process of reading such a 
novel we are inevitably familiarized with the affective consequences 
of bureaucracy and schooled in the ‘appropriate’ response to its 
procedures. We learn to wait patiently – to suspend teleology and 
desire, to tolerate perpetually deferred outcomes, and to reconcile 
ourselves to the ‘lengthening of the while’ (Heidegger, Fundamental 93). 
In short, like Agastya, we learn to be bored.
But this is a dangerous strategy for any narrative to employ, one 
that gives rise to a formidable discursive challenge. How is the author 
to make the boring interesting enough to keep us reading, but not 
so interesting that it should destroy the verisimilitude of the uninter-
esting? In order for English, August to succeed as a novel, it is crucial that 
we maintain some interest in its outcome and derive some degree of 
readerly pleasure from its diachronic unfolding; for as Miller observes 
of Bleak House, ‘were the novel itself ever to become as dreary [as the 
world it depicts], were it ever to cease making itself desirable, it would … 
by the same token cease to be read’ (Novel 85). Given its generic 
affinities, however, Chatterjee’s narrative is also compelled to convey 
the reality of the bureaucratic existence – the interminable meetings, 
the unnecessarily complicated and repetitive procedures, the endless 
paper trail of signatures and countersignatures – and by pursuing this 
objective, it inevitably diminishes its own readability. But not fatally so. 
 13 By using this phrase, Miller is of course evoking Kant, who, in the Critique 
of Judgement, claimed that the aesthetic category of the beautiful has as 




Chatterjee, I would argue, ultimately manages to accommodate these 
conflicting imperatives by bringing English, August as close as possible 
to ‘the absolute minimal condition of [the] interesting’ (Ngai, ‘Merely’ 
791), yet without completely destroying its ‘desirability’ as a narrative – 
doing just enough to keep us turning the pages, just enough to ensure 
the survival of the (realist) discourse, and no more.14
III
As I have suggested, the threat of interminability in literature is above all 
the threat of non-meaning, the threat that the narrative we are reading 
will fail to deliver the significance and coherence we traditionally 
expect from fictional discourse. ‘Meaning,’ the anthropologist Victor 
Turner writes, ‘is connected with the consummation of a process – it 
is bound up with termination … The meaning of any given factor in a 
process cannot be assessed until the whole process is past’ (97). Or to 
quote Peter Brooks once more,
The very possibility of meaning plotted through sequence and through 
time depends on the anticipated structuring force of the ending: the 
interminable would be the meaningless, and the lack of ending would 
jeopardize the beginning. We read the incidents of narration as 
‘promises and annunciations’ of final coherence … [A]cross the bulk 
of the as yet unread middle pages, the end calls to the beginning, 
transforms and enhances it. (Reading 93–94)
Simply put, it is primarily through endings, both anticipated and 
realized, that we seek to understand beginnings and middles. And that 
 14 Although the danger of boredom is particularly acute in this case, it is 
an affective state that underlies the production (and consumption) of all 
literature, however ‘interesting’ it may be. ‘The ideal dynamic between 
writing and reading,’ Patricia Meyer Spacks notes, ‘depends in part on 
boredom as displaced, unmentioned, and unmentionable possibility. The 
need to refute boredom’s deadening power impels the writer’s productivity 
and the reader’s engagement. In the best of all possible arrangements, an 
author’s energy and a reader’s reciprocate, establishing a “dialectics of 
desire” … But the implicit contract between creator and responder – 
the promise “I will interest you” corresponding to the demand “you will 
interest me” – remains, like other contracts, subject to default. The writer 




at least partially explains the ‘curious danger’ (Borges 195) of narrative 
interminability; for a novel with no ending would never be able to 
achieve final plenitude of meaning, would never be able to produce the 
‘commanding structure of significance’ (Bersani 53) that distinguishes 
the narrated from the unnarrated or the unnarratable.
Throughout English, August, Agastya struggles to derive some kind 
of meaning from his life in the provinces – a semblance of order that 
would make everything he experiences, all the disconnected trivialities 
and absurdities of bureaucratic existence, somehow converge and 
cohere. But of course it is not to be. Time and again, he is forced to 
confront, in Jonathan Culler’s words, ‘the discrepancy between meaning 
and experience’ (Flaubert 24). Nothing in his life makes sense, nothing 
matters, nothing satisfies – and so it is not particularly surprising that 
he should contemplate ending it all. ‘Sometimes,’ we learn,
he would lie in bed and remember Prashant, his schoolfriend who 
had been perfectly ordinary and likeable, but who had opted out, 
one June afternoon five years ago, by stepping into the path of a 
truck, to be minced into the melting tar of the VIP Road, leaving 
behind only a note saying that he was sorry. (153)
For Agastya, suicide represents the ‘ultimate release, the profoundest 
renunciation of one’s sentience’ (251–52). And that, I would contend, 
is precisely what he is hoping to achieve here: a total quiescence that 
would defy interminability and bestow retrospective significance on 
everything that has gone before. (On this subject, too, he cites his 
beloved Marcus Aurelius: ‘O, the consolation of being able to thrust 
aside and cast into oblivion every tiresome and intrusive impression, 
and in a trice be utterly at peace’ [153].15) Agastya’s suicidal tendencies 
are to be understood, then, both existentially and narratologically – 
for by terminating his own life, by achieving the ‘ultimate release,’ he 
would also terminate and give meaning to the novel we are reading. 
But apparently even this kind of conclusion requires ‘too much effort’ 
(153); and so, like the words in his diary, the narrative continues to 
‘trail aimlessly across the page’ (218), without any sense of direction 
or urgency.
Needless to say, Chatterjee’s novel does eventually run out of pages, 
but the ending, when it finally arrives, could hardly be considered an 
ending at all. Although the novel itself obviously comes to a conclusion 
 15 This line can be found in Meditations 5.2 (78).
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on page 322, in doing so, as we shall see, it refuses to provide the 
‘complex of narrative summations that would match … the external 
termination of [the] discourse with its internal closure’ (Miller, Novel 
90). It fails, in other words, to ensure that termination coincides with 
closure, that what finishes the narrative also resolves it. Furthermore, 
just when we are expecting the novel’s proairetic code to achieve a 
degree of resolution, however diminished or meagre, the discourse 
strives to jettison proairesis altogether by ‘externalizing’ it, by 
projecting it beyond the spatial and temporal parameters of the text 
we have before us.
I suggested earlier that something does keep us reading Chatterjee’s 
novel, something prevents us from simply giving up on it, and that 
something is the question of whether the narrative will sustain its 
anti-proairetic qualities to the end, or whether there will be a late 
flurry of action that retrospectively ‘energizes’ everything that has 
gone before. Essentially, the question we ask ourselves as we read is not 
what will happen in the end but whether anything will happen at all – 
whether the novel’s starved proairetic code will be capable of adequately 
resolving itself and thus producing a final discharge of meaning. But 
even this question does not generate too much suspense; and it is fairly 
predictable that it should turn out to be answered in the negative. 
Something does happen at the end of English, August, but it happens to 
someone else, somewhere else, and as readers we are offered only a 
fleeting, anecdotal glimpse of the kind of ‘endings’ taking place outside 
the spatial frame of the narrative. While visiting a remote village, 
Agastya hears some disturbing news about one of the novel’s peripheral 
characters, a forestry service officer who had recently been posted to 
another ‘very boring’ (294) location in the hinterland. ‘He abused the 
honour of the tribal woman who cooked for him,’ Agastya is told. ‘The 
men of her village were very angry. They visited [him] three nights 
ago, and surprised them both. In revenge, and as punishment, they cut 
off his arms’ (290). Thus, the most exciting event in the entire novel, 
indeed its most overtly novelistic event, is dispensed with in a mere two 
or three sentences, leaving us with the distinct impression that we may 
have been reading the wrong novel all along – or that the narrative has 
inadvertently taken the wrong character as its protagonist, and while 
we have been following Agastya’s trivial activities, something genuinely 
interesting and significant has been happening just around the corner. 
But it is obviously too late to do anything about it. This momentary 
glimpse of uninhibited proairesis soon fades, and before long we are 
back where we started, immersed in the quotidian banalities of our 
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hero’s life: ‘The rest of the months in Jompanna passed [with] the same 
routine, office and Rest House, two vegetarian meals a day, exercise 
on the three feet of jute carpet between bed and desk, in the evening 
[reading] files in his room to the music from the stalls’ (301).
And what of Agastya himself, how does his story conclude? Well, 
in this case the proairetic is projected beyond the narrative’s temporal 
frame, so that the novel closes by anticipating an event that has yet to 
occur, one that will take place only after the discourse itself has been 
terminated. We last see Agastya in a train on his way to Calcutta, where 
he will be staying with his father while he tries to decide what to do 
with his life. The novel’s final sentence reads as follows: ‘He watched the 
passing hinterland and looked forward to meeting his father’ (322). This 
moment of external prolepsis is particularly significant, for it ensures 
that the closure both Agastya and the reader have been seeking must 
once more be deferred, once more projected into the future.16 That 
the novel’s last sentence should anticipate something else, something 
located outside its chronological field, means that the termination 
of the discourse precedes (and thus precludes) closure – giving rise, 
yet again, to the threat of interminability. One might be reminded 
here, too, of Flaubert’s Sentimental Education, which also concludes by 
transgressing its own temporal boundaries. In the novel’s final scene, 
Frédéric Moreau and Deslauriers are reminiscing about a (frustrated) 
visit to a brothel they had made some years previously. ‘That was 
the happiest time we ever had,’ Frédéric says. ‘Yes,’ his friend replies, 
‘perhaps you’re right. That was the happiest time we ever had’ (419). 
And there the narrative concludes, invoking an event that, as Peter 
Brooks observes,
does not fall within the normal chronology of the novel, a moment 
presented at the very end that in fact predates the beginning. This 
striking analepsis … seems to say that everything we have read 
in this very long novel is somehow secondary to the unrecorded 
moment of three years before it began. It is as if the novel suddenly 
discovers that it began too late … Closure here also uncloses, 
suggesting that novels, like [psycho]analyses, may in essence be 
interminable. (Reading 211–12)
 16 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Genette divides prolepses (or anticipatory 
sequences) into ‘two classes, external and internal, depending on whether 
the point to which they reach is located outside or inside the temporal 
field of the [primary] narrative’ (61).
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As indicated above, the final sentence of English, August is also significant 
in that it serves to project the faltering proairetic code beyond the 
parameters of the narrative we have before us. Something may still 
happen, that is to say, but it will not be happening in this novel – not 
yet, not here. And this specific instance of deferral could be seen as 
emblematic of the narrative’s more general procrastinatory tendencies. 
In the traditional Bildungsroman, as we noted in Chapter 3, the hero 
eventually manages to find a place for himself in the world, and he 
does so by reconciling the competing imperatives of self and society, 
autonomy and interdependence. But not here. In Chatterjee’s novel, our 
hero never quite achieves this kind of equanimity, never manages to 
find ‘repose through the mastering of chaos’ (311). Instead, the narrative 
constantly frustrates or defers Agastya’s ‘coming of age,’ so that even in 
the final pages it is clear that he has made almost no progress toward 
this traditional generic objective. He has simply decided to take a year 
off to think about what he might like to do. But what exactly will that 
achieve? And what has he been doing during his year in the provinces 
anyway, if not idly contemplating his future? This deferral of ‘maturity,’ 
then, not only denies the narrative the possibility of closure, but also 
deprives it of the capacity for initiating change – leading us to believe 
that even if it were to continue indefinitely, what followed would merely 
repeat what had gone before. And this, of course, destroys the linear 
trajectory of the Bildungsroman by exposing the narrative, at the very 
moment it expires, to the renewed threat of circularity and eternal 
recurrence.
Here, too, Chatterjee’s novel could be said to resemble the bureau-
cratic processes it so accurately describes. As we have seen, the IAS is 
notorious for ‘delaying [the] finalization of any decision’ (Government 
of India 365) and for consistently valuing procedures over outcomes. In 
this world, ‘[e]verything is static’ (Chatterjee 231), endlessly deferred, 
‘bewildering and boring’ (35). So it is not too surprising that the 
novel itself should have internalized many of these entropic qualities, 
that its own energies should have been dissipated by the dilatory 
drag of IAS procedures. Only thus, I have argued, are we able to 
make sense of the narrative’s abbreviated proairetic code, its tendency 
to privilege the iterative over the singulative, and its pronounced 
aversion to anything that might constitute closure. But it would be 
unwise to overstate this case, for there is something in the very nature 
of English, August that militates against grand gestures and critical 
certainties. Jonathan Culler has suggested, rather provocatively, that 
‘interpretation is interesting only when it is extreme’ (Literary 167); yet 
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Chatterjee’s novel refuses to accommodate or endorse such extremes 
and, in so doing, effectively subdues (bores?) whatever critical discourse 
it might generate. Overinterpretation may well be more ‘interesting and 
intellectually valuable than “sound,” moderate interpretation’ (Culler, 
Literary 168), but to make the narrative too interesting, too stimulating 
or ‘productive,’ would be to disregard its essential ordinariness, its 
commitment to the banality of the bureaucratic experience.
Allow me to explain what I mean by this. To begin with, I have 
argued that the novel actively pursues ‘non-meaning,’ but this state is 
something it only partially achieves – for as Barthes notes, ‘everything 
in [a narrative] signifies … Even were a detail to appear irretrievably 
insignificant, resistant to all functionality, it would nonetheless end up 
with precisely the meaning of absurdity or uselessness’ (‘Introduction’ 
261). Take the passages describing Agastya’s daily routine, for instance. 
However ‘meaningless’ and inconsequential these descriptions may 
be, they still manage to produce a secondary layer of signification 
representing the principle of banality itself. This gesture is banal, they 
say to the reader; this action is boring and repetitive. Similarly, although 
the threat of interminability surfaces from time to time in the narrative, 
it is never fully realized, remaining perpetually mired in the subjunctive: 
‘if [the novel] were to continue indefinitely, what followed would merely 
repeat what had gone before.’ And in this respect, the narrative’s 
dominant structure of feeling takes on additional significance. After 
all, boredom is an emotion that also abjures extreme states of being, 
occupying the same temperate zone as alienation, indifference, and 
apathy. Indeed, one could describe boredom as the absence of feeling, 
certainly the absence of desire, for when we are bored we lose the 
capacity to feel strongly, one way or the other, about anything. (‘He 
wanted nothing, it seemed – only a peace, but that was too pompous a 
word’ [Chatterjee 155].) Boredom de-intensifies our lives, leaving us, as 
Heidegger writes, ‘equally distant from despair and joy’ (Introduction 2), 
and for this reason it has always been considered one of the ‘weaker’ 
and less prestigious dysphoric states. Unlike the pity and fear described 
in Aristotle’s Poetics, boredom is ‘explicitly amoral and noncathartic, 
offering no satisfactions of virtue, however oblique, nor any therapeutic 
or purifying release’ (Ngai, Ugly 6).17 And this ‘greyness,’ this tendency 
to avoid extremes or intensities, could be regarded as the last of the 
novel’s bureaucratic qualities. For the bureaucratic world is also a world 
of half-measures and compromise – a world in which we are bored but 
 17 See Aristotle, Poetics 10.
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never quite bored enough to leave (or stop reading), a world in which 
meaning recedes but never quite disappears, a world in which the end 
terminates but never quite closes.
IV
What, then, are we to make of these realist narratives that seem to 
contravene their own governing generic principles by resisting closure, 
suspending meaning, and deprivileging the proairetic? What are their 
commonalities, and what do they tell us about the relationship between 
bureaucracy, boredom, and narrative? As noted earlier, realism is 
expected to do everything it can to achieve an overarching significance 
and a full and final predication of meaning. In other words, the primary 
obligation of the realist novel is to locate the ‘interesting’ in the 
everyday, the meaningful in the mundane, and to make of that reality 
something worth narrating. But of course bureaucracy complicates 
this imperative, for any attempt to practise Erich Auerbach’s ‘serious 
treatment of everyday reality’ (491) in the age of the IAS would also 
require that the uninteresting be treated seriously; and to do so would 
bring two of the central aesthetic impulses of literary realism into direct 
conflict – namely, the commitment to verisimilitude and the desire to 
fill the world with significance. As Theodor Adorno observes, ‘telling a 
story means having something special to say, and that is precisely what 
is prevented by the administered world, by standardization and eternal 
sameness’ (‘Position’ 31). Or to put it another way, how is it possible for 
the realist writer to deliver something (significance, meaning, ‘interest’) 
that the reality to which he or she is beholden simply refuses to yield? 
For Adorno, this contradiction ultimately invalidates realism as a mode 
of representation in the bureaucratic age. ‘The more strictly the novel 
adheres to realism in external things,’ he writes, ‘to the gesture that 
says “this is how it was,” the more every word becomes a mere “as if,” 
and the greater becomes the contradiction between this claim and the 
fact that it was not so’ (33). The only way out of this impasse, Adorno 
concludes, is for the novel to abandon the ‘lie of representation’ (34) 
and defy the ‘epic precept of objectivity and material concreteness’ (32).
Narratives such as Bleak House, Sentimental Education, and Chatterjee’s 
English, August would seem to controvert Adorno’s stance, however, 
for in each case they are able to accommodate this underlying contra-
diction without entirely abandoning their governing generic principles. 
Although the Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit in Bleak House is never adequately 
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resolved – simply ‘laps[ing] and melt[ing] away’ on page 901 of my 
edition – the novel itself does eventually provide the kind of closure 
denied by the Court of Chancery. Sentimental Education also manages to 
negotiate the conflicting imperatives of realism and reality by asserting 
that the failure of meaning can itself be considered ‘interesting,’ and 
thus transformed into an object of readerly desire. And as we have 
seen, Chatterjee’s novel is only ever partially successful in its pursuit 
of non-meaning and insignificance, always managing to create just 
enough interest and energy to keep the narrative going and the reader 
reading. In this way, all three narratives generate a kind of ‘tenuous 
readability’ (Brooks, Reading 171) – hovering uncertainly between the 
interesting and the boring, meaning and non-meaning, significance 
and inconsequentiality. And it is this tenuous quality, this threading 
together of contradictory impulses and imperatives, that brings these 
examples of literary realism closer to Adorno’s ‘anti-realistic’ (‘Position’ 
32) ideal than may, at first glance, appear to be the case. Moreover, 
such ambivalence implies that realism as a mode of representation 
may be a good deal more agile than is oftentimes allowed – that it 
may be capable of accommodating (and even encouraging) significant 
ruptures of meaning, and capable, too, of challenging the very aesthetic 
principles to which it ‘officially’ adheres.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
Fear 
Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost
Fear
I comprehend in this word fear, a certain foresight of future 
evil.
Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments  
Concerning Government and Society, 1651
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of 
emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.
Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History,’ 1940
I
During the Sri Lankan Civil War, which lasted from 1983 until 2009, an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 people disappeared (Amnesty, 
Only 7). Of course, they did not simply ‘disappear’; they were arrested 
or abducted, often tortured and mutilated, and then almost certainly 
killed. According to an Amnesty International report published in 1990, 
none of the parties responsible for such atrocities made any effort to 
conceal what they had done:
Piles of bodies were dumped openly by roadsides, in fields and in 
cemeteries; others were thrown into rivers … Many bodies dumped 
in Sri Lanka were mutilated or burned beyond recognition, often 
on pyres of rubber tyres. In November and December [1989], the 
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mutilated bodies of [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna] suspects, many of 
them apparently captives at the time of their killing, were reported 
to have been left hanging at central points in Kandy … while in 
surrounding villages severed limbs were hung from trees as part 
of a macabre and terrifying warning to communities considered 
sympathetic to the JVP. (Sri Lanka 13)
In this case, the perpetrators were the Sri Lankan government forces, 
although the other two sides in what was essentially a three-way 
conflict – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who were fighting 
for an independent Tamil homeland in the north of the island, and the 
aforementioned JVP, a revolutionary left-wing party, which was mainly 
composed of young Sinhalese – were responsible for similar atrocities.1 
Altogether, by the time a ceasefire was finally declared in 2009, at least 
100,000 people had been killed (Kingsbury 142).2 One of the primary 
objectives of this violence was to terrorize the civilian population, to 
create a climate of fear that would reinforce the political and military 
dominance of the party in question – whether it be the Sri Lankan 
government, the LTTE, the JVP, or even the Indian peacekeeping force 
that was deployed in the country from 1987 to 1990. Despite their 
obvious differences, then, all three major parties (along with their 
 1 To be more precise, the war can be divided into three main phases: the 
period between 1983 and 1987, when the government and the LTTE were 
the primary adversaries; the period between 1987 and 1990, when the JVP 
entered the fray (along with an Indian peacekeeping force); and the period 
after 1990, when the largely bilateral conflict between the government and 
the LTTE resumed. By establishing an independent state, the LTTE sought 
to protect the minority Tamil community (which comprises roughly 15 per 
cent of the population) against discrimination on the part of the majority 
Sinhalese community (which comprises about 75 per cent). As for the JVP, 
it sought to overthrow the government of President J.R. Jayewardene and 
establish in its place a revolutionary socialist state based on the principles 
of radical Sinhalese nationalism. In the words of Jayadeva Uyangoda, 
the JVP’s ‘self-understanding during this period was that it was the sole 
patriotic force with the historical mission … to liberate the “motherland” 
from “traitors,” “aggressors,” and “foreign invaders”’ (43).
 2 This figure – the most widely cited – is based on an estimate provided 
by the UN in 2009. In a report published two years later, however, the UN 
suggested that up to 40,000 civilians may have died in the spring of 2009 
alone (during the final assault on the LTTE) (Seoighe 8). If we combine this 
more recent figure with the 60–100,000 people who ‘disappeared’ during 
the civil war, and whose fate has yet to be confirmed, it would seem that 
a total estimate of 100,000 casualties is decidedly conservative.
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affiliates and allies) employed identical tactics of intimidation and 
terror. During the war, as Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake notes, ‘ethnic’ 
violence became ‘organized, routinized, and systematized through 
disappearances, torture, rape, checkpoint searches, and massacres of 
entire villages in remote areas’ (58). And as a consequence of this 
widespread and deeply traumatizing violence, fear became a dominant 
structure of feeling within Sri Lankan society, giving rise to a large 
number of related pathologies. ‘The vast majority of ordinary people,’ 
Jagath P. Senaratne writes, ‘could not keep track of either the killers 
or those killed, and [therefore] retreated into cowed silence, fearful of 
venturing out of their homes’ (146). By the late eighties, the country 
had become ‘paralysed’ by this feeling of terror; and for the first time, 
‘[p]hrases such as “fear psychosis” [and] “fear syndrome” … began to 
be commonly used’ (145). Indeed, this particular phase of the conflict 
would come to be defined by the terror it generated, and in common 
parlance it is still known as the beeshana kalaya – the ‘time of great fear’ 
(Wickramasinghe 260).
In the novel I shall be discussing in this chapter, Michael Ondaatje’s 
Anil’s Ghost (2000), we can find traces of such fear on almost every page. 
‘Everyone’s scared,’ one character observes. ‘It’s a national disease’ (53). 
And there is a good reason why this should be the case. The novel is set 
in the late eighties and early nineties – a time of ‘continual emergency’ 
(42), of suicide bombings and mass graves and torture. Anil Tissera, a 
forensic anthropologist, has returned to Sri Lanka after many years to 
investigate the ‘organized campaigns of murder on the island’ (16). In 
order to do so, she has been paired with a local archaeologist, Sarath 
Diyasena; and when they discover a modern skeleton hidden in the 
Bandarawela caves, a national archaeological preserve, Anil hopes that 
she can use this evidence to prove that the security forces have been 
committing extrajudicial killings. The need to identify the skeleton 
(which they name Sailor) constitutes the narrative’s primary motivating 
force – not only because it will allow Anil to hold the government 
accountable for this specific crime, but also because it will provide, 
as far as she is concerned, a kind of representative justice for all of 
the unidentified victims of the civil war. ‘One village can speak for many 
villages,’ she believes. ‘One victim can speak for many victims’ (176).
As this quest advances, through a process of incremental repetition, 
we are given an increasingly strong sense of the fear that has come to 
dominate the affective lives of many of the novel’s characters. ‘In her 
years abroad,’ we are told, ‘Anil had courted foreignness, was at ease 
whether on the Bakerloo line or on the highways around Santa Fe … 
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But here, on this island, she realized that she was moving with only one 
arm of language among uncertain laws and a fear that was everywhere’ 
(54). As we shall see, this fear achieves a kind of ubiquity that allows 
it to saturate the representational plane of the narrative while also 
percolating into its underlying structure, where it creates a number 
of quite profound generic disturbances. In a fascinating article on the 
proliferation of supernatural narratives during the civil war, the anthro-
pologist Sasanka Perera argues that the conflict even transformed the 
Sinhala language itself. According to Perera, as the violence intensified in 
the late eighties, words such as beeshanaya (terror), wadhakagaraya (torture 
chamber), issuwa (kidnapped), and athurudahanwoowo (the disappeared) 
acquired ‘substantially altered meanings’ that were ‘specifically marked’ 
by the experience of terror.3 Having entered both journalistic and 
popular discourse, these transformed signifiers contributed to a more 
general ‘culture of terror’ within the country, a culture that had ‘its own 
vocabulary as well as its own overall structure’ (127).4 In the following 
pages, I will be exploring the way in which this culture of terror can 
also influence the production of literature. What, precisely, does such 
debilitating fear do to the literary discourse it generates? What does 
it make possible and what does it preclude? I shall begin by explaining 
how an emotion that is usually experienced in a deeply physiological 
way (‘one sweats, one’s heart races, one’s whole body becomes a space 
of unpleasant intensity’ [Ahmed, Cultural 65]) can acquire a decentred, 
disembodied status that facilitates the type of ubiquity I have been 
describing.5 I will then trace the process by which Anil’s Ghost internalizes 
 3 Similarly, while conducting fieldwork in Sri Lanka in the early eighties, 
E. Valentine Daniel observed that the ‘very words “project,” “informants,” 
“information,” “interview,” “evidence,” [and] “description” [had taken on] 
new and terrifying meanings’ (3).
 4 It was Michael Taussig who first used the phrase ‘culture of terror’ to 
describe the atrocities that were perpetrated along the Putumayo River, 
a tributary of the Amazon, during the rubber boom of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. ‘[S]tep by step,’ he writes, ‘terror and 
torture became the form of life for some fifteen years, an organized 
culture with its systematized rules, imagery, procedures, and meanings 
involved in spectacles and rituals that sustained the precarious solidarity 
of the rubber company employees as well as beating out through the 
body of the tortured some sort of canonical truth about Civilization and 
Business’ (495).
 5 Of all the emotions, fear is perhaps the most canonical and heavily 
theorized. In the Rhetoric, for instance, Aristotle defines it as ‘a kind of 
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this feeling of fear and, in so doing, replicates some of its more salient 
features – namely, its phobic, non-cathartic, and indefinite qualities. In 
each case, I would like to suggest, these qualities disrupt the generic 
imperatives that would typically govern a narrative of this kind, making 
it impossible to achieve the linearity, the hermeneutic closure, and the 
‘localization of culpability’ that we tend to associate with classic crime 
fiction. Under these circumstances, I shall argue, in a country where as 
many as 100,000 people are still missing (presumed dead) and where the 
language itself has been changed forever, acquiring terrifying new layers 
of connotative meaning, such reassuring literary palliatives are simply 
no longer available.
II
We all have the capacity to feel fear, and we all have the capacity 
to feel it in the same place: the amygdala. Discovered in 1819, the 
amygdala is a small bundle of nuclei located within each of the anterior 
temporal lobes of the brain. It is an integral part of the limbic system 
and primarily responsible for generating the feeling of fear – or more 
precisely, to quote the neurologist Antonio Damasio, it has the ability 
to trigger ‘the enactment of a body state characteristic of the emotion 
fear’ and to alter ‘cognitive processing in a manner that fits the state 
of fear’ (Descartes’ Error 131).6 In order to activate this emotion, the 
‘early sensory cortices [must first] detect and categorize the key … 
features of a given entity’ (e.g., speed, size, proximity, etc.), before 
pain or disturbance resulting from the imagination of impending danger, 
either destructive or painful’ (153); and in an often-cited passage from 
the Poetics, he argues that the arousal (and subsequent purgation) of 
both fear and pity are essential to the aesthetic pleasure that we derive 
from tragedy (10). Writing in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes 
identified ‘mutual fear’ as the affective foundation of ‘all great and lasting 
societies’ (113). And in 1757, Edmund Burke described fear as ‘the ruling 
principle of the sublime.’ No emotion, he claimed, ‘so effectually robs the 
mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear. For fear being an 
apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner that resembles 
actual pain. Whatever therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublime 
too, whether this cause of terror be endued with greatness of dimensions 
or not; for it is impossible to look on anything as trif ling, or contemptible, 
that may be dangerous’ (53).




alerting the amygdala to ‘their conjunctive presence’ (131–32). Once the 
amygdala receives these signals, it initiates a wide array of autonomic 
responses (releasing adrenaline, increasing blood pressure, enhancing 
muscle tone, etc.), which are also registered at the cognitive level, thus 
allowing the individual a ‘flexibility of response based on the particular 
history of [his or her] interactions with the environment’ (133).7 This is 
what Damasio refers to as a primary emotion; but of course it does 
not describe the full range of our emotional behaviour. There are also 
secondary emotions, he argues, which occur once we start ‘experiencing 
[conscious] feelings and forming systematic connections between categories 
of objects and situations, on the one hand, and primary emotions, on the other’ 
(134). Rather than being activated at the somatic level, these secondary 
emotions begin with a cognitive evaluation of the individual’s current (or 
anticipated) circumstances; and rather than being an innate response, 
they are acquired – that is to say, they are based on the individual’s 
‘unique experience,’ which ‘may be at subtle or at major variance with 
that of others’ (136). Although this evaluative process takes place in the 
prefrontal cortices, the fear signals it generates are also conveyed to 
the amygdala, whose autonomic response to such stimuli (involving a 
diverse range of physiological and neurological changes) is ultimately 
perceived, at the cognitive level, as the ‘feeling’ of fear.
From our perspective, the fact that Anil should be fascinated by 
‘this nerve bundle which houses fear’ (Ondaatje 135) is of particular 
significance. She had first discovered the amygdala, we are told, while 
studying in London, where her professor had described it as ‘the dark 
aspect of the brain,’ a ‘place to house fearful memories’ (134). And 
even now, when conducting an autopsy, she always makes a detour 
to look for this almond-shaped concentration of nerve fibres. It is 
significant, as well, that this analeptic reference to the amygdala should 
be immediately followed by a conversation that occurs while Anil and 
Sarath are driving. ‘Is your tape recorder off?’ Sarath asks, not once 
but twice. ‘Is your tape recorder off?’ And only when Anil replies in 
the affirmative does he begin to tell her about the detention centres 
in Colombo and the torture that takes place there. ‘I wanted to find one 
law to cover all of living,’ the narrator says, citing the poet Anne Carson. 
‘I found fear …’ (135). But the fear that Sarath demonstrates in this scene 
is not the innate fear that Damasio would describe as primary; it is a 
secondary fear that has been conditioned by experience and involves 




a cognitive evaluation of both the situation in which he finds himself 
and its potential consequences. Moreover, although it is object-directed 
in the sense that he is concerned about the tape recorder (and the 
danger it represents), the real source of his apprehension is far more 
indefinite and widely dispersed. In this respect, I would argue, the 
fear that Sarath is experiencing here displays some of the qualities 
that we would typically associate with anxiety, thus complicating the 
traditional distinction between the two feelings.
We find this distinction everywhere. Kierkegaard, for instance, writes 
that anxiety is ‘altogether different from fear and similar concepts that 
refer to something definite.’ Whereas fear is clearly object-directed, 
he suggests, the ‘relation of anxiety to its object’ is the relation of 
‘something’ to ‘nothing’ (42–43). Similarly, for Heidegger, ‘anything 
“fearsome” is always encountered as an entity within-the-world,’ 
while anxiety is caused by something ‘completely indefinite’ (Being 
230–31). And from a psychoanalytical perspective, Freud also chooses 
to distinguish between anxiety (Angst) and fear (Furcht): ‘I will only say 
that I think “Angst” relates to the state and disregards the object, while 
“Furcht” draws attention precisely to the object’ (Introductory 443). 
In Anil’s Ghost, however, the conventional distinction between these 
two categories is blurred. The fear we find here is still attached to an 
object, or at least anticipating an object of some kind, but the identity 
and location of that object is unpredictable and always shifting. The 
ultimate object of this fear could be the government forces (army, navy, 
air force, police, etc.), or the various pro-government paramilitaries, or 
the LTTE, or the JVP – or all of the above. And this is what gives the 
fear in the novel its free-floating, indiscriminate quality: not the fact 
that the object is nowhere (as is the case with anxiety) but that it is 
everywhere, or at least potentially so. Furthermore, even if this fear is not 
realized on a particular occasion, even if the fearsome object ‘passes 
them by,’ the apprehension that the characters experience will simply 
be transferred to other occasions and other objects – and as Sara 
Ahmed notes, this mobility, this slipperiness, only serves to intensify 
such dysphoric feelings. ‘Fear,’ she writes,
is all the more frightening given the potential loss of the object that 
it anticipates. The more we don’t know what or who it is we fear the 
more the world becomes fearsome. In other words, it is the structural 
possibility that the object of fear may pass us by which makes 
everything possibly fearsome. This is an important dimension in the 
spatial politics of fear: the loss of the object of fear renders the world 
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itself a space of potential danger, a space that is anticipated as pain 
or injury on the surface of the body that fears. (Cultural 69)
This is precisely the kind of fear that we encounter in Anil’s Ghost – one 
that is no longer attached to a single entity, or contained within a single 
object (whether it be a tape recorder or a detention centre), but has 
become systemic, an atmospheric pathology that inundates the entire 
narrative.8 We find the first reference to this emotion on the opening 
page of the novel (‘There was always the fear, double-edged, that it was 
their son in the pit, or that it was not their son – which meant there would 
be further searching’ [5]); and such references only proliferate thereafter 
– on pages 17, 20, 40, 54, 55, and so on – until finally the discourse 
itself internalizes this inescapable structure of feeling. And it is the 
decentred, indeterminate, and ‘atmospheric’ nature of the feeling in 
question that allows it to do so. In a way, one could argue, this process 
replicates the formation of a secondary emotion, as defined by Damasio. 
At the representational level of the narrative, we have a repository of 
mental images based on particular patterns of neural firing in the early 
sensory cortices. These images are evaluated by the discourse using 
acquired ‘dispositional representations that embody [prior] knowledge 
pertaining to how certain types of situations … have been paired 
with certain emotional responses’ (Descartes’ Error 136). Automatically 
and involuntarily, this (discursive) evaluation is then conveyed to the 
amygdala (i.e., the underlying structure of the narrative). And once the 
amygdala receives these signals, it initiates a number of autonomic 
responses that are registered at both a physiological and cognitive level 
– thus creating a ‘feeling.’9 Or to complete the analogy, the narrative’s 
 8 As such, this structure of feeling shares a number of clear affinities with 
Ato Quayson’s notion of the systemic uncanny, which we discussed in 
Chapter 1. ‘In the face of persistent physical and social violence,’ Quayson 
argues, ‘either triggered by acute political chaos or the general collapse of 
the social order, a process of internalization of these perceived disorders 
takes place. In such instances, the self is presumed to be constantly under 
threat, whether this threat ever materializes or not. The internalized 
translation of disorder does not, however, remain merely internalized, 
but gets cathected into inchoate senses of guilt, inexplicable terror, or a 
general sense of disquiet that may or may not be consciously traceable to 
a direct source’ (Aesthetic 142).
 9 I am using Damasio’s terminology here. ‘If an emotion is a collection of 
changes in body state,’ he writes, ‘connected to particular mental images 
that have activated a specific brain system, the essence of feeling an emotion 
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limbic system, having received these fear signals, initiates a number of 
autonomic responses that are subsequently registered at both a formal 
and representational level – thus ensuring that this feeling infiltrates 
even the deepest recesses of the discourse. And as I shall argue in the 
following section, these autonomic responses can be discerned most 
clearly at the level of genre, where they influence (and unsettle) the 
entire ‘organism.’
III
The fear responses we encounter most often in Anil’s Ghost are not of 
the confrontational variety but the evasive – replicating the classic 
‘phobic’ trajectory of this negative feeling. As Sianne Ngai writes, fear 
can be described as ‘dysphoric or experientially negative’ in the sense 
that it evokes ‘pain or displeasure’; it can be described as ‘semantically’ 
negative in the sense that it is ‘saturated with socially stigmatizing 
meanings and values’; and it can be described as ‘syntactically’ negative 
in the sense that it is ‘organized by trajectories of repulsion rather than 
attraction, by phobic strivings “away from” rather than philic strivings 
“toward”’ (Ugly 11). There are many examples of such phobic tendencies 
in the novel, but for our purposes, just a couple should suffice.
Sarath’s brother, Gamini, works as a surgeon in the emergency ward 
of a hospital in Colombo. Every dead body that is discovered in the 
city eventually finds its way here; and Gamini is required to sign off 
on it before it can be claimed or cremated. Despite his experience as a 
surgeon, however, he has developed a strong aversion to these corpses, 
and does everything he can to avoid direct contact with the bodies 
themselves: 
Gamini had chosen not to deal with the dead. He avoided the 
south-wing corridors, where they brought the torture victims to be 
identified. Interns listed the wounds and photographed the bodies. 
Still, once a week, he went over the reports and the photographs 
of the dead, confirmed what was assumed, pointed out fresh scars 
caused by acid or sharp metal, and gave his signature.
While studying these photos, Gamini covers the faces of the corpses 
with his left hand (‘the pulse in his wrist jumping’). ‘He worked better 
is the experience of such changes in juxtaposition to the mental images that 
initiated the cycle’ (Descartes’ Error 145).
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this way,’ we learn, ‘and there was no danger of his recognizing the dead’ 
(212–13). For Gamini, it appears, even the photographic representation 
of these corpses provokes a kind of phobic aversion – a turning ‘away 
from’ rather than a turning ‘toward.’ And as I suggested earlier, this fear 
at the representational level of the discourse also influences the novel’s 
formal qualities. On one occasion, just as Gamini is completing his 
weekly duties, another consignment of bodies arrives at the hospital; 
and as it does so, the discourse undergoes a sudden transition from the 
literal to the figurative: ‘The doors opened and a thousand bodies slid 
in, as if caught in the nets of fishermen, as if they had been mauled. 
A thousand bodies of sharks and skates in the corridors, some of the 
dark-skinned fish thrashing …’ (213). This sudden shift in register 
could be seen as a phobic reaction on the part of the discourse itself, 
which turns away from the aesthetic principles that have governed 
the narrative thus far, and instead takes refuge in a series of oblique 
metaphorical correlatives. As mentioned in the Introduction, Ato 
Quayson employs the term ‘symbolization compulsion’ to describe this 
kind of evasive strategy – a phobic impulse that drives the narrative 
toward an ‘insistent metaphorical register even when this register 
does not help to develop the action, define character or spectacle, or 
create atmosphere.’ Ultimately, Quayson argues, such a gratuitous use 
of figurative language serves as a defence mechanism for the discourse, 
a way of avoiding or repressing a traumatic experience that ‘cannot be 
named except through symbolized digressiveness’ (Calibrations 82). So 
when, on page 213 of Anil’s Ghost, the discourse suddenly lapses into 
figurative language that is really only notable for its incongruity, it is 
reasonable to see it as an evasive response, one that has been activated 
at the autonomic level of the narrative and has subsequently influenced 
the entire organism, saturating it with the linguistic equivalent of 
cortisol, say, or adrenaline.
We witness a similar response, a little earlier in the novel, when the 
disappearance of one of the characters’ wives is described. The passage 
in question occupies four pages and begins with a detailed account of 
her daily routine:
At six in the morning she dressed, then began walking the mile to the 
school. A few hundred yards before she climbed the hill, the road narrowed 
into a bridge, a lagoon on one side, a salt river on the other … It was 
always six-thirty a.m. when she reached the bridge. There would be a few 
prawn boats, a man up to his neck in the water, whose hands, out of sight, 
would be straightening the nets that had been dropped by his son from a 
boat during the night … From here Sirissa would reach the school in ten 
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minutes, change in a cubicle, soak rags in a bucket, and begin cleaning the 
blackboards … In the evenings during the government curfews she remained 
indoors, with a lamp and a book in her room. (172–73)
After two and a half pages, this iterative sequence gives way to a 
singulative description of one morning in particular. ‘Sirissa wakes and 
bathes herself at the well behind the house she is living in’; then, as always, 
she dresses and leaves for the school. When she reaches the bridge, 
however, she discovers a horrific scene: four local teenagers, whom she 
recognizes, have been decapitated – their heads impaled on stakes. 
Feeling the presence of something behind her, Sirissa begins to run. 
She runs across the bridge and up the hill toward the school. ‘She 
keeps running forward,’ we are told, ‘and then she sees no more’ (174–75). 
Once again, then, we have a phobic aversion to violence, and once 
again the discourse internalizes this fear, bringing the passage to an 
abrupt conclusion with the line quoted above. By doing so, it ensures 
that the majority of the passage should be dedicated to the kind of 
catalytic material that contributes nothing of any real significance or 
value to the story we are reading – while the implied act of violence 
that follows, which actually does matter, is ‘safely’ consigned to the 
interstices of the narrative.10
The phobic tendencies we have been exploring here also influence 
the narrative’s overarching trajectory, which is constantly deviating 
from its (generically) ordained course. As Tzvetan Todorov has argued, 
the classic detective novel is composed of not one but two narratives. 
We have the story of the crime and the story of the investigation, with 
the former obviously preceding the latter as it is the first narrative 
that makes the second one possible – or necessary – and the second 
narrative that makes the first one legible. Indeed, the sole purpose of 
the second narrative is to uncover the first one, the story of the crime, 
which is only revealed by following the various clues (the ‘traces’ left 
behind by the first narrative) back to their original source. Or to put 
it another way, as Todorov does, we might characterize ‘these two 
stories by saying that the first – the story of the crime – tells “what 
really happened,” whereas the second – the story of the investigation 
– explains “how the reader (or the narrator) has come to know about 
it”’ (44–45). In the opening pages of Anil’s Ghost, a scenario of this kind 
 10 Interestingly, in his essay on the subject, Quayson suggests that symboli-
zation compulsion may also take the form of an ‘intensification of the 
quotidian or the everyday’ (‘Symbolization’ 759–60).
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is immediately established. We have the mystery of the first narrative 
(involving Sailor’s murder) and the investigation that comprises the 
second (involving our two detective figures). But things very quickly 
begin to go awry. Rather than steadily advancing from one clue to 
another, in a concerted attempt to ‘reveal’ the first narrative, the 
discourse assumes an increasingly digressive quality, exploring a wide 
range of peripheral subtrajectories. On pages 39–40, for instance, 
we have a lengthy description of the National Atlas of Sri Lanka (full of 
poetic litanies and evocative place names). Not long afterward, there 
is an interlude of some thirty pages, during which Anil and Sarath visit 
the latter’s elderly mentor in the ‘Grove of Ascetics’ (86). And on pages 
138–40, we are introduced to some of the fundamental principles of 
Sri Lankan astrology, with particular reference to love and marriage. 
Needless to say, such digressive passages contribute very little to 
the novel’s primary plotline; and as they continue to accumulate, we 
eventually realize that there is something else going on here. More 
specifically, we begin to realize that the discourse has developed a 
phobic aversion to the very narrative it is supposed to be uncovering 
(i.e., the ‘story of the crime’). Instead of investigating Sailor’s murder, 
as a ‘good’ detective novel should, it would much rather be expatiating 
on the subject of native birdlife or prehistoric caves or astrology – or 
any subject, however arcane, that will allow it to turn away from this 
terrifying act of violence.
Along with its distinctly phobic qualities, the fear we encounter in 
Anil’s Ghost is also of the non-cathartic variety. ‘In a fearful nation,’ our 
narrator observes,
public sorrow was stamped down by the climate of uncertainty. If a 
father protested a son’s death, it was feared another family member 
would be killed. If people you knew disappeared, there was a chance 
they might stay alive if you did not cause trouble. This was the 
scarring psychosis in the country. Death, loss, was ‘unfinished,’ so you 
could not walk through it. There had been years of night visitations, 
kidnappings or murders in broad daylight … All that was left of law 
was a belief in an eventual revenge towards those who had power. 
(56; my italics)
In Ondaatje’s novel, however, such revenge, such closure, never arrives; 
and as a consequence, the general climate of fear within the country 
assumes an ongoing, ‘unfinished’ quality, which in turn removes the 
possibility of cathartic release. This is the kind of emotion that Antonio 
Damasio would describe as a ‘background feeling’: a constant, underlying 
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state of being that may be punctuated, from time to time, by more 
pronounced and less durable affective impulses. ‘When background 
feelings are persistently of the same type over hours and days,’ Damasio 
argues, ‘and do not change quietly as thought contents ebb and flow’ 
(Descartes’ Error 151), they contribute to a more general mood – which 
in the present case, of course, is notably dysphoric.11 And it is this 
interminable quality that eventually infiltrates the structure of the 
novel itself, making it almost impossible for the discourse to achieve 
its primary generic objective: hermeneutic closure. Who killed Sailor? 
Why? Under what circumstances? Were they ever brought to justice? 
These are just some of the questions that remain unanswered at the 
end of the novel. Rather fortuitously, Anil and Sarath do manage to 
identify Sailor, but this discharge of meaning, when it finally occurs on 
page 269, carries very little significance within the narrative as a whole 
and does almost nothing to alter its overall trajectory. The name of the 
victim may have been Ruwan Kumara, and he may have worked in a 
plumbago mine. He may have been identified as a ‘rebel sympathizer’ 
and subsequently taken into custody. But there is really nothing that 
we as readers can do with this information, and nothing much that the 
characters can do either. What should have been a pivotal moment 
in the novel, a moment of resolution and vindication, has become 
just another inconsequential aside – of no more significance than an 
endangered bird or a prehistoric cave.
And the reason that the solution to this particular mystery can be 
so easily disregarded is because it does nothing to contain or dissipate 
the fear that was generated by the discovery of Sailor’s body in the first 
place. After all, he is just one of many such victims, his murder just one 
of many such crimes. As a 1989 Amnesty International report put it, 
‘Violence is now so widespread [in Sri Lanka] that it is often difficult 
to establish with authority who the agents of specific killings were – 
or even to identify the victims whose bodies are sometimes grossly 
mutilated, burned to ashes or transported long distances … before 
being dumped’ (qtd. in Senaratne 146). The overwhelming scale of the 
 11 Elsewhere, Damasio has indicated that background feelings are 
‘engendered by ongoing physiological processes or by the organism’s 
interactions with the environment or both,’ and that they can include 
‘feelings of tension or relaxation, of fatigue or energy, of well-being or 
malaise, of anticipation or dread’ (Feeling 52). ‘When asked “how we feel,”’ 




violence is made abundantly clear on page 41 of the novel, where we 
are offered a representative list of unsolved disappearances (including 
precise times and places):
Kumara Wijetunga, 17. 6th November 1989. At about 11:30 p.m. from his 
house.
Prabath Kumara, 16. 17th November 1989. At 3:20 a.m. from the home of 
a friend.
Kumara Arachchi, 16. 17th November 1989. At about midnight from his 
house. 
Manelka da Silva, 17. 1st December 1989. While playing cricket, Embilipitiya 
Central College playground.
Jatunga Gunesena, 23. 11th December 1989. At 10:30 a.m. near his house 
while talking to a friend … [etc.]12
One could argue that each of these entries initiates a separate 
hermeneutic sequence, a separate mystery, so what does it really 
matter if just the one murder is (partially) solved? Under these circum-
stances, genuine closure, and the justice that ought to accompany 
it, is simply impossible to achieve. This is what ultimately gives the 
fear in the narrative its indefinite, free-floating quality – the fact that 
it cannot be attached to, or contained by, any one object – and this 
is also what makes it so very difficult to localize culpability in the 
manner of the classic detective novel. In traditional crime fiction, by 
solving the crime and identifying the criminal, the narrative serves 
to ‘quarantine’ criminality and re-establish a sense of social order. 
This stability may have been momentarily threatened by the discovery 
of the crime itself, but by locating (and ultimately punishing) the 
criminal, the narrative restores the social status quo and reassures us 
that such disruptive forces can be effectively contained. According to 
Franco Moretti, the perfect crime, which constitutes the ‘nightmare 
of detective fiction,’ is the ‘featureless, deindividualized crime that 
anyone could have committed because at this point everyone is the 
same.’ Classic detective fiction, however, serves to ‘dispel the doubt 
 12 As Sophia A. McClennen and Joseph R. Slaughter note, this passage 
reproduces a list of ‘unresolved disappearances’ that was first published 
in a 1992 Amnesty International report and later submitted to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 2005 (10).
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that guilt might be impersonal, and therefore collective and social’ (Signs 
135). By concentrating criminality within the figure of the criminal, it 
absolves society of all responsibility for the crime – thus producing 
or reinforcing a more general state of social innocence. In The Novel 
and the Police, D.A. Miller makes a similar point with reference to the 
production of meaning within such narratives. At the beginning of a 
detective novel, the discourse is saturated with potential significance; 
anything and everything may carry investigatory value, may constitute 
a ‘clue.’ Furthermore, any character (even the narrator in rare cases) 
may be guilty of the crime that is being investigated. At the end of the 
novel, though, when the detective offers his or her final summation, all 
of these ‘hypothetical significances … are simultaneously dissolved,’ 
and we discover that only a fraction of the narrative’s signifiers carry 
any real value. Everything and everyone else lapses into a state of 
irrelevance (which is also, of course, a state of innocence). ‘It is often 
argued,’ Miller writes, 
that the detective story seeks to totalize its signifiers in a complete 
and all-encompassing order. On the contrary, it is concerned to 
restrict and localize the province of meaning: to guarantee large areas 
of irrelevance. One easily sees, moreover, what else is guaranteed in 
such a form. For as the fantasy of total relevance yields to the reality 
of a more selective meaningfulness, the universality of suspicion 
gives way to a highly specific guilt. (34)13
Yet this is obviously not the case in Anil’s Ghost. Here, we find an 
abundance of violent crimes but no specific criminal – leaving society 
itself to bear the responsibility for such atrocities. In other words, the 
potential significance (and potential culpability) that saturates the novel 
at the beginning remains just as unfocused and widely dispersed at the 
end. Although Anil is given the opportunity to deliver a final summation 
before an audience of military and police personnel, here too things 
quickly go awry. She becomes confused and flustered. Her evidence is 
confiscated. She is interrupted, challenged (‘Why do you not investigate 
the killing of government officers?’ [275]), and then finally forced to leave 
the auditorium, having revealed little and resolved nothing. If, as Miller 
argues, the objective of the fictional detective is to ‘restrict and localize 
the province of meaning,’ to ‘guarantee large areas of irrelevance,’ then 
she has quite clearly failed in this endeavour. Anything could still carry 
 13 Some of this material is derived from my discussion of Roberto Bolaño’s 
2666 (see Scott, ‘Roberto’), which touches on similar issues.
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significance and anyone could still be guilty. By localizing meaning 
and culpability, the fictional detective also manages to localize fear 
– attaching it to a specific figure, the criminal, who is subsequently 
‘brought to justice’ and thus neutralized. But as I have suggested, the 
fear in Anil’s Ghost is not tethered to a single entity or figure; it cannot 
be localized in the form of an unidentified corpse, or an LTTE soldier, or 
a representative of the state. Instead, it moves from body to body, and 
from place to place, creating a dysphoric atmosphere – or structure of 
feeling – that permeates every level of the discourse.
IV
According to Tzvetan Todorov, as we have noted, the detective novel 
is founded on a duality, being composed of not one but two narratives 
– the story of the crime and the story of the investigation. The signif-
icance of the first story is easy enough to understand, but what 
happens, Todorov asks, in the second? ‘Not much. The characters 
of this second story, the story of the investigation, do not act, they 
learn. Nothing can happen to them: a rule of the genre postulates the 
detective’s immunity’ (44). In this chapter, we have discussed the way 
in which Anil’s Ghost internalizes the fear that achieved such ubiquity 
during the Sri Lankan Civil War. We have also looked at the way in 
which the discourse replicates some of the more salient features of 
this emotion (i.e., its phobic, non-cathartic, and indefinite qualities). 
These qualities, I have argued, in turn give rise to a number of generic 
disturbances, depriving the narrative of the linearity, the hermeneutic 
closure, and the ‘localization of culpability’ that we ordinarily associate 
with crime fiction. And so it is only fitting, perhaps, that the novel 
should conclude with one last generic violation, one last example of the 
way in which certain social realities can have quite tangible discursive 
consequences. As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, an 
estimated 60,000 to 100,000 people disappeared during the twenty-six 
years of the civil war. The initial manifestation of these disappearances, 
Sasanka Perera writes, was the ‘mutilated or burned bodies that were 
scattered around. People soon realized that every time they discovered 
bodies in places where they were not supposed to be, real people had 
disappeared from places where they should have been’ (166–67). In 
Ondaatje’s novel, the ‘first story,’ the story of the crime, is initiated 
by one such disappearance. As we eventually learn, a plumbago miner 
by the name of Ruwan Kumara, having been identified as a ‘rebel 
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sympathizer,’ was arrested one day by the security forces and never 
seen again. In the classic crime novel, this discovery would provide 
some closure; but not here, and certainly not under these specific 
circumstances. Typically, to quote Northrop Frye, the detective novel 
serves a ‘balancing and neutralizing’ function within society – ‘the 
murderer discovered at the end balancing the corpse that we normally 
find at the beginning’ (137). In Anil’s Ghost, however, this reassuring 
symmetry collapses, and our detective figures never even come close 
to identifying Kumara’s killers. Moreover, in the novel’s penultimate 
chapter, the boundary between the story of the crime and the story of 
the investigation, the one that is supposed to ensure the immunity of 
the detective, his or her inviolable status, finally ruptures. After leaving 
the auditorium in Colombo where Anil had been speaking, Sarath is 
abducted by the security forces, tortured, and murdered – thereby 
ensuring that the only symmetry to be found here involves the tragic 
repetition of the novel’s inaugural atrocity.
This second murder also activates an autonomic fear response on 
the part of the discourse, just as the first one had. After leaving the 
auditorium, Sarath waves down a Bajaj and gives the driver the address 
of his office: ‘[S]itting forward, his head in his hands, he trie[s] to lose 
touch with the world around him as the three-wheeler struggle[s] 
through the traffic’ (282). And that is the last we see of our ‘detective,’ 
until his mutilated body is delivered to the hospital morgue some time 
later. In this case, too, the act of violence is consigned to the interstices 
of the narrative – surrounded on one side by the deliberately banal 
description of the Bajaj and the heavy Colombo traffic, and on the 
other side, eventually, by the intensely poetic scene with which the 
novel concludes. The scene in question describes in some detail the 
construction (and reconstruction) of two monumental Buddha statues, 
a process that is only complete once the nētra mangala ceremony has 
been performed.14 This ceremony is conducted by Ananda, an artisan 
who had been helping with the investigation into Sailor’s murder; and 
as you can imagine, it is beautifully depicted. At one point, Ananda 
 14 Earlier in the novel, we are offered a useful description of this ceremony: 
‘Nētra means “eye,”’ one character says. ‘It is a ritual of the eyes. A special 
artist is needed to paint eyes on a holy figure. It is always the last thing 
done. It is what gives the image life. Like a fuse. The eyes are a fuse. It 
has to happen before a statue or a painting in a vihara can become a holy 
thing’ (97). For more on the significance of the nētra mangala ceremony, 
see Salgado 139–42 and Farrier 90–91.
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assumes the perspective of the statue itself, seeing ‘all the fibres of 
natural history’ laid out before him. He can see everything from ‘the 
smallest approach of a bird, every flick of its wing,’ to ‘a hundred-mile 
storm coming down off the mountains near Gonagola.’ He can feel ‘each 
current of wind, every lattice-like green shadow created by cloud.’ And 
above everything else, he is able to witness the ‘great churning’ of the 
weather as it is formed ‘in the temperate forests and sea, in the thorn 
scrub behind him in the southeast, in the deciduous hills, and … [along] 
the coast of mangroves, lagoons and river deltas’ (307). It is an intoxi-
cating state of omniscience, but it does not last long. In the novel’s final 
line, Ananda feels his nephew’s ‘concerned hand on his,’ a ‘sweet touch 
from the world’ (307).
As I say, this is a beautiful piece of writing, and heavily freighted 
with symbolic resonance – only it has been difficult for critics to agree 
on its precise meaning.15 Given everything we have discussed thus far, 
however, I would be inclined to see it as another instance of ‘symboli-
zation compulsion,’ as a way of avoiding or repressing a traumatic 
experience through the use of oblique figurative language. According 
to Ato Quayson, such phobic impulses often give rise to a semiotic 
structure whose ‘intensity completely obscures its [true] referential 
locus’ (Calibrations 90). And that, I would argue, is largely the case 
here. We have a series of signifiers that have been saturated with 
connotative value: the ceremony itself, for example, or the panoptic 
vision of the surrounding landscape, or the ‘combustible world of 
[the] weather’ (306), or the faint smell of grass being burned, or 
the girl moving in the forest below, or the ‘great scarred face’ (307) 
of the other statue half a mile away, or the intimate ‘touch’ of the 
boy’s hand. Every detail has been intensified, accentuated, invested 
with multiple layers of implied significance (much of which may be 
 15 ‘The ending of Anil’s Ghost,’ Minoli Salgado writes, ‘is contentious partly 
because it seems to replicate [the novel’s more general] interpretative 
indeterminacy in the very act of presenting an epiphanic insight. Critics 
have variously praised it as a “healing vision” that offers “a peace that 
encompasses understanding” … or either attacked it or dismissed it as a 
literary gloss. In terms that replicate Althusser’s formulation of art as an 
aesthetic resolution of political conflict, John de Falbe has claimed that this 
epiphany “uses an easy poetic image to evade a problematic conclusion to 
the novel.” Fans have claimed that it is “a tour de force” linked “with the 
redemptive act of writing,” while Qadri Ismail, in a vituperative attack on 
Ondaatje’s “casual racism,” has claimed that it indicates that Ondaatje is 
clearly “on the side of the enemy or Sinhala nationalism”’ (138).
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perfectly plausible).16 And this is what makes it so easy to overlook the 
solitary detail within this passage that gestures toward its invisible 
referential locus. I am referring to the line on page 305, where we 
learn that beneath his brocade costume, Ananda is wearing Sarath’s 
cotton shirt – ‘the one he had promised himself he would wear for this 
morning’s ceremony.’17 While everything else in the passage moves 
us toward a higher plane of paradigmatic meaning (where we may 
very well discover something of ‘thematic’ significance), this single, 
relatively mundane detail takes us to another place altogether. By 
gesturing toward the ‘unutterable traumatic occurrence’ (Quayson, 
Calibrations 82) that has precipitated this sudden discharge of symbolic 
meaning, it creates a pathway into the underlying structure of the 
narrative. Or to revive my earlier analogy, it moves us away from the 
narrative’s frontal lobes – where higher-order cognitive reasoning 
takes place – and into the deeper recesses of its limbic system, where 
the amygdala is located. This is the almond-shaped bundle of nerves, 
you may recall, that ‘creates’ the feeling of fear, giving rise to the 
various physiological processes and behavioural responses that we 
have learned to categorize in this way. Or in the case of Anil’s Ghost, 
as we have seen, it activates a phobic response on the part of the 
discourse itself, one that is registered most clearly, at the ‘cognitive’ 
level, as a series of generic and stylistic incongruities. But this response 
does not mean that the dead have been forgotten, only that they have 
assumed another form, another kind of discursive presence; and if we 
read the novel carefully enough, it is still possible to detect the faint 
traces of those who have disappeared – whether it be in the guise of 
the figurative, the mundane, or the symbolic.
 16 For Quayson, it is worth noting, symbolization compulsion can in some 
cases take the form of an ‘intensified perceptual sensorium’ accompanied 
by the ‘intrusion of the extraordinary into the mundane’ (‘Symbolization’ 
764); and it is also interesting that Freud should associate ‘increased 
sensory attention’ with the feeling of ‘realistic anxiety’ (Introductory 
442).
 17 This crucial gesture is anticipated earlier in the novel when we are told 
that Anil ‘used to believe that meaning allowed a person a door to escape 
grief and fear. But she [now] saw that those who were slammed and 
stained by violence lost the power of language and logic. It was the way 
to abandon emotion, a last protection for the self. They held on to just 
the coloured and patterned sarong a missing relative last slept in, which 




C H A P T E R  S I X
Stuplimity 
Vikram Chandra’s Sacred Games 
Stuplimity
Ours is indeed an age of extremity. For we live under 
continual threat of two equally fearful, but seemingly 
opposed, destinies: unremitting banality and inconceivable 
terror.
Susan Sontag, ‘The Imagination of Disaster,’ 1965
We were interested precisely in those things which are the 
opposite of the extraordinary yet … are not the ordinary 
either.
Paul Virilio, ‘On Georges Perec,’ 2001
I
Although it is often described as a thriller and demonstrates many of 
the characteristics that we typically associate with this genre, Vikram 
Chandra’s 2006 novel Sacred Games can, in places, be surprisingly 
unthrilling. For long stretches of time, nothing of any real significance 
transpires; and much of the narrative serves to impede, rather than 
facilitate, the progress of its most ‘thrilling’ plotline. It is certainly 
true that there is no shortage of spectacle here – whether it takes the 
form of a brutal gangland massacre, a terrorist bombing, or a police 
siege. Yet we are also exposed to the routine violence and criminality 
that, for many people, has become an inescapable feature of everyday 
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life in Mumbai, the Indian city of twenty-two million that serves as 
the novel’s primary setting. In the following pages, I would like to 
suggest that this conjunction of opposing categories gives rise to a 
dominant structure of feeling that not only influences the novel at the 
representational or mimetic level, where all the action takes place, but 
also penetrates the deeper reaches of form, genre, and style. More 
specifically, I shall argue that the concurrence of both spectacular 
and mundane forms of criminality within Sacred Games produces an 
affective state that is equally heterogeneous, combining the categories 
of the sublime and the stupefying, the astonishing and the boring. 
And this feeling – which I shall be describing as one of ‘stuplimity’ 
(Ngai, Ugly 271) – ultimately infiltrates the discourse itself, creating an 
unsettling slippage between the narrative’s more significant episodes 
(or nuclei) and those that constitute mere filler.
Before we begin, though, it may be worth considering, just briefly, 
some other crime narratives that have sought to dissolve the boundary 
between the public sphere and the private, the historical event and the 
everyday occurrence. In 1987, the Subaltern Studies historian Ranajit 
Guha published an essay, entitled ‘Chandra’s Death,’ that would go on 
to acquire a seminal status within the field of postcolonial studies. 
Based on a fragmentary document he discovered in the archives of 
Viswabharati University, Guha’s essay describes the accidental death 
of a young woman – a member of the disadvantaged Bagdi agricultural 
caste – in rural Bengal in the year 1849. The woman in question, 
Chandra Chashani, had been conducting an ‘illicit love affair’ (136) with 
her brother-in-law, and when this transgression led to an unwanted 
pregnancy, she was offered the choice of either aborting the child 
or being ostracized from the village in a punishment known as bhek. 
Together with her female relatives, Chandra decided on the former 
course of action; and with this purpose in mind, they procured ‘a herbal 
medicine which had to be taken thrice a day … [along] with some 
horituki (a wild fruit of medicinal value) and two tablets of bakhor guli (a 
preparation of herbs and rice used to induce abortion) diluted in lime 
water.’ In her subsequent statement, Chandra’s sister described the 
tragic consequences of this decision. ‘I prepared a paste of the medicine 
with my own hands,’ she said,
and administered one dose of it to Chandra at a quarter past the 
second pohor of the night [around 12.45 a.m.] … [As a result, the] 
foetus was destroyed and it fell to the ground. My mother picked 
up the bloody foetus with some straw and threw it away. Even 
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after that the pain in Chandra’s belly continued to increase and she 
died [roughly two hours before sunrise]. Chandra’s corpse was then 
buried near the [river’s] bend by my brother Gayaram, his brother-in-
law, and my mother’s brother Horilal. I administered the medicine in 
the belief that it would terminate her pregnancy and did not realize 
that it would kill her. (qtd. in Guha 136)
According to Guha, this document reveals the limitations of traditional 
historiography, which has been ‘[d]esigned for big events and 
institutions’ and ‘tends to ignore the small drama and fine detail of 
social existence, especially at its lower depths’ (138). Moreover, the 
fact that the episode has been translated into judicial discourse, in 
the form of a legal deposition, makes it particularly elusive. Although 
we are offered a number of statements that constitute ‘direct speech,’ 
Guha observes,
it is speech prompted by the requirements of an official investi-
gation into what is presumed to be a murder … [T]he narrative in the 
document [thus] violates the actual sequence of what happened in 
order to conform to the logic of a legal intervention which made the 
death into a murder, a caring sister into [a] murderess, all the actants 
in this tragedy into defendants, and what they said in a state of grief 
into ekrars [a legal term for confessions or acknowledgements of 
guilt]. (139–41) 
As a way of challenging these reductive judicial processes, Guha 
advocates a ‘critical historiography’ that is capable of ‘bending closer 
to the ground [so as] to pick up the traces of a subaltern life in its 
passage through time’ (138). And in this particular case, he argues, such 
a methodology would involve recontextualizing the document (and 
the ‘crime’ it describes) by situating it within ‘the life of a community,’ 
where ‘a multitude of anxieties and interventions endowed it with 
its real historical content,’ and by seeing it not as an ekrar, not 
as an admission of legal culpability, but as ‘the record of a Bagdi 
family’s effort to cope collectively, if unsuccessfully, with a [personal] 
crisis’ (142).1
 1 Although Guha’s masterful essay has been particularly influential within 
Indian literary studies, it is possible to identify similar tendencies 
elsewhere too. In 1984, for instance, the South African critic Njabulo 
Ndebele delivered a lecture in which he argued that the ‘history of black 
South African literature has largely been the history of the representation 
of spectacle.’ According to Ndebele, the sheer visibility of apartheid, the 
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If historiographical discourse has traditionally ignored ‘the small 
drama and fine detail of social existence, especially at its lower depths’ 
(138), and judicial discourse has typically reduced the complexity of 
crime to ‘a set of narrowly defined legalities’ (140), then we must look 
elsewhere for a more complete picture of these historical episodes. In 
a fascinating aside, Guha identifies one such source in the ‘narratives 
of crime’ (récits de crimes) that were widely read in France during the 
nineteenth century. These journalistic descriptions of actual cases, 
he writes, made it possible for the ‘common murder … to cross the 
uncertain frontier which separates it from the “nameless butcheries” of 
battle and make its way into history’ (139–40). Guha is quoting Foucault 
here, and referring, more specifically, to his 1973 essay ‘Tales of Murder’ 
(which discusses the case of Pierre Rivière, a Norman peasant who 
murdered three members of his immediate family in 1835). If we turn 
to this essay, it is easy to see why Guha favours such popular journalism 
as an alternative to standard historiographical and judicial discourse. 
According to Foucault, the purpose of the nineteenth-century récit de 
crime was to
alter the scale, to enlarge the proportions, to bring out the microscopic 
seed of the story, and make narrative accessible to the everyday. The 
first requisite in bringing about this change was to introduce into the 
narrative the elements, personages, deeds, dialogues, and subjects 
which normally had no place in [it] because they were undignified or 
lacking in social importance, and the second was to see that all these 
minor events, however commonplace and monotonous they may be, 
appeared ‘singular,’ ‘curious,’ ‘extraordinary,’ unique, or very nearly 
so, in the memory of man. (204)
spectacular nature of its systemic ‘violence and brutality,’ has given rise 
to ‘a highly dramatic, highly demonstrative form of literary represen-
tation’ (41). Under the circumstances, of course, this would appear to 
be a perfectly valid response to the flagrant inequities of apartheid; 
and Ndebele is careful to acknowledge as much in his lecture. However, 
he also argues that it is necessary to move beyond this melodramatic 
emphasis on spectacle by ‘rediscovering the ordinary’ – by making the 
‘ordinary daily lives of people … the direct focus of political [and literary] 
interest’ (57). Responding to Ndebele’s lecture some thirty years later, 
Saikat Majumdar has also emphasized the need for ‘[n]arratives of postco-
lonial reality’ to situate themselves within the world of the quotidian 
and the uninteresting, thereby ‘reclaim[ing] banality as an aesthetic form’ 
and acknowledging the significance of boredom for the vast majority of 
people who live their lives ‘far from the glare of the spectacle’ (178).
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By privileging ‘minor events’ in this way, Foucault concludes, such 
narratives were able to ‘make the transition from the familiar to the 
remarkable, the everyday to the historical’ (204), and thus served as a 
crucial ‘point of intersection’ (205) between these disparate spheres.
In Sacred Games, as I have noted, we encounter a similar collision 
of contraries. On the one hand, over the course of 947 pages, we are 
made to endure all the banality, repetition, and monotony of crime 
and criminality in the city of Mumbai, while on the other hand, we 
find ourselves confronting the periodic rupture of the ordinary in the 
‘spectacular’ form of terrorism and communal violence. In what follows, 
I shall be exploring both sides of this apparent dichotomy. I will begin by 
discussing the minor crimes to be found within the pages of Chandra’s 
novel – the petty burglaries, the routine corruption, the domestic 
disputes, and so on. I will then move on to address the episodes of 
‘exceptional’ criminality that also feature here: namely, the destruction 
of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992, the communal violence that took 
place in Bombay (as it was then known) in 1992–93, and the retaliatory 
bombings that occurred on 12 March 1993, killing 257 people.2 For 
some time, I shall argue, our hero – the police inspector Sartaj Singh 
– oscillates from one extreme to the other, from the banal to the 
extraordinary, the boring to the spectacular, before finally reconciling 
these traditional antitheses. The emotion that Sartaj experiences as a 
consequence of this dialectical intermingling could best be described 
by invoking Sianne Ngai’s notion of stuplimity (as formulated in her 
2005 work Ugly Feelings). According to Ngai, classic theories of the 
sublime fail to account for the ‘experience of boredom’ that has become 
‘increasingly intertwined with contemporary experiences of aesthetic 
awe’ (8). ‘Stuplimity,’ a portmanteau combination of the stupefying and 
the sublime, is the term she uses to delineate an aesthetic response 
of this kind, one in which ‘the initial experience of being aesthetically 
overwhelmed involves not terror or pain … but something much closer 
to an ordinary fatigue’ (270). And as we shall see, this is precisely the 
mood that dominates the conclusion of Sacred Games, allowing these 
 2 In 1995, the state government of Maharashtra, led by the right-wing 
Shiv Sena party, officially changed the name of the city from Bombay to 
Mumbai – thus privileging the language, culture, and history of the city’s 
Marathi majority. (For a particularly illuminating analysis of the identity 
politics underlying this transformation, see Hansen 1–6.) In this chapter, 




‘opposing’ realities – the stupefying and the sublime, the mundane and 
the spectacular – to infiltrate the very tissue of the narrative we are 
reading.
II
At a superficial, proairetic level – the level of action and plotting – Sacred 
Games clearly qualifies as a thriller. In the novel’s opening pages, Sartaj 
Singh, the world-weary police inspector mentioned above, discovers 
the dead body of a local gangster in a nuclear fallout shelter, and at the 
behest of the Indian security services, he launches an investigation into 
the case. Why had the legendary bhai, Ganesh Gaitonde, returned to 
Mumbai in the first place, and what was he doing in a bunker that had 
been designed to withstand a nuclear apocalypse? During his investi-
gation, Sartaj discovers that in recent years Gaitonde had fallen under 
the influence of a radical Hindu religious figure, Swami Shridhar Shukla 
(‘Guru-ji’), who has managed to smuggle a nuclear bomb into Mumbai 
with the intention of detonating it in the centre of the city and thereby 
ushering in a millenarian ‘golden age’ (838). As one might anticipate, 
however, Sartaj eventually manages to locate the nuclear device and, in 
so doing, both ensures the survival of the city he loves and reinforces 
the generic allegiance of the narrative in which he figures.
But there is a good deal more to Sacred Games than the plot I 
have outlined here. In his classic essay ‘Introduction to the Structural 
Analysis of Narratives,’ Roland Barthes draws a useful distinction 
between nuclei (those occurrences that ‘constitute [the] real hinge 
points of [a] narrative’) and catalyzers (those occurrences that ‘merely 
“fill in” the narrative space separating the [nuclei]’) (265). According 
to Barthes, nuclei are ‘the risky moments of a narrative’ – the places 
where discoveries are made, disasters averted, and nuclear devices 
disabled – while the catalyzers ‘lay out areas of safety’ (266), places 
where the energy of the narrative dissipates and nothing of any genuine 
consequence transpires.3 In the preceding synopsis, needless to say, 
I have cited only one or two of the novel’s most essential nuclei; yet 
as any reader of Sacred Games will know, the space between these 
crucial occurrences is heavily freighted with catalytic detail. On several 
occasions over the course of the novel, Sartaj becomes trapped in the 
‘congealed mass’ (Chandra, Sacred 88) of a traffic jam, the ‘compacted 
 3 For more on the distinction between nuclei and catalyzers, see Chapter 2.
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clog of rush-hour traffic’ (227), and one could argue that these delays 
serve as an intradiegetic correlative for the rather clogged nature of the 
narrative itself. Take the following passage, for instance:
A party of Municipal men were working on a hole in the road. They 
weren’t actually working, they were standing around the hole looking 
at it, and apparently waiting for something to happen. Meanwhile, a 
vast funnel of traffic pressed up against the bottleneck. Sartaj was 
somewhere towards the front, on his motorcycle. He was hemmed 
in by a BEST bus and two autos, and there was nowhere for anyone 
to go, so they all waited companionably. The bus was crammed 
full of office-goers, and the autos were taking college students to 
their classes. Young boys were working the stalled traffic, selling 
magazines and water and gaudy Chinese statues of a laughing man 
with his hands above his head. A pair of maimed beggars went from 
car to car, tapping their stumps on the windscreens. (945–46)
Of course, a scene like this is not without significance; but any meaning 
it does generate is inevitably ‘attenuated [and] parasitic’ (Barthes, 
‘Introduction’ 266).4 We could remove this passage entirely, or alter 
every sentence, every detail, and the basic narrative structure would 
remain unchanged, for none of these magazines or bottles of water or 
gaudy Chinese statues contribute anything of real value to the story we 
are reading. Like the traffic jam itself, all these catalyzers do is prevent 
the narrative from moving forward – forcing us to turn our attention 
to the inconsequential, the banal, and the boring while we wait ‘for 
something [of significance] to happen.’5
 4 In a perceptive article on the role of waiting (anticipation, deferral, delay, 
etc.) in the contemporary detective novel, Theodore Martin argues that 
this particular scene demonstrates the fact that waiting is not merely ‘an 
empty space of disappointment,’ an ‘absence or a void,’ but the ‘temporal 
form of our inchoate, unfolding present.’ In other words, the traffic jam 
gives Sartaj ‘a different way to measure present time … Forced, finally, to 
slow down, [he] is no longer waiting for something. The experience of the 
traffic jam instead hints that [waiting] is the basic condition of everyday life 
– the time that governs each passing day’ (180–81). Although this interpre-
tation is obviously quite legitimate (and provides a good example of the 
way in which any scene, however banal it may be, is capable of generating 
symbolic meaning), the traffic jam still carries no ‘proairetic’ significance 
within the narrative and does nothing whatsoever to move the plot along.
 5 Ross Chambers’ description of narrative ‘clogging’ comes to mind here. 
‘What is at issue in [the] clogging of narrative,’ he writes, ‘is a certain 
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We find the same aesthetic strategy employed elsewhere too. 
Relatively early in the novel, Sartaj and his partner are waiting (once more) 
to apprehend some gangsters who are suspected of having murdered 
one of their accomplices; and in order to kill time, and fill space, they 
begin to trade grievances. Among other things, they complain about 
the municipality, the price of mangoes, the traffic, collapsing buildings, 
clogged drains, bad movies, unwatchable television, interstate 
quarrelling over natural water resources, American interference in 
subcontinental affairs, the depiction of the police in the aforemen-
tioned movies – and, of course, ‘the job, the job, and the job.’ When 
you have ‘complained enough about everything else,’ our narrator says, 
‘there [is] always the job, with its unspeakable hours, its monotony, its 
political complications, its thanklessness, [and] its exhaustion’ (296). As 
readers, we are already familiar with the monotony of Sartaj’s profes-
sional duties – not to mention his fatigue. On page 19, for example, he 
is assigned to investigate a murder case that we are told, quite candidly, 
will not be ‘especially interesting.’ The neighbourhood where the crime 
occurred, a slum by the name of Navnagar, is ‘very poor, and dead 
bodies there [are] just dead, devoid of any enlivening possibilities of 
professional praise, or press, or money’ (19). And this indeed proves to 
be true. As far as Sartaj’s partner, Katekar, is concerned,
a Bangladeshi boy had been murdered by his [accomplices], but so 
what? It was a minor case with minor possibilities, and it could easily 
be investigated on paper, just like the municipality lorries which on 
paper ran punctually every morning. Nobody would mind too much 
if this case was left undetected, and so it was silly to be out here 
[in Navnagar] suffering [the] odours and the odiousness of these 
foreigners. (78)
This minor case with minor possibilities, devoid of any larger signif-
icance, will eventually be solved; but like so much else in the novel, it 
hovers on the very edge of tellability and contributes almost nothing 
reversal of proportion and emphasis between narrative structure, with 
its reliance on story and its beginning-middle-end grammar of closure, 
and the paradigmatic or listing dimension of discourse that spins out 
a narrative enunciation in time, employing devices like description, 
parenthesis, asyndeton, digression, so that the supposedly secondary 
comes to occupy the foreground of attention, and the hierarchizing 
distinction between the relevant and the pointless, on which the story 
depends, begins to lose its own cogency’ (117).
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to the primary plotline that we are supposed to be following (the one 
involving the dead gangster and the threatened destruction of India’s 
largest city).6 And the same thing could be said of all the other routine 
crimes that clog the narrative too – the ‘everyday matters of blackmail, 
thievery, [and] murder’ (614) that are ‘perfunctorily investigated and 
[almost] never solved’ (429).7
At the microcosmic level, as we have seen, this inconsequential 
‘filling’ (magazines, bottles of water, gaudy Chinese statues, etc.) has 
practically no inf luence over the underlying structure of the narrative. 
However, when entire scenes assume a largely catalytic function, they 
create conspicuous deviations in the novel’s plot trajectory. To some 
degree, of course, all plotting involves a series of deviations from a 
straight line; without these irregularities, these ‘anomalies,’ there 
would be no intervening substance to prevent the beginning of a 
narrative from collapsing prematurely into its end. ‘Deviance,’ Peter 
Brooks writes, ‘detour, an intention that is irritation: these are [the] 
characteristics of the narratable … of fabula [story] become sjužet 
[discourse].’ The desire we experience as readers, Brooks argues, like 
the ‘desire’ of the discourse itself, is ultimately ‘desire for the end, 
but desire for the end reached only through the at least minimally 
complicated detour, the intentional deviance … which is the plot of 
narrative’ (Reading 104). Such deviations are, then, essential to the 
diachronic unfolding of any narrative, yet again it is a question of 
degree; and in the case of Sacred Games, these digressive tendencies 
become one of the novel’s governing aesthetic principles. Consider 
the morgue scene, for instance, which takes place in Chapter 4. In 
the classic detective novel or police procedural, this scene serves a 
crucial function. It establishes, in the form of a dead body lying on 
an autopsy table or a steel refrigerator-tray, a point of intersection 
between two different narratives: the narrative of the crime, usually 
 6 By ‘tellability’ I mean, very simply, the quality that makes stories worth 
telling, the ‘prolonged deviance from the quiescence of the “normal”’ 
(Brooks, Reading 103) that characterizes all successful narratives. For a 
useful summary of this concept, see Ryan.
 7 In an article on the aesthetics of the ‘non-event’ in contemporary South 
Asian literature, Megha Anwer makes a similar observation, arguing that 
Sacred Games ‘shrink[s] from climactic moments, evading the event in 
favour of desultory non-events and the quotidian’ (27). Unlike Anwer, 
however, I shall be exploring the way in which the novel ultimately 
achieves an amalgamation of the eventful and the non-eventful, the 
spectacular and the boring, in the form of stuplimity.
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murder, and the narrative of the investigation.8 For this reason, 
the morgue scene typically occupies a privileged position within 
the narrative, and often provides the detective with something of 
forensic (and narratological) value – a way of moving the case (and the 
plot) forward. In Sacred Games, however, Sartaj’s visit to the morgue 
to view the dead bodies of Gaitonde and his female companion, Jojo, 
is ultimately futile, a complete waste of narrative energy. Once more, 
this is something that Sartaj’s partner correctly anticipates: ‘The man 
was dead, Katekar said, and he and the woman would remain dead, 
so there was no need to go near them now, none at all’ (90). Ignoring 
this advice, Sartaj passes at least half an hour – and five pages – in 
the morgue, before rejoining his colleague outside. Although he 
assures the pathologist that seeing the dead bodies has been ‘[v]ery 
useful,’ on reflection he decides otherwise: ‘Now the desire to see the 
bodies, which only a little while ago had seemed so coherent, seemed 
bizarre. What had he learnt? Sartaj had no idea. It had all been a waste 
of time’ (95; my italics).
It should be pointed out at this stage that I am not simply referring 
to the odd superfluous scene here; I am actually describing the 
majority of the novel. For alongside the story of Sartaj’s investigation, 
we are also offered a detailed, analeptic account of Gaitonde’s rise to 
prominence within the Mumbai underworld. This tangential plotline is 
narrated by Gaitonde himself and occupies at least half of the novel’s 
947 pages – carrying us from ‘A to C’ by way of ‘L, M and Z’ (526). 
The dead gangster’s story is engaging, to be sure, and beautifully 
told; but for the most part it operates not on the syntagmatic plane 
of the (primary) narrative, moving the plot forward in a horizontal 
direction, but on the associative or paradigmatic plane, which always 
moves sideways, at an oblique angle, bringing us no closer to the final 
predication of the narrative sentence. In this regard, the trajectory of 
the novel could be said to resemble the ‘squiggle’ that Balzac, citing 
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, uses as his epigraph to The Wild Ass’ Skin 
(1831):
 8 I am paraphrasing Tzvetan Todorov here. As we saw in Chapter 5, he 
famously observed that the classic detective novel ‘contains not one but 
two stories: the story of the crime and the story of the investigation.’ 
According to Todorov, we can characterize ‘these two stories by saying 
that the first – the story of the crime – tells “what really happened,” 
whereas the second – the story of the investigation – explains “how the 
reader (or the narrator) has come to know about it”’ (44–45).
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But why should Sacred Games look like this? Why should a novel that is 
supposed to be a thriller consistently privilege the paradigmatic over 
the syntagmatic, deviance over directionality? In his incisive reading of 
Eugène Sue’s The Mysteries of Paris (1842–43), Brooks provides us with a 
possible answer to these questions. As the nineteenth century became 
increasingly ‘standardized and boring,’ he argues, writers began to 
explore a new ‘urban topography and demography,’ one of ‘crime and 
social deviance’ (Reading 147). In Sue’s case, it is clear that he regarded 
the Parisian underworld, the ‘social inferno’ (153) in which he chose 
to situate his roman-feuilleton, as ‘the last refuge of the narratable’ 
(155). That was where his stories were to be found, among the various 
reprobates, the prostitutes and thieves, who in those days populated 
the Cité; and as a consequence, these wayward and degenerate figures 
came to embody two different types of deviance – one social, the other 
narratological. As Brooks writes,
Deviance as a question in social pathology offers an opportunity for 
tracing its arabesque figure as plot. That ‘arabesque’ – the figure 
found in La Peau de chagrin [The Wild Ass’ Skin] – represents the 
opposite of the straight line: it is the longest possible line between 
two points, or rather, the maintenance of the greatest possible 
deviance and detour between beginning and end, depending on the 
play of retardation, repetition, and return in the postponement and 
progressive unveiling of the end … If the wretched of the earth are 
Sue’s preferred subject, it may be first of all because … they are 
eminently the stuff of plotted story. (155–56)
In Sacred Games, the various criminal figures (and above all Gaitonde 
himself) also constitute ‘the stuff of plotted story.’ They, too, embody 
both social and narratological deviance. Yet as we have observed, the 
stories they generate in such abundance often contribute very little 
to the narrative’s primary plotline. Instead, these episodes of routine 
crime and violence assume a catalytic quality, creating paradigmatic 
subtrajectories that consistently lead us away from, rather than toward, 




As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, however, episodes of 
‘exceptional’ criminality can also be found within the pages of Sacred 
Games. Situated more obviously in the public sphere, these episodes 
form part of a larger, historical narrative that will already be familiar 
to many of the novel’s readers. In December 1992, the Babri Masjid, 
a sixteenth-century mosque located in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, was 
illegally demolished during a rally held by the Vishva Hindu Parishad 
(VHP), a right-wing Hindu nationalist organization affiliated with the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Constructed on a site that also carries 
religious significance for Hindus, the mosque had long been ‘the pivot 
for leaping political parties, the target for processions of thousands, 
[and] the standing sign for ancient wrongs’ (Chandra, Sacred 383). In 
the days following the demolition of the mosque, communal violence 
erupted in urban centres around the country, leading to the death of 
an estimated 900 people in Bombay alone.9 The majority of the dead 
were Muslim, and in many cases they had been killed with the direct 
complicity of the police.10 In retaliation for this violence, Dawood 
Ibrahim, a legendary figure within the Mumbai underworld, organized 
a series of bombings in the city that took place on 12 March 1993, 
killing 257 people and injuring roughly 700.11 As a young police officer, 
Sartaj had witnessed the 1993 bombings, and he finds it difficult, even 
years later, to reconcile this ‘spectacular’ event, this terrifying rupture 
of the ordinary, with the everyday crimes he typically solves. On one 
occasion, for instance, while searching for a missing chokra (or street 
kid), he remembers ‘that day, that long-ago Friday in 1993,’ when he 
had found himself ‘walking on blood, splashing through it,’ in the 
immediate aftermath of the explosions. Although he tries, repeatedly, 
to ‘[c]oncentrate on the problem at hand’ (the missing chokra in the red 
 9 For a vivid description of this violence, see Chandra, Sacred 383–87.
 10 A 1998 commission of inquiry led by Justice B.N. Srikrishna found that 
the Bombay police had not only failed to prevent anti-Muslim violence 
during the 1992–93 riots, but had actually participated in such atrocities 
by ‘shoot[ing] people dead or actively direct[ing] the [Shiv] Sena mobs’ 
(Mehta 81).
 11 For a detailed account of Ibrahim’s life and career, see Zaidi, Dongri; and 
for more on the subject of the 1993 bombings, see Zaidi, Black. In the 
foreword to the first of these volumes, Vikram Chandra acknowledges 
that much of Sacred Games was based on information provided by Zaidi, 
who served as his Dantesque ‘guide into the underworld’ (ix).
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T-shirt), he is ‘unable to rid himself completely of [these] memories’ 
(519), and of his fear that Mumbai may be about to experience another 
episode of apocalyptic violence. ‘What use was it to be concerned with 
the everyday matters of blackmail, thievery, [or] murder,’ he wonders 
later in the novel,
when this enormous fear billowed overhead? It was an abstracted 
danger, this grim notion of a sweeping fire, it was unreal. But with its 
cold drip of images, it crowded out the mundane. Sartaj blinked. He 
was at his desk, in his dingy little office with the weathered benches 
and untidy shelves. [Another police officer] was hunched over a 
report. Two constables were laughing in the corridor outside. There 
was a little pool of sunlight from a window, and a pair of hopping 
little sparrows on the sill. And all of it was dreamlike, as gauzy as 
the wafting of early morning. If you let yourself believe in that other 
monstrous thing, even a little, then this ordinary world of bribes and 
divorces and electricity bills vanished … It got eaten up. (614)12
In this passage, as elsewhere, Sartaj oscillates rapidly from one extreme 
to another. On the one hand, he experiences an overwhelming fear of 
nuclear annihilation (‘this grim notion of a sweeping fire’), while on 
the other, he forces himself to concentrate on the mundane reality of 
his daily life (‘this ordinary world of bribes and divorces’). Try as he 
might, he is simply incapable of accommodating both the exceptional 
and the routine, the spectacular and the boring, without one of these 
categories invalidating or precluding the other. Images of a nuclear 
apocalypse, we are told, ‘crowded out the mundane,’ leaving no space 
whatsoever for the banal substance of everyday life. Or to put it 
another way, we might say that Sartaj is struggling here to reconcile 
the nuclear (this time in the narratological sense of the word) with the 
catalytic – his dingy little office, the weathered benches, the untidy 
shelves.
 12 Sartaj’s fear of nuclear annihilation may not be restricted to the specific 
threat he faces here. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests conducted 
by the Indian Army in 1998 (codenamed Operation Shakti), Ashis Nandy 
published a sobering article in which he explored the ‘psychopatho-
logical’ consequences of the Indo-Pakistani arms race. The ideology of 
‘nuclearism,’ he wrote, ‘seeps into public consciousness, [creating] a new 
awareness of the transience of life. It forces people to live with the 
constant fear that, one day, a sudden war or accident might kill not only 




Of course, there are clear correspondences between this dynamic 
and the act of reading itself, which also combines the exceptional 
and the routine, the nuclear and the catalytic. In other words, every 
narrative fluctuates between episodes of intensity and episodes of 
relative quiescence (Barthes’ ‘areas of safety’), where nothing of any real 
significance seems to be happening; and this shifting dynamic in turn 
influences our experience as readers – episodes of greater intensity 
within a narrative typically soliciting more attentive or avid reading 
than the intervening ‘low-intensity’ passages. As Barthes observes in 
The Pleasure of the Text, the classic readerly narrative
bears within it a sort of diluted tmesis: we do not read everything 
with the same intensity of reading; a rhythm is established, casual, 
unconcerned with the integrity of the text; our very avidity for 
knowledge impels us to skim or to skip certain passages (anticipated 
as ‘boring’) in order to get more quickly to the warmer parts of 
the anecdote … we boldly skip (no one is watching) descriptions, 
explanations, analyses, conversations … [I]t is the very rhythm of 
what is read and what is not read that creates the pleasure of the 
great narratives: has anyone ever read Proust, Balzac, War and Peace, 
word for word? (10–11)
Needless to say, one does feel inclined to read every word of Sacred 
Games, but we may not read every page with the same ‘avidity.’ And 
in those passages or scenes that could be described as low-intensity 
– where the paradigmatic function of the discourse overrides its 
syntagmatic function, or where the catalytic eclipses the nuclear – 
we may find ourselves anticipating more eagerly the action that lies 
ahead. This is, after all, a thriller; and it is a fundamental requirement 
of the genre that it should privilege the proairetic over all other codes. 
Yet for long stretches of time, we are obliged to focus our attention 
on episodes of minimal significance: a two-year sojourn in the Arthur 
Road jail (450–87, 490–505), a mystical enquiry into ‘the nature of the 
self [and] the universe’ (609; 574–605), even the ill-fated production 
of a Bollywood movie (666–704). And it is during these episodes, as 
the narrative explores the outer reaches of relevance – the discursive 
equivalent of weathered benches and untidy shelves – that we first 
encounter the phenomenon of stuplimity.
In Ugly Feelings, if you remember, Sianne Ngai uses the term 
‘stuplimity’ to describe the way in which boredom or fatigue has 
become ‘increasingly intertwined with contemporary experiences 
of aesthetic awe’ (8) – hence her neologistic conjunction of the 
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stupefying and the sublime. Some of the examples she offers, in order 
to demonstrate this tendency, include Gertrude Stein’s 922-page The 
Making of Americans (‘an experiment in both duration and endurance’ 
[253]), Samuel Beckett’s late fiction (which manages to be ‘[s]imulta-
neously astonishing and … fatiguing’ [260]), and the ‘exciting [yet] 
enervating’ (264) work of Georges Perec, John Cage, and Gerhard 
Richter. According to Ngai, such a contradictory aesthetic gives rise to 
an equally contradictory emotional response, involving a combination 
of affective states that, in traditional theories of the sublime, have 
always been regarded as mutually exclusive. She describes this hybrid 
feeling as a ‘concatenation of boredom and astonishment – a bringing 
together of what “dulls,” and what “irritates” or agitates; [a mixture] of 
sharp, sudden excitation and prolonged desensitization, exhaustion, 
or fatigue’ (271). I am not suggesting, of course, that Sacred Games is 
simply boring, or that it could be easily classified alongside Gerhard 
Richter’s Atlas (1997) or the meticulous inventories of Georges Perec. 
However, I do believe that its governing aesthetic principles can be 
aligned, in several key ways, with Ngai’s notion of stuplimity. For one 
thing, as we have seen, the narrative of Sacred Games is particularly 
vulnerable to clogging, whether it be in the form of unnecessary 
catalytic detail (magazines, bottles of water, gaudy Chinese statues, 
etc.) or equally unnecessary paradigmatic digressions (recall, if you 
will, the morgue scene, which even our hero describes as a complete 
‘waste of time’ [95]). Such clogging or coagulation is, for Ngai, one 
of the characteristic features of stuplimity. Although ‘repetition, 
permutation, and seriality figure prominently as devices in aesthetic 
uses of tedium,’ she notes, ‘[writers] have achieved the same effect 
through a strategy of agglutination – the mass adhesion or coagulation 
of data particles or signifying units’ (263; my italics).13 In the case of 
 13 One could also relate such agglutination to Sara Ahmed’s notion of 
‘stickiness,’ a term she uses to describe the way in which certain objects, 
bodies, or signs can become ‘saturated with affect’ (Cultural 11), be it 
positive or negative. According to Ahmed, this accumulation of affective 
value not only binds objects, bodies, or signs together, but may also 
create a blockage, preventing them from ‘moving [on] and acquiring new 
value’ (92). Stickiness, she writes, ‘involves a form of relationality, or a 
“withness,” in which the elements that are “with” get bound together. 
One can stick by a friend. One can get stuck in traffic. Some forms of 
stickiness are about holding things together. Some are about blockages 




Sacred Games, this steady accretion of extraneous material serves to 
elongate the discourse, ensuring that the space between the beginning 
and the end should be filled with as much (narratological) deviance as 
possible; and this, too, is a typical feature of the ‘stuplime’ narrative. 
Like the feelings they generate, Ngai argues, such narratives often 
have a ‘remarkable capacity for duration’ (7), an ability to fill page after 
page with particles of meaning whose functionality or value within the 
narrative as a whole approaches the zero degree.
Over the course of Sacred Games, as I have suggested, Sartaj 
struggles to reconcile the spectacular nature of communal violence 
and nuclear annihilation with the mundane reality of his everyday life 
(‘this ordinary world of bribes and divorces’ [614]). Only at the very 
end of the novel does he experience a genuine sense of stuplimity – as 
the sublime finally merges with the stupefying, the spectacular with 
the boring. It is early evening, and Sartaj and his colleagues have at 
last managed to locate the nuclear device that has been smuggled into 
Mumbai. Once they arrive at the scene, a ‘two-storey bungalow’ (874) 
in a neighbourhood known as Chembur, the police and the security 
forces immediately establish a command post some distance from the 
house itself. And this, we are told, is where Sartaj chooses to stay for 
the rest of the night, thereby missing the dramatic conclusion of his 
own narrative:
Sartaj never saw the bungalow … He was content to sit in the glow 
of the laptop screens and watch the [sky] change colour outside the 
window to the rear. Someone had once told him, he didn’t remember 
who, that the fantastic colours in Mumbai’s evening came from 
all the pollution that floated over the city, from all the incredible 
millions who crowded into a very small space. Sartaj had no doubt it 
was true, but the purples and reds and oranges were still beautiful 
and grand. (875)
Meanwhile, sixty metres away, ‘behind a screen of trees’ (875), the raid 
itself is taking place: ‘[Sartaj heard] a series of pops, and then another, 
phap-phap-phap, phap-phap-phap-phap. And then a last little boom … 
[And] with those little banging sounds far away, apparently the world had 
been saved’ (876–77). After more than eight hundred pages of prelimi-
naries, then, we have finally reached the novel’s climactic episode, the 
spectacular event that will provide the closure we have been seeking 
for so long, the ultimate discharge of meaning that will justify – or 
bestow value on – everything that has gone before. Only, when it does 
eventually transpire, this climactic event, it takes place just beyond 
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the representational range of the narrative we are reading. Instead 
of witnessing the raid directly, that is to say, we are obliged to join 
Sartaj in contemplating the colour of the evening sky. And rather than 
experiencing the ‘thrill’ that the novel’s generic affiliation ostensibly 
promises, we are subjected instead to our narrator’s inexplicable sense 
of fatigue:
Sartaj tried to discover some enthusiasm within himself … but 
he just felt sleepy. He noted his own curious lack of excitement 
about the prospect of being saved, and thought it was probably just 
exhaustion … Probably I will feel something tomorrow. But right 
now I think I will just sit here and feel nothing. (876)
This apathy, this anticlimactic fatigue, is difficult to understand 
without recourse, once more, to the concept of stuplimity. When 
we encounter a combination of the sublime and the stupefying, Ngai 
argues, our ‘initial experience of being aesthetically overwhelmed 
involves not terror or pain … but something much closer to an ordinary 
fatigue’ (Ugly 270). And this is precisely what Sartaj is experiencing here 
– not a transcendent state of sublimity, not the kind of tranquillity 
that we might associate with Kant’s notion of sublime apatheia, but a 
much more ‘adulterated’ feeling, one that combines the overwhelming 
nature of the spectacular with the deadening qualities of the boring, 
the sudden irruption of the extraordinary with the inescapable banality 
of the everyday.14
 14 In Ugly Feelings, Ngai is careful to distinguish between the philosophical 
notion of apatheia, as it relates to the Kantian sublime, and the sense 
of boredom that accompanies the feeling of stuplimity. While apatheia 
signifies the complete absence of emotion, and is therefore experienced by 
the subject as neither ‘pleasurable nor unpleasurable,’ boredom ‘involves 
a deficiency of affect that is reflexively felt to be dysphoric – stultifying, 
tedious, irritating, fatiguing, or dulling’ (269). ‘Given the sluggishness 
associated with boredom,’ Ngai writes, ‘the difference between the two 
types of affective deficiency becomes clearer when Kant … contrasts 
“affection[s] of the strenuous kind,” which merit characterization as 
aesthetically sublime, with “affections of the languid kind,” which are 
barred from the sublime and, as Kant notes, “have nothing noble in 





In Book Two of Stendhal’s The Red and the Black (1830), the protagonist, 
Julien Sorel, challenges an aristocrat by the name of Charles de 
Beauvoisis to a duel. Once his challenge has been accepted, the two 
men immediately set off for the ‘secluded spot’ where the duel is 
to take place. The adversaries, each accompanied by a second, are 
travelling in the same carriage; and given the purpose of their journey, 
Julien is rather surprised when the conversation on the way proves to 
be ‘extremely pleasant’:
[Monsieur de Beauvoisis and his second] were talking about some 
dancers who had had a great public success at the ballet the previous 
evening. The gentlemen alluded to some spicy details about which 
Julien and his second, the lieutenant of the 96th, knew nothing 
whatsoever. Julien was not so stupid as to pretend to know; with 
a good grace he admitted his ignorance. His candour pleased [de 
Beauvoisis’] friend – he told them the stories replete with details, 
and told them very well. (285)
As for the duel itself, the melodramatic focal point of many a nineteenth-
century narrative, it ‘was over in a moment.’ Julien ‘received a ball in the 
arm; they dressed it with handkerchiefs; they damped these with brandy; 
and the Chevalier de Beauvoisis very politely begged to be allowed to 
take Julien home in the same carriage by which they had come’ (285). 
In this scene, as D.A. Miller has observed, the discourse undergoes 
a process of displacement; it moves sideways, like Balzac’s dilatory 
squiggle, gravitating toward the banal periphery of the narrative. Or to 
put it another way, rather than focusing on the episode’s ‘nuclear’ core 
(the ‘risky moment’ of the duel), it allows itself to be distracted by the 
surrounding catalyzers – those ‘areas of safety’ (Barthes, ‘Introduction’ 
266) where no one ever gets hurt and the conversation is always 
pleasing.15 On the one hand, Miller writes, there is
 15 Such tendencies are also typical of the digressive mode of writing that Ross 
Chambers has labelled ‘loiterature.’ According to Chambers, the classic 
‘loiterly’ narrative constitutes a site of ‘endless intersection,’ its narrator’s 
attention being ‘always divided between one thing and some other thing, 
always ready and willing to be distracted’ (9). The loiterly style, he writes, 
is ‘inevitably episodic [and] digressive’; it is ‘more concerned with the, 
often obscure, “coherence” of experience … than it is respectful of 
patterns that are more strictly designed and thus “cohesive”’ (31).
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something like a scenario: a sequence of actions whose order is 
presumed to be known in advance. Logical expectations are invoked: 
it is hard to imagine any telling of a duel … in which the actual 
shooting would not be the logical climax or ending of the account. 
Cultural expectations are aroused as well: semantically, a duel would 
seem naturally to involve motifs of honor, risk, fear, shame, and so 
forth. On the other hand, narrative attention is distracted from what 
logically and culturally ‘ought’ to happen; and it is instead focused 
on what retards or frustrates the articulation of the scenario, on 
peripheral details and incidents that the scenario neither demands 
nor accounts for. The very contours of the scenario run the risk 
of dissolving under the pressure of so much ‘irrelevant’ material. 
(Narrative 261)
The correspondences between this episode and the raid scene from 
Sacred Games ought to be clear. In both cases, the discourse defies its 
own generic imperatives by renouncing the spectacular, the dramatic, 
and the meaningful, in order to concentrate on their opposites: those 
‘subsidiary notations’ that ‘merely “fill in” the narrative space separating 
the [various nuclei]’ (Barthes, ‘Introduction’ 265). As Miller indicates, 
this catalytic material not only carries a minimal significance within 
the narrative as a whole, but it also ‘frustrates the articulation of the 
scenario’ itself – very nearly causing what really matters (the raid, the 
duel) to dissolve altogether under the pressure of such irrelevance. Very 
nearly but not quite; and that is the point I am trying to make with regard 
to Sacred Games. The spectacular may be sidelined here, the raid may be 
concealed ‘behind a screen of trees,’ but it is not entirely evacuated from 
the narrative. Instead, as I have suggested, this shift in narratorial focus 
ultimately brings about a conflation of these two categories – of the 
sublime and the stupefying – integrating one into the other, so that the 
spectacular becomes a constitutive feature of everyday life (no longer 
‘crowd[ing] out the mundane’ [Chandra, Sacred 614]), and the everyday 
in turn merges with the spectacular, creating something that is both 
extraordinary and banal, both astonishing and boring.
We see this conjunction quite plainly in the scene described above; 
but we also see it, operating in a more subtle way, in the novel’s final 
lines. Early one morning, we are told, having arrived at the police 
headquarters,
Sartaj got off his [motorcycle]. He put his shoes up on the pedal, one 
by one, and buffed them with a spare handkerchief until they shone. 
Then he ran a finger around his waistline, along the belt. He patted 
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his cheeks, and ran a forefinger and thumb along his moustache. He 
was sure it was magnificent. He was ready. He went in and began 
another day. (947)
And there the novel concludes. On the face of it, this passage would 
appear to be entirely unremarkable. Sartaj arrives at the police station; 
then he polishes his shoes and makes sure that everything else is in 
order, running a ‘forefinger and thumb along his moustache,’ before 
going inside. But the fact that these are the novel’s final lines gives 
them an underlying significance that belies their superficial banality. 
All endings, by virtue of their being endings, assume a certain intensity; 
they demand our attention in the same way that beginnings do. Over 
the course of a novel, as mentioned earlier, we may read with varying 
degrees of avidity, but the conclusion will almost always be read as 
closely as possible, for this is where the final predication of meaning 
occurs, where the narrative circle is closed (one way or the other), and 
where the major hermeneutic and proairetic sequences are typically 
resolved. Even if Barthes is right when he suggests that no one has 
ever read In Search of Lost Time or War and Peace word for word, it would 
be difficult to find someone who had not read their final lines (having 
made it that far) with due diligence. Endings also typically involve a 
shift in register, whereby they assume the kind of semantic resonance 
– often lyrical or contemplative – that we have come to expect from 
‘last words,’ even if what is actually being said at the literal level is 
quite mundane. This is what Viktor Shklovsky describes as a ‘false 
ending’ (56), and it is precisely how Chandra has chosen to bring his 
novel to a close.16 Nothing could be more banal than this description of 
Sartaj arriving at the police headquarters, shining his shoes, carefully 
grooming himself, and then walking inside to ‘beg[in] another day.’ But 
because of the fact that it is situated at the very end of a (947-page) 
narrative, because this is the conclusion we have been pursuing all 
along, each one of these catalytic occurrences takes on a ‘nuclear’ 
quality – and the passage as a whole assumes the kind of semantic 
resonance that Shklovsky associates with the ‘false ending.’ Thus, the 
extraordinary manages, once more, to infiltrate the everyday; and it is 
 16 According to Shklovsky, such endings are ‘usually fashioned from a 
description of nature or the weather,’ but have nothing to do with the 
actual resolution of the narrative. Instead, they provide the illusion of 
closure by offering us a (vaguely metaphorical) description of autumn 
leaves, say, or an ‘indifferent sky’ (56).
Stuplimity
167
entirely appropriate that it should do so, for in contemporary Mumbai it 
has become increasingly difficult to disentangle these two categories.
During the last half-century, as the anthropologist Vyjayanthi Rao 
observes, Bombay has been transformed from a ‘city of risk’ – of 
‘speculation and entrepreneurial spirit’ – to a ‘city at risk,’ one that is 
‘marked by spectacular [as well as] quotidian violence’ (5). The communal 
violence that erupted in 1992–93, following the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid, clearly belongs to the first of these categories, as do the many 
terrorist attacks that have occurred since the so-called Black Friday 
bombings of 1993.17 However, it is also important to acknowledge the 
episodes of ‘routine’ criminality that may not always make it into the 
newspapers: the corruption, the domestic violence, the extrajudicial 
killings (an estimated total of 589 during the years 1993–2003 [Belur 
204]), the burglaries, the kidnappings, and so on. Over the course of 
Sacred Games, as we have noted, Sartaj gradually manages to reconcile 
these antithetical categories and, in doing so, experiences a feeling 
that could be closely aligned with Sianne Ngai’s notion of stuplimity – 
a counter-intuitive, yet immediately recognizable, combination of the 
stupefying and the sublime. This feeling in turn infiltrates the narrative 
itself, so that episodes of ‘nuclear’ intensity (such as the climactic raid 
in Chapter 24) merge with catalytic passages of utter insignificance; 
and purely catalytic sequences (such as the description we are offered 
in the novel’s final lines) are invested with all the intensity, all the 
prestige, and all the danger of the nuclear. For Barthes, if you remember, 
nuclei constitute ‘the risky moments of a narrative,’ the places of 
tension, of potential catastrophe, while catalyzers ‘lay out areas of 
safety’ (‘Introduction’ 266), places where nothing particularly bad can 
happen because nothing of any consequence can happen there at all. 
In Sacred Games, however, this reassuring binary collapses, allowing 
danger to merge with safety, the extraordinary with the mundane, the 
 17 In 2003, for instance, two car bombs exploded in the centre of the city, 
claiming fifty-four lives and injuring 244 people. Three years later, in 
2006, the Mumbai suburban railway system was the target of another 
bombing, this time a series of seven explosions that killed 209 people 
and injured 700. In 2008, in a coordinated assault that was televised 
around the world, ten members of the Pakistani terrorist organization 
Lashkar-e-Taiba subjected the city to four days of shootings and bombings 
that would ultimately kill 164 people (including the chief of the Mumbai 
Anti-Terrorist Squad [ATS]) and injure 308. And most recently, in 2011, a 
series of explosions in three different locations within the city claimed a 
further twenty-eight lives and left 130 people injured.
Affective Disorders
168
spectacular with the boring. And in a narrative of this kind, a narrative 
where there are no longer any ‘areas of safety,’ where the nuclear and 
the catalytic have fused with one another, even an action as banal 
as shining your shoes or grooming yourself can quite easily bring 
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